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The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In the 17th of Tammuz the walls of Jerusalem were breached and on the 9th of Av Jerusalem and the Temple were destroyed. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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== Three Weeks ==<br />
The gemara only begins the practices of mourning in the period following the start of Av and the beginning of the nine days. While the gemara does not record any prohibitions in the period of the three weeks- Talmudic sources still acknowledge the three weeks as a unique time of sadness.<ref>The term “days between the straits” first appears in the Midresh Rabbah on Eichah- (Eikhah Rabbah 1:29) The talmud yerushalmi (Tanit 4.5) records the practice of some women to abstain from meat and wine in the three weeks- the earliest apparent source. Some point out that Sefer Daniel (10:23) describes how Daniel fasted for three weeks upon hearing of the destruction of the Temple. These sources view our practice as an extension of Daniel’s.</ref><br />
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In the centuries following the Talmud, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a variety of mourning customs during the three weeks. Ashkenazi Jews accepted upon themselves a more stringent approach to the period, while different groups of Sephardi Jews accepted different practices depending on their place of origin. <br />
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Ashkenazi Jews prohibit the following practices- which will be explained below in fuller detail<br />
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# Weddings<br />
# Dancing<br />
# Music<br />
# Shaving and Haircuts<br />
# Beracha of Shechiyanu<br />
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Each of these practices seems to have emerged separately- but contemporary poskim have categorized the overall pattern overlaying these mourning customs. These conceptual views have a significant impact on the way these poskim ultimately rule on three week matters.<ref>The most well known of these attempts at conceptualization are in the writing of Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik (found in numerous places- Nefesh HaRav 191, Inyanei Tisha ba'Av p20-21,https://etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/avelut-yeshanah-and-avelut-chadashah) . He argued that all customs must be based off of existing halachic structures. He identified the three weeks as paralleling the halachic structure of mourning the dead. This assumption is well accepted- the Talmud (Yevamot 43b) itself compares mourning for the Temple to mourning for a relative- distinguishing between “Mourning for the Old (the Temple)” and “Mourning for the New (a dead relative).” This seeming parallel is expanded by Rav Soloveitchik in his writing. He argued that each step of the Tisha baV mourning process parallels one step of the mourning for the dead- the parallel being exact. Thus he compared the three weeks to the twelve months of mourning for a parent, the nine days to shloshim, and tisha bav itself to the period of shiva. <br />
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Rav Soloveitchik’s view of the three weeks is innovative in several respects. He joins the period of the three weeks to the talmudic mourning that begins with Av. He assumes that this post talmudic mourning was structured after mourning proper in the same manner as the the rest of the mourning of Tisha bav.<br />
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Rav Solovetichiks’ conceptualization generates a whole series of reinterpretations of the halachot of the three weeks. Rav Soloveitchik argued that the prohibition of dancing should be understood as reference to the festive gatherings prohibited during the twelve months. Thus music by itself is not forbidden to Rav Soloveitchik- rather festive settings. Further, Rav Soloveitchik noted that in the twelve months of mourning a mourner is permitted to shave once he reaches a state of deshevelment- the same halacha should apply during the three weeks. <br />
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There is a serious difficulty in the view that the halachot of the three weeks parallel the halachot of Aveilut exactly- in light with the assumptions of Rav Soloveitchik. The Shulchan Aruch reccoords the practice to refrain from saying the beracha of Shehechiyanu during the three weeks. Yet mourners have no prohibition on saying the beracha of shechiyanu. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra Orach Chaim 551.17) rejected the practice of not reciting shecheyanu for this reason. The Vilna Gaon says “it a tremendous stringency that it should not be more stringent than the mourning on the day of death.”<br />
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Yet the difficulty was already anticipated by the Hilechot Ketanot (2.175). He writes that the practice of not saying shecyani during the the three weeks is because mourning for the dead is different from mourning for the Temple. This answer flies in the face of Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion. <br />
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</ref><br />
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Some understand the mourning practices of the three weeks as having the same level of stringency as that of the nine days.<ref>Eleh Hem Moadai 3. 296-297, 307. This work argues that the three weeks are more stringent than the mourning practices of sefirat hammer since the three weeks extend the overall Talmudic level mourning for the Temple</ref> This opinion sees the minhag of mourning during the three weeks as an expansion of the Talmudic mourning for the Temple. Others see the practices of the three weeks as an add-on to the Talmudic periods of mourning and thereby lacking in stringency. <ref>Minchat Yitzchak 1.111- He derives halachot from the mourning of Omer to the three weeks. He explains that both practices are merely minhagim of mourning and hence comparable. </ref> <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Shechiyanu and Shopping==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks.<ref>The Sefer Chasidim (580) says that one should avoid saying shecheyianu during the three weeks unless the beracha cannot be postponed until the end of the three weeks- this is cited in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 551.17. The Taz (551.17) questioned the overall Sefer Chasidim noting that every case of the beracha of shechiyanu is time-sensitive given the risk that a person will die before the end of the three week<br />
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The Gra rejected the practice since aveilim can make a beracha of shechiyanu and the practices of mourning for the temple are based on the three weeks<br />
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Quoted in mishna berurah (551-98)<br />
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Because of issues with this minhag we make exception for shabbos- taz.<br />
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The Hilchot Ketanot (2.175) defended the practice against an attack similar to that of the Gra. He says that Aveilut for the temple is different than mourning over the dead.<br />
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Others say that shechiyanu is a problem as a reference to time of danger and in the beracha of shechyanu we thank Hashem for bringing us to this simcha (Magen Avraham 551.42)<br />
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Other expand issur of shechiyanu to include buying new clothes as a source of simcha like the elyah rabba ( 551:121)- they explained a wider issur of simcha during this period<br />
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Sharei tzion (551:48) questioned the Elyah Rabba. The Sharei Tzion says that we don’t have a concept of decreasing simcha before rosh chodesh av.<br />
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Rav Shmuel Kaminessky(kovetz halachot bein hametzarim85-86) points out the apparent strangeness of that statement- the three weeks do seem to be about decreasing happiness. It seems that we do decrease happiness. He responds that these prohibitions are not about decreasing happiness but rather showing Aveilut</ref> However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:80, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=126 Nitei Gavriel 17:22], Shaare Teshuvah 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
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===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
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===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
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===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
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===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
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==Weddings==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
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===Engagement===<br />
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#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
<br />
==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
<br />
#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
<br />
==Cutting Hair==<br />
<br />
#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
<br />
===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
<br />
===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
<br />
==Shaving==<br />
<br />
#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
<br />
*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. However, after making Aliyah and discussing the matter with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, [https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/three-weeks-and-nine-days Rav Lichtenstein stopped shaving at all during the three weeks]. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
<br />
==Dancing==<br />
<br />
#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
<br />
==Swimming==<br />
<br />
#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
<br />
==Music and Dancing==<br />
Generally speaking it is prohibited to listen to music during the three weeks.<ref>This statement is usually cited to the Magen Avraham (551.10) who prohibits varies kinds of dancing during the three weeks. He does not mention music. <br />
<br />
Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (Halichot Shlomo Bein Hametzarim 14.3) explains that music is prohibited if it leads to dancing<br />
<br />
Rav Eliyashiv (Ashrei Ish Orach Chaim- 2 p65) argues that the Magen Avraham is not the source of the practice to not listen to music. Instead he asserts that the source for the practice is the opinion found in the gemara that music is prohibited all year round after the destruction of the Temple. The general practice of the Jewish people is to adopt the lenient position and permit music. Rav Eliyashiv asserts that during the period of the three weeks, the Jewish people are strict for this mourning custom of not listening to music that technically speaking should apply year round (Also found in Rav Rimon Sefirat HaOmer 120-121, . This parallels the idea found in the Biur HaGra (551.9) that during the prohibition of meat during the nine days is to make up for the fact that after the destruction of the temple meat should have been entirely forbidden if not for the fact that such a decree would not be accepted. Nevertheless, the Gra states, we use the period of the three weeks to adopt such stringency of mourning that we should have done year round. The Gra therefore explains that the minhagim that prohibit eating meat during the three weeks, but the same explanation holds true for the prohibition of music. <br />
<br />
According to Rav Soloveitchik's approach for the three weeks cited above - the prohibitions during the three weeks parallel the year long mourning for a parent. During that period music proper is not prohibited- rather the prohibition is on participating in festive and social settings- simcha mareiut. Thus to Rav Soloveitchik- a solitary individual is not prohibited from listening to music. </ref>{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
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#<br />
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==Miscellaneous== <br />
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#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
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===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
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===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
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==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
<br />
==Links==<br />
<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
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==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Three_Weeks&diff=34248Three Weeks2025-07-23T14:30:55Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Shechiyanu and Shopping */</p>
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<div>[[Image:Destruction_temple.jpg|200px|right]]<br />
The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In the 17th of Tammuz the walls of Jerusalem were breached and on the 9th of Av Jerusalem and the Temple were destroyed. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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== Three Weeks ==<br />
The gemara only begins the practices of mourning in the period following the start of Av and the beginning of the nine days. While the gemara does not record any prohibitions in the period of the three weeks- Talmudic sources still acknowledge the three weeks as a unique time of sadness.<ref>The term “days between the straits” first appears in the Midresh Rabbah on Eichah- (Eikhah Rabbah 1:29) The talmud yerushalmi (Tanit 4.5) records the practice of some women to abstain from meat and wine in the three weeks- the earliest apparent source. Some point out that Sefer Daniel (10:23) describes how Daniel fasted for three weeks upon hearing of the destruction of the Temple. These sources view our practice as an extension of Daniel’s.</ref><br />
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In the centuries following the Talmud, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a variety of mourning customs during the three weeks. Ashkenazi Jews accepted upon themselves a more stringent approach to the period, while different groups of Sephardi Jews accepted different practices depending on their place of origin. <br />
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Ashkenazi Jews prohibit the following practices- which will be explained below in fuller detail<br />
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# Weddings<br />
# Dancing<br />
# Music<br />
# Shaving and Haircuts<br />
# Beracha of Shechiyanu<br />
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Each of these practices seems to have emerged separately- but contemporary poskim have categorized the overall pattern overlaying these mourning customs. These conceptual views have a significant impact on the way these poskim ultimately rule on three week matters.<ref>The most well known of these attempts at conceptualization are in the writing of Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik (found in numerous places- Nefesh HaRav 191, Inyanei Tisha ba'Av p20-21,https://etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/avelut-yeshanah-and-avelut-chadashah) . He argued that all customs must be based off of existing halachic structures. He identified the three weeks as paralleling the halachic structure of mourning the dead. This assumption is well accepted- the Talmud (Yevamot 43b) itself compares mourning for the Temple to mourning for a relative- distinguishing between “Mourning for the Old (the Temple)” and “Mourning for the New (a dead relative).” This seeming parallel is expanded by Rav Soloveitchik in his writing. He argued that each step of the Tisha baV mourning process parallels one step of the mourning for the dead- the parallel being exact. Thus he compared the three weeks to the twelve months of mourning for a parent, the nine days to shloshim, and tisha bav itself to the period of shiva. <br />
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Rav Soloveitchik’s view of the three weeks is innovative in several respects. He joins the period of the three weeks to the talmudic mourning that begins with Av. He assumes that this post talmudic mourning was structured after mourning proper in the same manner as the the rest of the mourning of Tisha bav.<br />
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Rav Solovetichiks’ conceptualization generates a whole series of reinterpretations of the halachot of the three weeks. Rav Soloveitchik argued that the prohibition of dancing should be understood as reference to the festive gatherings prohibited during the twelve months. Thus music by itself is not forbidden to Rav Soloveitchik- rather festive settings. Further, Rav Soloveitchik noted that in the twelve months of mourning a mourner is permitted to shave once he reaches a state of deshevelment- the same halacha should apply during the three weeks. <br />
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There is a serious difficulty in the view that the halachot of the three weeks parallel the halachot of Aveilut exactly- in light with the assumptions of Rav Soloveitchik. The Shulchan Aruch reccoords the practice to refrain from saying the beracha of Shehechiyanu during the three weeks. Yet mourners have no prohibition on saying the beracha of shechiyanu. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra Orach Chaim 551.17) rejected the practice of not reciting shecheyanu for this reason. The Vilna Gaon says “it a tremendous stringency that it should not be more stringent than the mourning on the day of death.”<br />
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Yet the difficulty was already anticipated by the Hilechot Ketanot (2.175). He writes that the practice of not saying shecyani during the the three weeks is because mourning for the dead is different from mourning for the Temple. This answer flies in the face of Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion. <br />
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</ref><br />
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Some understand the mourning practices of the three weeks as having the same level of stringency as that of the nine days.<ref>Eleh Hem Moadai 3. 296-297, 307. This work argues that the three weeks are more stringent than the mourning practices of sefirat hammer since the three weeks extend the overall Talmudic level mourning for the Temple</ref> This opinion sees the minhag of mourning during the three weeks as an expansion of the Talmudic mourning for the Temple. Others see the practices of the three weeks as an add-on to the Talmudic periods of mourning and thereby lacking in stringency. <ref>Minchat Yitzchak 1.111- He derives halachot from the mourning of Omer to the three weeks. He explains that both practices are merely minhagim of mourning and hence comparable. </ref> <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Shechiyanu and Shopping==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks.<ref>The Sefer Chasidim (580) says that one should avoid saying shecheyianu during the three weeks unless the beracha cannot be postponed until the end of the three weeks- this is cited in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 551.17. The Taz (551.17) questioned the overall Sefer Chasidim noting that every case of the beracha of shechiyanu is time-sensitive given the risk that a person will die before the end of the three week<br />
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The Gra rejected the practice since aveilim can make a beracha of shechiyanu and the practices of mourning for the temple are based on the three weeks<br />
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Quoted in mishna berurah (551-98)<br />
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Because of issues with this minhag we make exception for shabbos- taz.<br />
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The Hilchot Ketanot (2.175) defended the practice against an attack similar to that of the Gra. He says that Aveilut for the temple is different than mourning over the dead.<br />
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Others say that shechiyanu is a problem as a reference to time of danger and in the beracha of shechyanu we thank Hashem for bringing us to this simcha (Magen Avraham 551.42)<br />
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Other expand issur of shechiyanu to include buying new clothes as a source of simcha like the elyah rabba ( 551:121)- they explained a wider issur of simcha during this period<br />
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Sharei tzion (551:48) questioned the Elyah Rabba. The Sharei Tzion says that we don’t have a concept of decreasing simcha before rosh chodesh av.<br />
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Rav Shmuel Kaminessky(kovetz halachot bein hametzarim85-86) points out the apparent strangeness of that statement- the three weeks do seem to be about decreasing happiness. It seems that we do decrease happiness. He responds that these prohibitions are not about decreasing happiness but rather showing Aveilut</ref> However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:80, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=126 Nitei Gavriel 17:22], Shaare Teshuvah 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
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===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
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===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
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===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
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===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
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==Weddings==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
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===Engagement===<br />
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#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
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==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
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#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
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==Cutting Hair==<br />
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#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
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===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
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===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
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==Shaving==<br />
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#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
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*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. However, after making Aliyah and discussing the matter with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, [https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/three-weeks-and-nine-days Rav Lichtenstein stopped shaving at all during the three weeks]. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
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==Dancing==<br />
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#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
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==Swimming==<br />
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#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
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==Listening to Music==<br />
{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
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#<br />
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==Miscellaneous== <br />
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#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
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===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
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===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
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==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
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==Links==<br />
<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
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==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Three_Weeks&diff=34247Three Weeks2025-07-23T14:15:27Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Three Weeks */</p>
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<div>[[Image:Destruction_temple.jpg|200px|right]]<br />
The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In the 17th of Tammuz the walls of Jerusalem were breached and on the 9th of Av Jerusalem and the Temple were destroyed. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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== Three Weeks ==<br />
The gemara only begins the practices of mourning in the period following the start of Av and the beginning of the nine days. While the gemara does not record any prohibitions in the period of the three weeks- Talmudic sources still acknowledge the three weeks as a unique time of sadness.<ref>The term “days between the straits” first appears in the Midresh Rabbah on Eichah- (Eikhah Rabbah 1:29) The talmud yerushalmi (Tanit 4.5) records the practice of some women to abstain from meat and wine in the three weeks- the earliest apparent source. Some point out that Sefer Daniel (10:23) describes how Daniel fasted for three weeks upon hearing of the destruction of the Temple. These sources view our practice as an extension of Daniel’s.</ref><br />
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In the centuries following the Talmud, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a variety of mourning customs during the three weeks. Ashkenazi Jews accepted upon themselves a more stringent approach to the period, while different groups of Sephardi Jews accepted different practices depending on their place of origin. <br />
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Ashkenazi Jews prohibit the following practices- which will be explained below in fuller detail<br />
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# Weddings<br />
# Dancing<br />
# Music<br />
# Shaving and Haircuts<br />
# Beracha of Shechiyanu<br />
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Each of these practices seems to have emerged separately- but contemporary poskim have categorized the overall pattern overlaying these mourning customs. These conceptual views have a significant impact on the way these poskim ultimately rule on three week matters.<ref>The most well known of these attempts at conceptualization are in the writing of Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik (found in numerous places- Nefesh HaRav 191, Inyanei Tisha ba'Av p20-21,https://etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/avelut-yeshanah-and-avelut-chadashah) . He argued that all customs must be based off of existing halachic structures. He identified the three weeks as paralleling the halachic structure of mourning the dead. This assumption is well accepted- the Talmud (Yevamot 43b) itself compares mourning for the Temple to mourning for a relative- distinguishing between “Mourning for the Old (the Temple)” and “Mourning for the New (a dead relative).” This seeming parallel is expanded by Rav Soloveitchik in his writing. He argued that each step of the Tisha baV mourning process parallels one step of the mourning for the dead- the parallel being exact. Thus he compared the three weeks to the twelve months of mourning for a parent, the nine days to shloshim, and tisha bav itself to the period of shiva. <br />
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Rav Soloveitchik’s view of the three weeks is innovative in several respects. He joins the period of the three weeks to the talmudic mourning that begins with Av. He assumes that this post talmudic mourning was structured after mourning proper in the same manner as the the rest of the mourning of Tisha bav.<br />
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Rav Solovetichiks’ conceptualization generates a whole series of reinterpretations of the halachot of the three weeks. Rav Soloveitchik argued that the prohibition of dancing should be understood as reference to the festive gatherings prohibited during the twelve months. Thus music by itself is not forbidden to Rav Soloveitchik- rather festive settings. Further, Rav Soloveitchik noted that in the twelve months of mourning a mourner is permitted to shave once he reaches a state of deshevelment- the same halacha should apply during the three weeks. <br />
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There is a serious difficulty in the view that the halachot of the three weeks parallel the halachot of Aveilut exactly- in light with the assumptions of Rav Soloveitchik. The Shulchan Aruch reccoords the practice to refrain from saying the beracha of Shehechiyanu during the three weeks. Yet mourners have no prohibition on saying the beracha of shechiyanu. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra Orach Chaim 551.17) rejected the practice of not reciting shecheyanu for this reason. The Vilna Gaon says “it a tremendous stringency that it should not be more stringent than the mourning on the day of death.”<br />
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Yet the difficulty was already anticipated by the Hilechot Ketanot (2.175). He writes that the practice of not saying shecyani during the the three weeks is because mourning for the dead is different from mourning for the Temple. This answer flies in the face of Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion. <br />
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</ref><br />
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Some understand the mourning practices of the three weeks as having the same level of stringency as that of the nine days.<ref>Eleh Hem Moadai 3. 296-297, 307. This work argues that the three weeks are more stringent than the mourning practices of sefirat hammer since the three weeks extend the overall Talmudic level mourning for the Temple</ref> This opinion sees the minhag of mourning during the three weeks as an expansion of the Talmudic mourning for the Temple. Others see the practices of the three weeks as an add-on to the Talmudic periods of mourning and thereby lacking in stringency. <ref>Minchat Yitzchak 1.111- He derives halachot from the mourning of Omer to the three weeks. He explains that both practices are merely minhagim of mourning and hence comparable. </ref> <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Shechiyanu and Shopping==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
#<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:80, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=126 Nitei Gavriel 17:22], Shaare Teshuvah 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
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===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
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===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
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===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
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===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
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==Weddings==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
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===Engagement===<br />
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#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
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==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
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#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
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==Cutting Hair==<br />
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#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
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===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
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===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
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==Shaving==<br />
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#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
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*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. However, after making Aliyah and discussing the matter with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, [https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/three-weeks-and-nine-days Rav Lichtenstein stopped shaving at all during the three weeks]. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
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==Dancing==<br />
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#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
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==Swimming==<br />
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#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
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==Listening to Music==<br />
{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
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#<br />
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==Miscellaneous== <br />
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#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
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===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
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===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
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==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
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==Links==<br />
<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
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==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Three_Weeks&diff=34246Three Weeks2025-07-23T14:01:38Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Meat, Wine, and Laundry */ bit redudant compared to nine days article</p>
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<div>[[Image:Destruction_temple.jpg|200px|right]]<br />
The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In the 17th of Tammuz the walls of Jerusalem were breached and on the 9th of Av Jerusalem and the Temple were destroyed. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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== Three Weeks ==<br />
The gemara only begins the practices of mourning in the period following the start of Av and the beginning of the nine days. While the gemara does not record any prohibitions in the period of the three weeks- Talmudic sources still acknowledge the three weeks as a unique time of sadness.<ref>The term “days between the straits” first appears in the Midresh Rabbah on Eichah- (Eikhah Rabbah 1:29) The talmud yerushalmi (Tanit 4.5) records the practice of some women to abstain from meat and wine in the three weeks- the earliest apparent source. Some point out that Sefer Daniel (10:23) describes how Daniel fasted for three weeks upon hearing of the destruction of the Temple. These sources view our practice as an extension of Daniel’s.</ref><br />
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In the centuries following the Talmud, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a variety of mourning customs during the three weeks. Ashkenazi Jews accepted upon themselves a more stringent approach to the period, while different groups of Sephardi Jews accepted different practices depending on their place of origin. <br />
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Ashkenazi Jews prohibit the following practices- which will be explained below in fuller detail<br />
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# Weddings<br />
# Dancing<br />
# Music<br />
# Shaving and Haircuts<br />
# Beracha of Shechiyanu<br />
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Each of these practices seems to have emerged separately- but contemporary poskim have categorized the overall pattern overlaying these mourning customs. These conceptual views have a significant impact on the way these poskim ultimately rule on three week matters.<ref>The most well known of these attempts at conceptualization are in the writing of Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik (found in numerous places- Nefesh HaRav 191, Inyanei Tisha ba'Av p20-21,https://etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/avelut-yeshanah-and-avelut-chadashah) . He argued that all customs must be based off of existing halachic structures. He identified the three weeks as paralleling the halachic structure of mourning the dead. This assumption is well accepted- the Talmud (Yevamot 43b) itself compares mourning for the Temple to mourning for a relative- distinguishing between “Mourning for the Old (the Temple)” and “Mourning for the New (a dead relative).” This seeming parallel is expanded by Rav Soloveitchik in his writing. He argued that each step of the Tisha baV mourning process parallels one step of the mourning for the dead- the parallel being exact. Thus he compared the three weeks to the twelve months of mourning for a parent, the nine days to shloshim, and tisha bav itself to the period of shiva. <br />
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Rav Soloveitchik’s view of the three weeks is innovative in several respects. He joins the period of the three weeks to the talmudic mourning that begins with Av. He assumes that this post talmudic mourning was structured after mourning proper in the same manner as the the rest of the mourning of Tisha bav.<br />
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Rav Solovetichiks’ conceptualization generates a whole series of reinterpretations of the halachot of the three weeks. Rav Soloveitchik argued that the prohibition of dancing should be understood as reference to the festive gatherings prohibited during the twelve months. Thus music by itself is not forbidden to Rav Soloveitchik- rather festive settings. Further, Rav Soloveitchik noted that in the twelve months of mourning a mourner is permitted to shave once he reaches a state of deshevelment- the same halacha should apply during the three weeks. <br />
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There is a serious difficulty in the view that the halachot of the three weeks parallel the halachot of Aveilut exactly- in light with the assumptions of Rav Soloveitchik. The Shulchan Aruch reccoords the practice to refrain from saying the beracha of Shehechiyanu during the three weeks. Yet mourners have no prohibition on saying the beracha of shechiyanu. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra Orach Chaim 551.17) rejected the practice of not reciting shecheyanu for this reason. The Vilna Gaon says “it a tremendous stringency that it should not be more stringent than the mourning on the day of death.”<br />
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Yet the difficulty was already anticipated by the Hilechot Ketanot (2.175). He writes that the practice of not saying shecyani during the the three weeks is because mourning for the dead is different from mourning for the Temple. This answer flies in the face of Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion. <br />
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</ref> <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Eating a New Fruit and Buying New Clothing==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:80, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=126 Nitei Gavriel 17:22], Shaare Teshuvah 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
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===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
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===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
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===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
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===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
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==Weddings==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
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===Engagement===<br />
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#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
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==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
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#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
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==Cutting Hair==<br />
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#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
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===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
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===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
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==Shaving==<br />
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#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
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*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. However, after making Aliyah and discussing the matter with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, [https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/three-weeks-and-nine-days Rav Lichtenstein stopped shaving at all during the three weeks]. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
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==Dancing==<br />
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#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
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==Swimming==<br />
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#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
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==Listening to Music==<br />
{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
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#<br />
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==Miscellaneous== <br />
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#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
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===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
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===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
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==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
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==Links==<br />
<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
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==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Three_Weeks&diff=34245Three Weeks2025-07-23T13:59:37Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Question and Answers */ didn't fit wider pattern of page</p>
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The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In the 17th of Tammuz the walls of Jerusalem were breached and on the 9th of Av Jerusalem and the Temple were destroyed. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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== Three Weeks ==<br />
The gemara only begins the practices of mourning in the period following the start of Av and the beginning of the nine days. While the gemara does not record any prohibitions in the period of the three weeks- Talmudic sources still acknowledge the three weeks as a unique time of sadness.<ref>The term “days between the straits” first appears in the Midresh Rabbah on Eichah- (Eikhah Rabbah 1:29) The talmud yerushalmi (Tanit 4.5) records the practice of some women to abstain from meat and wine in the three weeks- the earliest apparent source. Some point out that Sefer Daniel (10:23) describes how Daniel fasted for three weeks upon hearing of the destruction of the Temple. These sources view our practice as an extension of Daniel’s.</ref><br />
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In the centuries following the Talmud, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a variety of mourning customs during the three weeks. Ashkenazi Jews accepted upon themselves a more stringent approach to the period, while different groups of Sephardi Jews accepted different practices depending on their place of origin. <br />
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Ashkenazi Jews prohibit the following practices- which will be explained below in fuller detail<br />
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# Weddings<br />
# Dancing<br />
# Music<br />
# Shaving and Haircuts<br />
# Beracha of Shechiyanu<br />
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Each of these practices seems to have emerged separately- but contemporary poskim have categorized the overall pattern overlaying these mourning customs. These conceptual views have a significant impact on the way these poskim ultimately rule on three week matters.<ref>The most well known of these attempts at conceptualization are in the writing of Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik (found in numerous places- Nefesh HaRav 191, Inyanei Tisha ba'Av p20-21,https://etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/avelut-yeshanah-and-avelut-chadashah) . He argued that all customs must be based off of existing halachic structures. He identified the three weeks as paralleling the halachic structure of mourning the dead. This assumption is well accepted- the Talmud (Yevamot 43b) itself compares mourning for the Temple to mourning for a relative- distinguishing between “Mourning for the Old (the Temple)” and “Mourning for the New (a dead relative).” This seeming parallel is expanded by Rav Soloveitchik in his writing. He argued that each step of the Tisha baV mourning process parallels one step of the mourning for the dead- the parallel being exact. Thus he compared the three weeks to the twelve months of mourning for a parent, the nine days to shloshim, and tisha bav itself to the period of shiva. <br />
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Rav Soloveitchik’s view of the three weeks is innovative in several respects. He joins the period of the three weeks to the talmudic mourning that begins with Av. He assumes that this post talmudic mourning was structured after mourning proper in the same manner as the the rest of the mourning of Tisha bav.<br />
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Rav Solovetichiks’ conceptualization generates a whole series of reinterpretations of the halachot of the three weeks. Rav Soloveitchik argued that the prohibition of dancing should be understood as reference to the festive gatherings prohibited during the twelve months. Thus music by itself is not forbidden to Rav Soloveitchik- rather festive settings. Further, Rav Soloveitchik noted that in the twelve months of mourning a mourner is permitted to shave once he reaches a state of deshevelment- the same halacha should apply during the three weeks. <br />
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There is a serious difficulty in the view that the halachot of the three weeks parallel the halachot of Aveilut exactly- in light with the assumptions of Rav Soloveitchik. The Shulchan Aruch reccoords the practice to refrain from saying the beracha of Shehechiyanu during the three weeks. Yet mourners have no prohibition on saying the beracha of shechiyanu. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra Orach Chaim 551.17) rejected the practice of not reciting shecheyanu for this reason. The Vilna Gaon says “it a tremendous stringency that it should not be more stringent than the mourning on the day of death.”<br />
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Yet the difficulty was already anticipated by the Hilechot Ketanot (2.175). He writes that the practice of not saying shecyani during the the three weeks is because mourning for the dead is different from mourning for the Temple. This answer flies in the face of Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion. <br />
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</ref> <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Eating a New Fruit and Buying New Clothing==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:80, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=126 Nitei Gavriel 17:22], Shaare Teshuvah 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
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===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
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===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
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===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
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===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
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==Weddings==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
<br />
===Engagement===<br />
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#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
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==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
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#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
<br />
==Cutting Hair==<br />
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#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
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===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
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===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
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==Shaving==<br />
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#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
<br />
*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. However, after making Aliyah and discussing the matter with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, [https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/three-weeks-and-nine-days Rav Lichtenstein stopped shaving at all during the three weeks]. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
<br />
==Dancing==<br />
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#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
<br />
==Swimming==<br />
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#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
<br />
==Bathing and Showering==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to bathe or shower for all Nine Days even in cold water. The Sephardic custom is only to refrain from a warm bath or shower for the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rambam Hilchot Taaniot 5:6 writes that the custom is not to bathe or shower in warm water the week of Tisha BeAv. Mordechai Taanit 639, however, writes that it begins from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. Both opinions are quoted in Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:16. Rama 551:16 writes that Ashkenazim begin this practice from Rosh Chodesh Av. Mishna Brurah 551:94 agrees. For Sephardim, Kaf Hachayim 551:186 writes that a person should follow the custom of the place where you are living. Yechave Daat 1:38 holds that the Sephardic custom is that one is permitted to shower in cold water throughout. Also, the Sephardic custom is only to stop using hot water for the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].</ref> <br />
#For [[Shabbat Chazon]], Ashkenazim hold that it is forbidden to bathe or shower one's whole body even in cold water. It is permitted to wash one's face, hands, feet, and hair if one usually cleans that for Shabbat.<Ref>Rama 551:16, Mishna Brurah 551:94</ref> Sephardic poskim permit washing the whole body with hot water for Shabbat Chazon.<ref>Yechave Daat 1:38 </ref><br />
#Many poskim hold that it is permitted to bathe or shower during the Nine Days if the purpose is to remove dirt or sweat.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:37. Dirshu 551:109 quotes this same point from Rav Chaim Zonenfeld and Rav Moshe Feinstein. However, they also quote Rav Chaim Kanievsky who held that it is forbidden to take a full body shower during the Nine Days even to remove sweat. Also, Rav Elyashiv only permitted showering during the Nine Days for someone who showered every day even during the winter.</ref><br />
#Men who have the custom to use the mikveh daily can continue to use a cold mikveh during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] , even according to the custom that people wouldn't swim or shower.<ref>Kaf Hachayim 551:190, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 16, Yechave Daat 1:38 </ref><br />
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==Listening to Music==<br />
{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
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==Meat, Wine, and Laundry==<br />
#Although there is a practice that a minority of people have not to have meat and wine all of the Three Weeks, most only refrain from it for the Nine Days. The details are found on the [[Nine_Days#Eating_Meat_and_Drinking_Wine]] page.<br />
#Laundry is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]]. See that page for details.<br />
#Cutting nails is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]].<br />
#Building and planting is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]].<br />
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==Miscellaneous== <br />
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#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Court Cases===<br />
#If a Jew has to have a lawsuit with a non-Jew, he should avoid having it with him in Av, as this is a time of ill fortune for a Jew.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:1, Taanit 29b. Mishna Brurah 551:2 based on the Magen Avraham 551:2 says that this applies throughout the month of av until [[rosh chodesh]] [[elul]], but at the minimum until [[Tisha BeAv]]. This is the ruling of the Chayei Adam 133:9, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:7. Ben Ish Chai Devarim Halacha 1 says one should preferably wait until the fifteenth of av but really one has to wait until the tenth. </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
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===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
#If possible, one should avoid flying on an airplane during the Nine Days.<ref>Halichot Shlomo 14:24</ref><br />
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===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
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==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
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==Links==<br />
<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
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==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Three_Weeks&diff=34244Three Weeks2025-07-23T13:58:29Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
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<div>[[Image:Destruction_temple.jpg|200px|right]]<br />
The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In the 17th of Tammuz the walls of Jerusalem were breached and on the 9th of Av Jerusalem and the Temple were destroyed. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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== Three Weeks ==<br />
The gemara only begins the practices of mourning in the period following the start of Av and the beginning of the nine days. While the gemara does not record any prohibitions in the period of the three weeks- Talmudic sources still acknowledge the three weeks as a unique time of sadness.<ref>The term “days between the straits” first appears in the Midresh Rabbah on Eichah- (Eikhah Rabbah 1:29) The talmud yerushalmi (Tanit 4.5) records the practice of some women to abstain from meat and wine in the three weeks- the earliest apparent source. Some point out that Sefer Daniel (10:23) describes how Daniel fasted for three weeks upon hearing of the destruction of the Temple. These sources view our practice as an extension of Daniel’s.</ref><br />
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In the centuries following the Talmud, the Jewish people accepted upon themselves a variety of mourning customs during the three weeks. Ashkenazi Jews accepted upon themselves a more stringent approach to the period, while different groups of Sephardi Jews accepted different practices depending on their place of origin. <br />
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Ashkenazi Jews prohibit the following practices- which will be explained below in fuller detail<br />
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# Weddings<br />
# Dancing<br />
# Music<br />
# Shaving and Haircuts<br />
# Beracha of Shechiyanu<br />
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Each of these practices seems to have emerged separately- but contemporary poskim have categorized the overall pattern overlaying these mourning customs. These conceptual views have a significant impact on the way these poskim ultimately rule on three week matters.<ref>The most well known of these attempts at conceptualization are in the writing of Rav Yosef Ber Soloveitchik (found in numerous places- Nefesh HaRav 191, Inyanei Tisha ba'Av p20-21,https://etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/avelut-yeshanah-and-avelut-chadashah) . He argued that all customs must be based off of existing halachic structures. He identified the three weeks as paralleling the halachic structure of mourning the dead. This assumption is well accepted- the Talmud (Yevamot 43b) itself compares mourning for the Temple to mourning for a relative- distinguishing between “Mourning for the Old (the Temple)” and “Mourning for the New (a dead relative).” This seeming parallel is expanded by Rav Soloveitchik in his writing. He argued that each step of the Tisha baV mourning process parallels one step of the mourning for the dead- the parallel being exact. Thus he compared the three weeks to the twelve months of mourning for a parent, the nine days to shloshim, and tisha bav itself to the period of shiva. <br />
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Rav Soloveitchik’s view of the three weeks is innovative in several respects. He joins the period of the three weeks to the talmudic mourning that begins with Av. He assumes that this post talmudic mourning was structured after mourning proper in the same manner as the the rest of the mourning of Tisha bav.<br />
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Rav Solovetichiks’ conceptualization generates a whole series of reinterpretations of the halachot of the three weeks. Rav Soloveitchik argued that the prohibition of dancing should be understood as reference to the festive gatherings prohibited during the twelve months. Thus music by itself is not forbidden to Rav Soloveitchik- rather festive settings. Further, Rav Soloveitchik noted that in the twelve months of mourning a mourner is permitted to shave once he reaches a state of deshevelment- the same halacha should apply during the three weeks. <br />
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There is a serious difficulty in the view that the halachot of the three weeks parallel the halachot of Aveilut exactly- in light with the assumptions of Rav Soloveitchik. The Shulchan Aruch reccoords the practice to refrain from saying the beracha of Shehechiyanu during the three weeks. Yet mourners have no prohibition on saying the beracha of shechiyanu. The Vilna Gaon (Biur HaGra Orach Chaim 551.17) rejected the practice of not reciting shecheyanu for this reason. The Vilna Gaon says “it a tremendous stringency that it should not be more stringent than the mourning on the day of death.”<br />
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Yet the difficulty was already anticipated by the Hilechot Ketanot (2.175). He writes that the practice of not saying shecyani during the the three weeks is because mourning for the dead is different from mourning for the Temple. This answer flies in the face of Rav Soloveitchik’s opinion. <br />
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</ref> <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Eating a New Fruit and Buying New Clothing==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:80, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=126 Nitei Gavriel 17:22], Shaare Teshuvah 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
<br />
===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
<br />
===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
<br />
===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
<br />
===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
<br />
==Weddings==<br />
<br />
#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
<br />
===Engagement===<br />
<br />
#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
<br />
==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
<br />
#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
<br />
==Cutting Hair==<br />
<br />
#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
<br />
===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
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===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
<br />
==Shaving==<br />
<br />
#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
<br />
*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. However, after making Aliyah and discussing the matter with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, [https://www.etzion.org.il/en/holidays/three-weeks/three-weeks-and-nine-days Rav Lichtenstein stopped shaving at all during the three weeks]. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
<br />
==Dancing==<br />
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#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
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==Swimming==<br />
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#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
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==Bathing and Showering==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to bathe or shower for all Nine Days even in cold water. The Sephardic custom is only to refrain from a warm bath or shower for the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rambam Hilchot Taaniot 5:6 writes that the custom is not to bathe or shower in warm water the week of Tisha BeAv. Mordechai Taanit 639, however, writes that it begins from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. Both opinions are quoted in Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:16. Rama 551:16 writes that Ashkenazim begin this practice from Rosh Chodesh Av. Mishna Brurah 551:94 agrees. For Sephardim, Kaf Hachayim 551:186 writes that a person should follow the custom of the place where you are living. Yechave Daat 1:38 holds that the Sephardic custom is that one is permitted to shower in cold water throughout. Also, the Sephardic custom is only to stop using hot water for the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].</ref> <br />
#For [[Shabbat Chazon]], Ashkenazim hold that it is forbidden to bathe or shower one's whole body even in cold water. It is permitted to wash one's face, hands, feet, and hair if one usually cleans that for Shabbat.<Ref>Rama 551:16, Mishna Brurah 551:94</ref> Sephardic poskim permit washing the whole body with hot water for Shabbat Chazon.<ref>Yechave Daat 1:38 </ref><br />
#Many poskim hold that it is permitted to bathe or shower during the Nine Days if the purpose is to remove dirt or sweat.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:37. Dirshu 551:109 quotes this same point from Rav Chaim Zonenfeld and Rav Moshe Feinstein. However, they also quote Rav Chaim Kanievsky who held that it is forbidden to take a full body shower during the Nine Days even to remove sweat. Also, Rav Elyashiv only permitted showering during the Nine Days for someone who showered every day even during the winter.</ref><br />
#Men who have the custom to use the mikveh daily can continue to use a cold mikveh during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] , even according to the custom that people wouldn't swim or shower.<ref>Kaf Hachayim 551:190, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 16, Yechave Daat 1:38 </ref><br />
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==Listening to Music==<br />
{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
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==Meat, Wine, and Laundry==<br />
#Although there is a practice that a minority of people have not to have meat and wine all of the Three Weeks, most only refrain from it for the Nine Days. The details are found on the [[Nine_Days#Eating_Meat_and_Drinking_Wine]] page.<br />
#Laundry is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]]. See that page for details.<br />
#Cutting nails is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]].<br />
#Building and planting is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]].<br />
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==Miscellaneous== <br />
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#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Court Cases===<br />
#If a Jew has to have a lawsuit with a non-Jew, he should avoid having it with him in Av, as this is a time of ill fortune for a Jew.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:1, Taanit 29b. Mishna Brurah 551:2 based on the Magen Avraham 551:2 says that this applies throughout the month of av until [[rosh chodesh]] [[elul]], but at the minimum until [[Tisha BeAv]]. This is the ruling of the Chayei Adam 133:9, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:7. Ben Ish Chai Devarim Halacha 1 says one should preferably wait until the fifteenth of av but really one has to wait until the tenth. </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
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===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
#If possible, one should avoid flying on an airplane during the Nine Days.<ref>Halichot Shlomo 14:24</ref><br />
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===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
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==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
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==Question and Answers==<br />
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#Is it permissible to shave during the 3 weeks for Kavod [[Shabbos]]? [[#shavingforkavodshabbos| See above]]<br />
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==Links==<br />
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*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
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==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Three_Weeks&diff=34196Three Weeks2025-07-09T20:17:18Z<p>Maharikorkus: modified introduction</p>
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<div>[[Image:Destruction_temple.jpg|200px|right]]<br />
The Three Weeks or Yamei Bein Hametzarim (literally the days between the straits are a period of [[mourning]] from the fast of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] until [[Tisha BeAv]], when the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed. During this time, Jews observe a number of practices, such as refraining from getting married, listening to music, cutting their hair, and wearing new clothes. The [[Nine Days]], which begin on [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, are a more stringent period of mourning, during which additional practices are observed.<br />
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The Three Weeks consist of separate periods that fall between the three weeks behind shiva asar betaumaz until Tisha BeAv. In each period, the level of restriction increases until reaching a peak with Tisha BeAv. Each period of time consists of additional stringency on top of the prior. <br />
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The first period, which is also known as the three weeks, spans the time between Shiva asar BeTamuz until Rosh Chodesh Av (although technically speaking the term three weeks subsume the entire time between Shiva asar betamuz until Tisha Bav). From Rosh Chodesh Av to Tisha Bav is known as the nine days. The week in which Tisha beAv falls is termed "shvua shechal bo" (the week it takes place) and it has its own stringency in different traditions. <br />
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==When do the Three Weeks begin?==<br />
#Many authorities hold that the practices of [[mourning]] begin from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] (before the fast actually begins).<ref><br />
*The Chida in Sh"t Chaim Sha’al 1:24 writes that one may not make [[shehechiyanu]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Kaf Hachaim 551:207 agrees. Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 maintains that the one may not make a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and bases it on the ruling of the Chida not to say [[shehechiyanu]] from the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. He add that according to some achronim the night of the 17th of tammuz is as strict as the [[Nine Days]]. In regards to weddings the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]], Eshel Avraham Mebutchatch OC 551, Nitei Gavriel (Bein HaMetzarim, vol 1, 14:5), Halichot Shlomo (Moadim vol 2, 18:5), and Rabbi Soloveitchik (cited by Rabbi Hershel Schachter in Nefesh Harav page 196) agree. Orchot Rabbeinu (vol 2, pg 127) quotes the Steipler about not taking a haircut the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. See also Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh UMashkeh pg 207-208), Divrei Moshe 1:33, [[Shevet Halevi]] 8:168:7 and 10:81:2, Moadim Uzmanim 8:338, and Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) who agree with this approach.</ref> On the other hand, there are authorities who are lenient in cases of great need, and permit the practices of mourning on the night of Shiva Asar BeTamuz. <ref>*Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, 3:100 (at the end), and 4:112(2), is lenient about this issue in cases of great need (such as performing a wedding on Motzei [[Shabbat]] the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]). Igrot Moshe 3:100 adds that since saying [[shehechiyanu]] is a dispute there's no need to be strict not to say it the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Igrot Moshe 4:112(2) writes that for great need one can be lenient to cut one's hair the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:1 agrees. Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 writes that later Rav Moshe was asked about performing a wedding the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and he advised doing the Chupah before [[Shekiyah]]. Rav Elyashiv (cited by Doleh U’mashke pg 208 note 557) says that in a pressing situation one can be lenient.</ref> <br />
#If [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] falls out on [[Shabbat]] and is pushed off to Sunday, then everyone agrees that the practices of [[mourning]] apply the night of the fast (Motzei Shabbat) as some of them already apply on Shabbat.<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 1:168, and 3:100 </ref><br />
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==Eating a New Fruit and Buying New Clothing==<br />
===Shehechiyanu===<br />
# One should refrain from making a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. However, if one needs to perform a [[Pidyon Haben|Pidyon HaBen]]<ref>Maamar Mordechai 551:16 adds that Sefardim who have the minhag of reciting [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, would say it during the Three Weeks. The reason that Shulchan Aruch didn't mention this explicitly, is because Ashkenazim don't have the practice of saying [[shehechiyanu]] at a Milah, and the Mechaber chose an example that is relevant for everybody. </ref>, then [[shehechiyanu]] is recited, and the mitzvah should not be delayed until after the Three Weeks<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17, based on Maharil 31 and Sefer Chasidim 840, writes that one should refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. The Magen Avraham 551:42 notes that the reason for this halacha is not because this is a time of mourning, as it's permitted for a mourner to recite [[shehechiyanu]] (as per Berachot 59b). Instead, he explains that the reason not to make [[shehechiyanu]] is since this is a period in which Klal Yisrael was punished, it's improper to recite a beracha thanking Hashem for allowing us to survive until this time. However, the Gra s.v. tov, rejects Magen Avraham's explanation, and believes that not reciting [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks is an extra chumra, as it should be no different from a mourner who may say [[shehechiyanu]]. The Taz 551:17 agrees to be lenient based on the concern that one might pass away during the Three Weeks, and miss out on the chance to say [[shehechiyanu]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one shouldn’t be lenient except on [[Shabbat]]. Yalkut Yosef 551:12 rules like Shulchan Aruch that one should refrain from making [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. </ref>. Similarly, if there is a fruit that won't be available after the Three Weeks, one is permitted to make a [[shehechiyanu]] and eat it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rema ibid</ref><br />
#One shouldn’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, if there is a great need, there’s what to rely on.<ref>Sh”t Sh”t Chaim Shal 1:24, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, Sdei Chemed 5:page 277, Beiur Halacha 551:2 and Ikrei HaDaat O”C 27:9 write that one shouldn’t say [[shehechiyanu]] on the night of [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]]. However, Nechamat Yisrael (pg 40) permits in case of great need based on Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 1:168 (so is explicit in Sh”t Igrot Moshe O”C 3:100) and Mishnat Yacov (pg 168) permits [[shehechiyanu]] at night even without any need. </ref><br />
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===Wearing New Clothing or Eating New Fruit===<br />
#During the Three Weeks, one should not wear any new clothing nor eat a new fruit which would obligate one to make a [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:17 writes that it is good not to make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. <br />
*The Sh"t Maharil 15 writes that one shouldn't make a [[shehechiyanu]] on a new fruit or new clothing during the Three Weeks. Shulchan Aruch 551:17 codifies this as halacha saying that it is good not to say [[shehechiyanu]] during the Three Weeks. <br />
* Bach 551 (at the end) agrees and writes should avoid getting into situations that would obligate reciting shehechiyanu; that is, eating a new fruit, buying or wearing new clothing. Kaf HaChaim 551:210 agrees. Also, Mishna Brurah 551:99 writes that one shouldn't eat new fruit or wear new clothing. The Bear Mayim Chaim 7 disagrees with Bach and writes that the only issue is not to make the bracha of [[shehechiyanu]], however, one may eat a new fruit and just not make [[shehechiyanu]]. The Maamar Mordechai 551:14 rejects this idea and doesn't allow eating the new fruit. The Mishna Brurah 551:99, Kaf HaChaim 551:207, and Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot p. 129) agree with the Maamar Mordechai.<br />
* Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:6 rules that it is forbidden to wear new clothes during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out and the Rama adds that the Ashkenazic minhag is to be strict on this starting from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av (during the entire [[Nine Days]]). The Magen Avraham 551:21 is bothered why there is another prohibition to wear new clothes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6) if one can't wear new clothes anyway because of avoiding making [[shehechiyanu]] during the entire Three Weeks (Shulchan Aruch 551:17). See there where he gives 2 answers. The Kaf HaChaim 551:88 answers that avoiding [[shehechiyanu]] is only considered preferable by Shulchan Aruch 551:17, while not wearing new clothes during the week during which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out is an actual prohibition.</ref> Because it is proper to refrain from saying [[shehechiyanu]], one should not put himself into a situation which would necessitate its recitation.<ref>Sh”t Chaim Sheol O”C 7 and Ketonet Yosef 11 (quoted in Kaf HaChaim 551:207) writes that even though one can’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] during the 3 weeks, one can eat a new fruit and wear new clothing without a Bracha. However, the Sefer Chasidim 840, Shaarei Knesset HaGedolah 551:52, Bach 551, Maamer Mordechai 551:14, Yometz Ometz 56, Bear Heitev 551:20, and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 write that one is not allowed to eat a new fruit during the Three Weeks without a Bracha, since eating a new fruit requires a Bracha and it can’t be made during the Three Weeks. Birkei Yosef 551:12, Shaare Teshuva 551:38, and Kaf Hachayim 551:215 hold that a [[shehechiyanu]] may be recited if by mistake he already made the borei pri haetz over a new fruit. </ref> <br />
#During the [[Nine Days]] one should not buy new clothing.<ref>Rama 551:7 writes that buying new clothing is forbidden during the [[Nine Days]] just like fixing new clothing.</ref> See [[Nine_Days#Buying_or_Wearing_New_Clothing]] for details.<br />
# A pregnant woman or a sick person is permitted to eat new fruit.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:99, Yalkut Yosef 551:13 </ref><br />
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===Buying New Clothing===<br />
#Since nowadays we don’t make a [[shehechiyanu]] on buying new clothes but only for wearing new clothes, some permit buying new clothes and some forbid.<ref>Halichot Shlomo p. 411 brings from the Talmidim of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach that it’s permissible to buy new clothes since nowadays we don’t make a Bracha on buying clothes. This is the ruling of Mishna Brurah 551:45 and Kaf Hachayim 551:88, see Nechamet Yisrael pg 40 </ref><br />
#If one doesn't have non-leather shoes for [[Tisha BeAv]] and one forgot to buy, one may buy them in the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Sh"t Halachot Ketanot 1:139, Zeh HaShulchan (vol 2, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
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===Fixing Old Clothing===<br />
#Knitting and needle-craft is prohibited during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Rav Shimon Eider Halachos of the Three Weeks page 11. </ref> Repairing a torn garment is permitted.<ref>Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:79. </ref><br />
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===On Shabbat===<br />
# On [[Shabbat]], many poskim are lenient to allow one to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sefer Chasidim 840, Mateh Moshe 697, Yosef Ometz 861, Magen Avraham 551:21,42, Chaye Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2, and Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:37 permit making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]]. However, the Magen Avraham 551:42 quotes the Kitvei HaArizal who is machmir even on [[Shabbat]]. Mishna Brurah 551:98 concludes that one can be lenient regarding making [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] since there’s some are lenient on [[shechiyanu]] during all of the Three Weeks and there’s some who specifically permit [[Shabbat]]. </ref><br />
#On [[Shabbat]] Chazon one shouldn’t wear new clothes that would require [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Eliyah Rabba 551:17 in name of Madenei [[Yom Tov]] that one should not wear new clothes even on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks because wearing new clothes has a special aspect of happiness (which is greater than eating a new fruit). This is also the opinion of the Derech HaChaim 551:6 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:2 not to wear new clothes all Three Weeks including [[Shabbat]]. However, Chaye Adam 133:14 and Aruch HaShulchan 551:38 writes that one can make [[shehechiyanu]] before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, but afterwards one shouldn’t make [[shehechiyanu]] even on [[Shabbat]]. Additionally, Mishna Brurah 551:45 writes that even those who are lenient to make [[shehechiyanu]] on [[Shabbat]] during the Three Weeks will agree to be strict on [[Shabbat]] Chazon not to wear new clothes (which has a special element of happiness that a new fruit doesn’t have). Sh”t Yechave Daat 1:37 and Torat HaMoadim 5:7 concurs to the opinion of Mishna Brurah. </ref> There is also a minhag not to wear new clothing that don't require a [[shehechiyanu]] specifically during the Nine Days.<ref>Rama 551:7, Mishna Brurah 551:9</ref> See further on the [[Nine Days#Buying Clothing|Nine Days]] page.<br />
===Bracha for a Baby===<br />
#A person should recite a [[shehechiyanu]] upon the birth of a baby boy or girl during the Three Weeks, because this Bracha cannot be pushed off until after the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:19, Avnei Yishpeh 5:80 based on Maharil 31 who says the restriction of saying [[shehechiyanu]] is only on a beracha that can wait until after. </ref> <br />
===Pidyon Haben===<br />
#A [[shehechiyanu]] should be recited for the [[Pidyon Haben]] even during the Three Weeks.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:17, Moed Likol Chai 9:25 </ref><br />
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===Hatov Vihametiv===<br />
#One may say the Bracha of [[HaTov VeHaMeitiv]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Nitei Gavriel 17:22, Shaare [[Teshuvah]] 551:10, Moed Likol Chai 9:24, Machazik Beracha 551:10, Rav Chaim Kanievsky quoted in Nechamas Yisroel page 45:footnote 14, Rivevot Ephraim 4:135:2, 7:58, 234, Avnei Yushfe 5:81 quoting Rav Wosner, Or Letzion 3:25:4 </ref><br />
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===Sales===<br />
#If there is a sale and one will be unable to purchase the same clothing after [[Tisha BeAv]] at the sale price, one may buy the item during the [[Nine days]], but may not wear the clothing until after [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rabbi Moshe Feinstein quoted in Mesoras Moshe volume 2 O"C 262, Ohr Letzion volume 3 26:2 end of note 2.</ref><br />
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===Tzitzit and Tefillin===<br />
#If one doesn't have [[Tefillin]] or one has the opportunity to buy nicer [[Tefillin]], it's permissible to buy them even after [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av.<ref>Zeh HaShulchan (vol 1, Siman 551), Iggerot Moshe OC 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 </ref><br />
#One should refrain from buying [[Tzitzit]] or a [[Tallit]] during the Three Weeks.<ref>Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375 in the name of Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that one should refrain from buying [[Tzitzis]] or a Talis. Similarly, Or LeArba Asar (pg 81) writes that one should buy and wear it (and make [[shehechiyanu]]) before the Three Weeks, however, after the fact if one didn't and one doesn't have as nice a pair one is permitted to wear it. Sh"t Birkat Reuven Shlomo 9:31 agrees. She'elat Yaavetz 82 says that if your [[tzitzit]] become pasul and you don't have another, you may wear or even purchase a new one to fulfill the mitzva. </ref><br />
#One should not purchase a new talit gadol as this would require making a shehechiyanu. However, one may purchase a new tallit katan since shehechiyanu is not recited.<ref>Iggerot Moshe 3:80</ref> One may also purchase a tallit gadol if it doesn't have strings up until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Moadei Yeshurun pg. 129:13b and pg. 152:34 in the name of Rav Moshe</ref><br />
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===Cars===<br />
#One should refrain from buying a car during the Three Weeks unless one is buying it primarily for business purposes.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375</ref> <br />
#Also, if one's entire family will use it and benefit from it, then one may buy it until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av and make a bracha of HaTov VeHaMetiev instead of [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Sh"t Igrot Moshe 3:80, Sh"t Rivevot Efraim 1:375, Nitay Gavriel Page 51 </ref><br />
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===Furniture and Appliances===<br />
#Some poskim permit buying a closet or cabinet during the [[Nine Days]], while others forbid it.<ref>Torat Hamoadim 5:16 says that buying closets or cabinets doesn't make one joyful and is therefore permitted but Iggerot Moshe 3:82 says a bookshelf does make people happy and is not allowed to be bought. </ref><br />
#Some poskim permit buying any necessary appliance, such as a refrigerator, washing machine, or bed, to replace one that broke during the Three Weeks.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:11 </ref><br />
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==Weddings==<br />
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#The Ashkenazic custom is not to get married during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rama 551:2 and Darchei Moshe 551:5 based on the Sefer Haminhagim, Chayei Adam 133:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMetsarim (Rabbi Moshe Karp) 3:1, Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:8. On the night of Shiva Asar Bitammuz itself, Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC 168) is lenient, while Tzitz Eliezer 10:26 is strict. </ref> Among Sephardim, some have just the custom not to get married during the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av until [[Tisha BeAv]]) <ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:2, based on gemara Yevamot 43b, Yalkut Yosef (Moadim, 5748 edition, pg 554, Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 140), Sh"t Yabia Omer OC 6:43, Sh"t Yechave Daat 1:36, Sh"t Or Litzion 3:25:1 </ref> and some have the custom not to get married the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim Halacha 4 based on the Shyarei Knesset Hagedola, Sdei Chemed 6 Marechet Bein Hametzarim 1:10, [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=946 Rabbi Mansour on DailyHalacha.com] says that this is the Syrian minhag. </ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted for an Ashkenazi to attend a sefardi wedding before [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av, and they may even dance at the wedding.<ref>Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim vol. 1, 14:10, Teshuvot Vihanhagot 4:128 </ref> Others hold that it is forbidden.<ref>Rivevot Ephraim 6:289</ref><br />
#Technically, it is permitted to get married on Motzaei [[Tisha BeAv]], but some have the custom not to. If one is unsure what his custom is, he can be lenient and rely on the ikar hadin that it is permitted.<ref>Sh"t Yabia Omer 2:23:16, Sh"t Yechave Daat 5:41. </ref><br />
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===Engagement===<br />
<br />
#It is permitted to become engaged and write tenaim during the [[Nine Days]], even on [[Tisha BeAv]] itself, as long as there is no meal, music, or dancing.<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:2 with Magen Avraham 551:10, and Mishna Brurah 551:16 and 19, Tur 551 in the name of Rav Nissim, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:1, Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 551:10, Baer Heitev 551:11, Moed Likol Chai 9:18, Ben Ish Chai Parashat Devarim 1:5, Chayei Adam 133:8, Aruch Hashulchan 551:8, Yalkut Yosef Moadim page 553. <br /><br />
However, the Tzitz Eliezer (13:60) notes that many Jews refrain from doing so on Tisha B'Av. In addition, the Ben Ish Chai (Devarim: Halacha 4) writes that in Baghdad, they would not get engaged during the Nine Days between Rosh Chodesh Av and Tisha B'Av. He says further that it is preferred not to get engaged at all during the "Three Weeks." </ref> Until [[Rosh Chodesh]], one is allowed to celebrate the engagement with a festive meal but without dancing.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 </ref><br />
#It is permitted for the chattan and kallah to wear Shabbat clothing to their engagement party.<ref>Halichos Shlomo Moadim 2:14:4 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow buying the engagement ring during the Nine Days,<ref>Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Shalmei Simcha page 61 </ref> while others are strict unless there will be a financial loss.<ref>Igros Moshe E.H. 4:84 </ref><br />
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==Meals or Activities with Friends==<br />
<br />
#Some say that it is forbidden to have meals with friends during the Nine Days.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:8</ref> However, if it isn't a meal but only desserts, that is okay.<ref>Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 16:1) based on Magen Avraham 551:10</ref><br />
#An engagement or vort may be celebrated with a meal during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:19 (with Shaar Hatziyun 551:26) holds that having a meal for writing the tenayim, agreement that a couple will get married, is permitted during the Three Weeks since it is a mitzvah. Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45) agrees and applies this to engagements and vorts.</ref><br />
#It is permitted to celebrate a birthday party during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh Av.<ref>Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref> Regarding a good bye party one should ask one's rabbi.<br />
# Is it permissible to go a sports game during the Three Weeks? Some poskim permit it and consider any music that is listened to as incidental. Other poskim forbid it because it is like an activity done with a group of friends which is forbidden during the Three Weeks. Even within those who permit, some only permit until Rosh Chodesh but not in the Nine Days.<ref>Tiferet Efraim pp. 481-482 quotes Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky (Kovetz Halachot pp. 15-18) who permitted going to a sports game even during the Nine Days and didn't consider the music to be a problem. Since the music isn't the main focus and is just incidental it is fine. However, he also quotes Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shemaytata Dmoshe 551:6) as holding that it is permitted during the Three Weeks but not the Nine Days. Rav Soloveitchik as quoted there held that going to a sports game is forbidden during the Three Weeks because it is a group activity, where being there with others is a simcha shel rabbim.</ref><br />
#It is permissible to give gifts during the Three Weeks until Rosh Chodesh. However, one should not give a gift that would require the recipient to recite [[shehechiyanu]].<ref>Shaarei Teshuva 551:18*, Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 45)</ref><br />
<br />
==Cutting Hair==<br />
<br />
#According to Ashkenazim it’s forbidden to cut one’s hair for the entire Three Weeks, however, according to Sephardim one can cut hair until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>The Gemara in Taanit 26b says that one shouldn’t cut one’s hair the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. This Gemara is brought as Halacha by the Rambam (Taaniot 5:6). The Ramban (Torat HaAdam ([[Aveilut]] Yishana pg 346) explains that this prohibition applies to all hair on the body except the mustache if it interferes with eating. The Tur and S”A 551:3,12-13 rule like the Ramban that during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] one is forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body except if there’s facial hair interfering with eating. Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158) and Ben Ish Chai Devarim 12 write that this is Sephardic custom. However, Darkei Moshe 551:5 and Rama 551:4 rules that Ashkenazim should be strict not to cut hair all Three Weeks like the Sefer Minhagim (pg 74). Levush 3, Chayei Adam 133:8, Mishna Brurah 551:82, Aruch Hashulchan 551:31, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:3. Aruch Hashulchan 551:16 says the reason for this is that if we were allowed to get haircuts until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av it would not be clear that we grew our hair for [[mourning]], therefore we stop cutting it for the entire Three Weeks. </ref> One should wait until after [[chatzot]] on the tenth of Av to get a haircut.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:16. </ref><br />
#For Sephardim, it is permitted to take a haircut during the Three Weeks, even for a Sephardic Yeshiva Bachur in a Ashkenazi Yeshiva.<ref>Sh”t Yechave Daat 4:36, 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5, Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 551(2):11) </ref> However, it’s preferable to be strict not to cut the entire Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 158-9) </ref><br />
#The father of a baby boy, the sandak, and the mohel can all cut their hair on the day of a baby's [[brit milah]].<ref>Shaar Hatziyun 551:4 quoting the Chatam Sofer 158, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:15, Kaf ha-Chayim 551:10, Pitchei [[Teshuvah]] 551:1, She’arim Metzuyanim b'Halachah 122:16. Baer Heitev 551:3 is stringent. </ref><br />
# If there is a [[Pidyon Haben]] during the Three Weeks, according to Sephardim the father may shave or cut his hair,<ref>Yalkut Yosef (Sova Semachot v. 2 p. 335)</ref> while according to Ashkenazim they may not.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitai Gavriel 20:5]</ref><br />
#It is forbidden to take a haircut for a bar mitzva.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128. Rivevot Ephraim (1:337 and 2:155:20) and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=46439&pgnum=135 Nitei Gavriel 20:6] quoting some opinions allow for a bar mitzva boy to get a haircut until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. </ref><br />
#Some say that if one’s hair is so long that it is a chatzitzah for [[tefillin]] then one is permitted to get a haircut.<ref>Shalmei Moed page 476, Nitei Gavriel 19:7 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to cut one's hair during the Three Weeks if it will cause great monetary loss, but not during the week of Tisha B'av. If it will not cause loss, it is prohibited even if the hair makes him uncomfortable.<ref>Iggerot Moshe OC 4:102. See Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 93. see also See also Halichos Shlomo Moadim vol. 2 page 414 </ref><br />
#Some poskim allow a child under the age of six to get a haircut.<ref>Iggerot Moshe YD 1:224 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:31. Mishna Brurah 551:81 and Shaar Hatziyun 551:91 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:18 conclude that children even below 6 should not get haircuts and bring two reasons from the Terumat Hadeshen 142. One being [[chinuch]], in which case it would only apply to older than six and the other being "agmat nefesh," meaning it makes people feel more pain to see children [[mourning]], in which case it would apply to even children under 6. Chanoch lanaar 21:2:1, Nitei Gavriel 20:7, Rivevot Ephraim 1:336:2, 2:155:19 say that if an upsherin falls out during the Three Weeks one should either push it up or postpone it. Torat Yekutiel 1:47 is lenient. </ref><br />
#It is permitted to comb and style one's hair during the Three Weeks and [[Nine Days]], and one doesn't have to worry that one will pull out hairs.<ref>Eliya Rabba 551:7, Shaare Teshuva 551:12, Mishna Brurah 551:20, Aruch Hashulchan 551:15, Sh"t Yechave Daat 6:35, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 14, Kaf Hachayim 551:46. </ref><br />
#The poskim debate if one can trim his eyebrows during the Three Weeks.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein (quoted in Nitei Gavriel Bein Hametzarim pg. 130) says that may not do so during the Three Weeks either. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichot Shlomo vol. 2: pg. 414) disagrees and permits it. Devar Halachah 9, Shalmei Moed page 477 agrees. </ref><br />
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===Women===<br />
#It is permissible for a woman to cut her hair during the Three Weeks if she needs to do so in order to get married, if she is already engaged, or if a woman has the custom of cutting her hair before going to the mikveh.<ref>Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taniyot pg 163), Shalmei Moed (pg 477), Igrot Moshe YD 2:137, Halichot Shelomo 3:14, Devar Halachah 10, Shalmei Moed Perek 89. See also Nefesh Harav 191-192 where he writes that it makes sense to say that women should be allowed to get haircuts up until the week of Tisha B'av. </ref><br />
#If a woman’s hair is growing so long that it is becoming difficult for her to keep the hair under the head covering, she can cut it during the Three Weeks.<ref>Mishnah Brurah 551:79, Rivevot Ephraim 8:178 </ref><br />
#It is permitted to put on makeup as one would on a regular day of the year but not something extra special.<ref>[http://www.tzohar.org.il/?p=1652 Rav Broner on tzohar.org.il], [http://din.org.il/2016/07/25/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%92%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/ din.org.il], and [http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=26322 Rav Sherlow]. This is also the implication of the Nitai Gavriel (Ben Hametzarim 73 fnt. 10).</ref><br />
#Some say that it is permitted to dye your hair during the Nine Days.<ref>http://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/</ref> Others say that it is only permitted in the Three Weeks before the Nine Days.<ref>http://shut.moreshet.co.il/shut2.asp?id=116844, https://www.toraland.org.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%94/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A6%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%A8-%D7%91%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/. http://www.shoresh.org.il/spages/shut/shut4811.htm writes that it is permitted during the Nine Days if there's a specific pressing need otherwise it should be delayed. </ref><br />
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===Wigs===<br />
#Women may get their sheitels cut or styled during the Three Weeks, as sheitels are considered their garments, not their hair.<ref>Nitei Gavriel (Bein Hamitzarim pg. 139) </ref><br />
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==Shaving==<br />
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#There is a general prohibition of [[shaving]] during the Three Weeks. However, there are several situations which may warrant [[shaving]], including a person who shaves everyday, [[shaving]] for work, and [[shaving]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. As each one of these is a dispute and unclear if it is totally permissible, a person should follow his father’s minhag or ask his local Rabbi for guidance.<ref>Since S”A 551:12 rules that it’s forbidden to cut any hair on one’s body during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] as a din from the Gemara it would seem clear that it’s forbidden to shave during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. Additionally, Ashkenazim who follow the Rama shouldn’t be able to shave during the entire Three Weeks as Rama 551:4 writes that the minhagim of the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] apply to the entire Three Weeks. However, there are several leniencies in the Achronim. <br />
<br />
*(1) [[Shaving]] Regularly: Magen Avraham 551:14 explains that the reason the Rama is strict by cutting hair all three week and is lenient by washing clothes (that it should only begin from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av) is because it wasn’t common to cut hair every week. This Magen Avraham is brought by the Achronim including the Chaye Adam 133:17, and Mishna Brurah 551:32. Additionally, Aruch HaShulchan 551:16 explains that it takes 3 weeks of not cutting hair to make it recognizable that one is in [[mourning]]. Based on this, Shearim Metzuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 says that those who usually shave every 2-3 days should be able to shave since for them it’s just like washing clothes. Rav Ovadyah in Chazon Ovadyah (Vol Arba Taniot pg 162) based on this M”A says that seemingly, Ashkenazim should be allowed to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] prior to the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. However, Sh”t Shaar Zekenim pg 88a (quoted by Kaf HaChaim 551:65), Shivilei Dovid 551:4, and Rav Vozner in Sh”t Shevet HaLevi 10:81:3 reject this leniency based on the minhag to be strict for all circumstances.<br />
*(2) Uncomfortable: (a) Rabbi Elazar Melamed in Peninei Halacha (zmanim pg 154-5) writes that if a person shaves everyday it’s very uncomfortable not to shave and it’s similar to S”A 551:13 that permits [[shaving]] a moustache that interferes with eating. (b)Rav Soloveitchik (quoted by Nefesh HaRav, Rav Schachter pg 191 and Shiurei Harav Al Inyanei [[Aveilut]] V'Tisha B'Av, pages 20-21 compared the Three Weeks to the [[Aveilut]] of a year, the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] (or according to Ashkenazim, from [[Rosh Chodesh]]) compares to the [[Aveilut]] of Shloshim, and [[Tisha BeAv]] itself is like [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]]. Accordingly, Rav Schachter writes that one who regularly shaves every day would be allowed to shave everyday until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. (Rav Schachter supports this comparison from Sh”t Panim Meirot 3:37e, and goes so far as to question Sh”t Igrot Moshe Y”D 2:137 who compares the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] to [[Aveilut]] of [[Shiva]].)<br />
*(3) [[Shaving]] Specifically: Seemingly, from S”A 551:12 all bodily hair can’t be cut including [[shaving]] a beard. However, Sh”t Chatam Sofer Y”D 348 s.v. VeIy Galach writes that the entire prohibition only applies to cutting one’s hair but the poskim never spoke about [[shaving]] facial hair. This chiluk is also made by the Sh”t Nodeh BeYehuda O”C 14. Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha 122:5 brings these achronim as halacha for someone who needs to shave for work.<br />
*(4) Monetary loss: (a)Sh”t Maharam Shik Y”D 371 writes that there is what to defend those who it’s difficult to do business with important people without [[shaving]] and during the year they regularly shave every 2-3 days to continue in the Three Weeks until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]. (b) Sh”t Igrot Moshe C”M 1:93, O”C 4:102, 5:24:9 writes that by losing a business deal or customers that will affect one’s income after [[Tisha BeAv]], one can shave until the week of [[Tisha BeAv]], but during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] itself it’s only permissible to shave if one will not be able to make an income after [[Tisha BeAv]] or without working one needs to borrow money and it’s difficult to find someone to borrow from). Halachos of the Three Weeks by Rabbi Eider p. 3 writes that a person who needs to shave for work can shave during the Three Weeks but shouldn't during the Nine Days or at least the week when Tisha B'av falls out.(c) Maadenei Shlomo pg 51 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that if there’s a chance you’ll lose your job you can shave (even during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]]). Halichot Shlomo pg 414 brings Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who says that it’s permissible for a person who is in danger of losing a lot of money or his job may shave during the Three Weeks. (d)Shearim Metsuyanim BeHalacha brings the Taz 551:1 (brought by Mishna Brurah 551:12) that says nowadays we don’t decrease our business activity during this time since we have to pay government taxes and all income is included in our [[Parnasa]] and therefore here too if there’s a chance of losing [[Parnasa]] that can be considered a concern of loss of money.<br />
*<div id="shavingforkavodshabbos"></div> (4) Kavod [[Shabbat]]: (a) Magen Avraham 551:14 and Mishna Brurah 551:32 write that the prohibition of cutting hair applies even for Kavod [[Shabbat]] (unlike [[laundering]] which is relaxed for Kavod [[Shabbat]] for someone who doesn't have other clothes, because people don't cut their hair either way weekly). Yet, Pri Megadim (A”A 551:14) writes that according to Rama one can shave in honor of [[Shabbat]] until [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. However, Mateh Yehuda 551:4 writes that even in honor of [[Shabbat]] one can’t shave during the Three Weeks. (b) On this dispute, Kaf HaChaim 551:66 writes that in this regard in depends on the minhag of the place (to follow the Pri Megadim or not), and Rabbi Moshe Karp in Hilchot UMinhagei Ben HaMeysarim (pg 25) writes that the Pri Megadim was more in line with minhag Ashkenaz than the Mateh Yehuda and there’s a lot to rely on to follow Pri Megadim. (c) Even on the original position of the Magen Avraham, the Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Beiur Halacha 551:3 s.v. VeChen (based on Tosfot Tanit and the Yerushalmi) argue that cutting hair should be permissible for Kavod [[Shabbat]] even for [[Shabbat]] Chazon. [However, the Rishonim themselves don’t all agree with Tosfot including the Kol Bo (quoted in Bet Yosef 551:4) who wouldn’t shave before [[Shabbat]] chazon and the Bet Yosef (who argues on Tosfot that it’s impossible to think that it’s permissible to cut hair on [[Tisha BeAv]] for Kavod [[Shabbat]]).] (d) Ashkenazim: Sh”t Ner Ezra (vol 2 pg 155-8) concludes that one can be lenient to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] and quotes Rav Aharon Lichtenstein who agrees. [http://www.torah.org/advanced/weekly-halacha/5762/pinchas.html Weekly Parsha Halacha by Rabbi Neustadt] writes that since many do shave regularly (more than once a week) there is a basis for the lenient minhag (based on the logic of the Magen Avraham). Nonetheless, the Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchata 42:52 writes simply like the Mishna Brurah not to shave during the Three Weeks even for Kavod [[Shabbat]]. (e)Sephardim: Rav Ovadyah Yosef (Sh"t Yechave Daat 3:39, Sh”t Yabia Omer 3:31:5; Chazon Ovadyah pg 162) writes that there is what to rely on to shave Friday of [[Shabbat]] Chazon if ones beard is uncomfortable, and certainly there’s what to rely on for Ashkenazim to shave for Kavod [[Shabbat]] during the rest of the Three Weeks. (e) Someone in doubt: Rabbi Rabinowitz (quoted in Peninei Halacha by 156) says that a person should follow the minhag of his father so as not to appear more lenient or strict that his father.</ref><br />
#A mourner who completed his [[mourning]] period during the Three Weeks, may take a haircut and a shave until [[Rosh Chodesh]].<ref>Mishna Brurah 551:87, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:14 </ref><br />
#Women may shave their legs if necessary.<ref>Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 128 note 9, Kitzur Hilchot Bein hametzarim page 4. </ref><br />
<br />
==Dancing==<br />
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#Dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks, even if not done in the context of a joyous occasion.<ref>Magen Avraham 551:10 says explicitly that it is forbidden to dance during the Three Weeks even if not in the context of a joyous occasion such as an engagement. The Eliya Rabba 551:6, Pri Megadim E"A 551:10, Baer Hetiev 551:11, Mishna Brurah 551:16, Ben Ish Chai (Shana Rishona, Devarim no. 5), Yalkut Yosef (Moadim pg 560, Kitzur S”A 551:9), Chazon Ovadyah (Arba Taaniyot pg 149), Simchat Cohen 162, and Lehorot Natan 10:49 all concur that dancing is forbidden during the Three Weeks. </ref><br />
#Some poskim are lenient to permit dancing at a sheva brachot during the Three Weeks for someone who got married before the Three Weeks.<ref>Lehorot Natan 10:49 explains that not dancing during the Three Weeks is a minhag but making the chatan and kallah happy at sheva brachot is a biblical or rabbinic obligation.</ref> Other poskim forbid it and even recommend not having a sheva brachot meal.<ref>Keneh Bosem 3:36. Nitai Gavriel (Three Weeks 6:5) cites poskim about this dispute.</ref><br />
<br />
==Swimming==<br />
<br />
#Many hold that it is permissible to swim during the Three Weeks except in dangerous waters until the [[Nine Days]] (from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av).<ref>Sh"t Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:263, Piskei Teshuvot 551:46 [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735559/Rabbi_Aryeh_Lebowitz/Halachos_of_the_Three_Weeks Rabbi Ayreh Lebowitz], Moadei Yeshurun (pg 128) quoting Rav Moshe, Halichot Shlomo (Moadim, vol 2, chap 14, note 7), MeBayit Levi (vol 13, pg 22, note 5) quoting Rav Wosner, Sh"t Rivevot Ephraim 3:333, 4:135:14, 6:285:2, Shevet HaKehati 1:169:4, and Laws of Daily Living: The Three Weeks (p. 46). [http://books.google.com/books?id=k2lV5wQwwj0C&lpg=PA34&ots=yg-xJtgt00&dq=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q=swimming%20during%20the%20three%20weeks&f=false Rabbi Eider] quotes Rav Moshe Iggerot Moshe Even Haezer 4:84 who says even during the [[Nine Days]] if one is sweating or dirty and wants to wash off it's permissible to dip in the pool for a short time. Shaarim mitzuyanim bihalacha kuntres acharon 122:12 is lenient with children swimming in private area during the [[Nine Days]], but not in public, like camps. Yechave Daat 1:38 says that Sephardim are permitted to swim throughout the Three Weeks, [[Nine Days]], and week of [[Tisha BeAv]] but Ashkenazim who follow the Rama should not. [https://itorah.com/power-search-results/6/2181 Rabbi Eli Mansour] writes that the Syrian minhag is not to swim during the week in which [[Tisha BeAv]] falls out. </ref><br />
<br />
==Bathing and Showering==<br />
<br />
#The Ashkenazic custom is not to bathe or shower for all Nine Days even in cold water. The Sephardic custom is only to refrain from a warm bath or shower for the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>Rambam Hilchot Taaniot 5:6 writes that the custom is not to bathe or shower in warm water the week of Tisha BeAv. Mordechai Taanit 639, however, writes that it begins from [[Rosh Chodesh]] Av. Both opinions are quoted in Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:16. Rama 551:16 writes that Ashkenazim begin this practice from Rosh Chodesh Av. Mishna Brurah 551:94 agrees. For Sephardim, Kaf Hachayim 551:186 writes that a person should follow the custom of the place where you are living. Yechave Daat 1:38 holds that the Sephardic custom is that one is permitted to shower in cold water throughout. Also, the Sephardic custom is only to stop using hot water for the week of [[Tisha BeAv]].</ref> <br />
#For [[Shabbat Chazon]], Ashkenazim hold that it is forbidden to bathe or shower one's whole body even in cold water. It is permitted to wash one's face, hands, feet, and hair if one usually cleans that for Shabbat.<Ref>Rama 551:16, Mishna Brurah 551:94</ref> Sephardic poskim permit washing the whole body with hot water for Shabbat Chazon.<ref>Yechave Daat 1:38 </ref><br />
#Many poskim hold that it is permitted to bathe or shower during the Nine Days if the purpose is to remove dirt or sweat.<ref>Aruch Hashulchan 551:37. Dirshu 551:109 quotes this same point from Rav Chaim Zonenfeld and Rav Moshe Feinstein. However, they also quote Rav Chaim Kanievsky who held that it is forbidden to take a full body shower during the Nine Days even to remove sweat. Also, Rav Elyashiv only permitted showering during the Nine Days for someone who showered every day even during the winter.</ref><br />
#Men who have the custom to use the mikveh daily can continue to use a cold mikveh during the week of [[Tisha BeAv]] , even according to the custom that people wouldn't swim or shower.<ref>Kaf Hachayim 551:190, Ben Ish Chai Devarim 16, Yechave Daat 1:38 </ref><br />
<br />
==Listening to Music==<br />
{{Listening to Music during the Three Weeks}}<br />
<br />
==Meat, Wine, and Laundry==<br />
#Although there is a practice that a minority of people have not to have meat and wine all of the Three Weeks, most only refrain from it for the Nine Days. The details are found on the [[Nine_Days#Eating_Meat_and_Drinking_Wine]] page.<br />
#Laundry is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]]. See that page for details.<br />
#Cutting nails is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]].<br />
#Building and planting is permitted during the Three Weeks until the [[Nine Days]].<br />
<br />
==Miscellaneous== <br />
<br />
#During the Three Weeks a Rabbi should be careful not to hit his students<ref>Shulchan Aruch O.C. 551:18, Shulchan Shlomo 18, Chayei Adom 133:8. Mishna Brurah 551:103, Bear Heitev 551:41, Taz, Levush, Eshel Avraham Butchatch 551:18, Chayei Adam 133:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 551:39 add that this includes hitting with a strap. Kaf Hachayim 551:232 says that one should refrain even from the slightest hit. </ref> and a parent should not hit his child.<ref>Kitzur S”A 122:2, Kaf Hachayim 551:230, Orchos Rabbeinu 2: page 129:14 </ref><br />
===Court Cases===<br />
#If a Jew has to have a lawsuit with a non-Jew, he should avoid having it with him in Av, as this is a time of ill fortune for a Jew.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 551:1, Taanit 29b. Mishna Brurah 551:2 based on the Magen Avraham 551:2 says that this applies throughout the month of av until [[rosh chodesh]] [[elul]], but at the minimum until [[Tisha BeAv]]. This is the ruling of the Chayei Adam 133:9, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:7. Ben Ish Chai Devarim Halacha 1 says one should preferably wait until the fifteenth of av but really one has to wait until the tenth. </ref><br />
===Fasting During the Three Weeks===<br />
#Although some have the custom to fast every day between the seventeenth of tammuz until the ninth of av, this should not be kept by a teacher of torah or somebody who is learning.<ref>Tur 551 and S”A 551:16 as well as the Chayei Adam 133:8 raise this minhag, but Birkei Yosef 551:7, Shaare Teshuva on S”A 551:16, Kaf Hachayim 551:191 and Mishna Brurah 90 say that this should not be done by a talmid chacham because he will not be able to focus on learning. </ref><br />
===Hagomel===<br />
#One is permitted to recite the bracha of [[Hagomel]] at any point during the Three Weeks, including [[Shiva Asar BeTamuz]] and [[Tisha BeAv]].<ref>[http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=2349 Rabbi Eli Mansour] </ref><br />
===Tikkun Chatzot===<br />
#It is praiseworthy to recite "tikkun Rachel" after chatzot (of the day), each day during the Three Weeks. This is in addition to the praiseworthy minhag to recite "[[tikkun chatzot]]" every night after chatzot. "Tikkun Rachel" should not be recited after chatzot of the day on Tish'a Bi'av itself. On Erev Rosh Chodesh, Rosh Chodesh, Erev Shabbat, and Shabbat, "tikkun Rachel" is not recited during the day. This applies to any day that tachanun is not recited as well. For example, the mohel, sandak, and avi haben, should not recite "tikkun Rachel" on the day of the berit milah. "Tikkun Chatzot" is not recited at night during a shemittah year, but a person may nevertheless recite "tikkun Rachel" during the day during the Three Weeks.<ref>Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128-129 </ref><br />
<br />
===Travel and Recreation===<br />
# One shouldn't schedule trips and recreational activities for the Three Weeks.<ref>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 quoting the Masa Chaim of Rav Chaim Palagi that the rabbis of his generation established that people shouldn't go on trips during the Three Weeks. He also writes that this is cited by the Sdei Chemed Ben Hametzarim 1:10 and Nitai Gavriel Ben Hametzarim 23 fnt. 7. He also quotes that he heard from Rav Shaul Yisraeli that one shoudln't go on recreational trips during the Three Weeks. </ref> Some say that if that is the only time a person has to take trips with his family, or it is for medical reasons, it is permitted until the Nine Days.<reF>Mikraei Kodesh 5:1 citing Rav Mordechai Eliyahu</ref><br />
#During the Three Weeks one should refrain from going to dangerous places and should be even more careful during the [[Nine Days]].<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, 46. Also see [http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1682 Rabbi Eli Mansour on dailyhalacha.com]. </ref><br />
#If possible, one should avoid flying on an airplane during the Nine Days.<ref>Halichot Shlomo 14:24</ref><br />
<br />
===Surgery===<br />
#One should not schedule surgery for during the 3 weeks, and certainly not during the 9 days, unless the doctor insists that it cannot be postponed.<ref>Piskei Teshuvot 551:1, Dirshu Mishna Brura 551:note 128 in the name of Rav Shmuel Vosner, Rav Moshe Feinstein quoted in Moadei Yeshurun page 130:footnote 44, Emes Liyaakov 551:footnote 515, Nitei Gavriel 23:8. [http://www.doresh-tzion.co.il/QAShowAnswer.aspx?qaid=97499 Rav Bentzion Mussafi] permits until [[Rosh Chodesh]] to get surgery. see also Chazon Ovadia Arba Ta'aniyot page 128 footnote 2 and Halichot Olam vol 2 pg. 134 </ref><br />
<br />
==Haftarot==<br />
# The custom is to read three tragic haftarot during the Three Weeks followed by 7 consolation haftarot.<ref>Tosafot Megillah 31b s.v. Rosh Chodesh Av, Shulchan Aruch 428:8, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 122:6 </ref><br />
# On the [[shabbat]] prior to [[Tisha BeAv]], [[Shabbat Chazon]], we read Isaiah Perek 1:1-27. It is the final of the three tragic haftarot.<Ref>see https://www.ou.org/holidays/the-three-weeks/shabbat_chazon/ </ref><br />
<br />
==Question and Answers==<br />
<br />
#Is it permissible to shave during the 3 weeks for Kavod [[Shabbos]]? [[#shavingforkavodshabbos| See above]]<br />
<br />
==Links==<br />
<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/838353/Rabbi_Ezra_Schwartz/Halachos_of_Three_Weeks Halachos of Three Weeks] by Rabbi Ezra Schwartz<br />
*[http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/714866/Rabbi_Yaakov_B_Neuburger/Halachas_of_the_Three_Weeks_and_Nine_days_-_Shiur_for_Women Halachas of the Three Weeks and Nine days - Shiur for Women] by Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger<br />
*Article on [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/711706/Rabbi_Josh_Flug/The_Laws_Of_Bein_HaMetzarim The Laws Of Bein HaMetzarim] by Rabbi Josh Flug<br />
<br />
==Sources==<br />
<references /><br />
{{Holidays}}<br />
[[Category:Holidays]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33728The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-11-01T15:07:29Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom describes how the merchants bribed local court officials to look for the items stolen from the shipwreck. In particular- Rabbeinu Gershom describes the merchants as having "paid bribes to the rulers (moshlim) and judges (shoftim), to investigate who the people suspected of having gathered there (the site of the shipwreck)." What kind of officials were these merchants dealing with?<br />
<br />
Our first source is a different tshuva of Rabbeinu Gershom, where he contrasts the courts of Talmudic Babylon to the courts of his own time. "The courts in Babylon judge righteously and take from thieves and return to the owners, but in other lands they take bribes and pervert judgement.<ref>Shut Maharam meRothenburg Prague Siman 660<br />
<br />
tshuva printed there is attributed by scholars as actually being Rabbeinu Gershom</ref>" Rabbeinu Gershom's statement from the get go implies a lack of confidence in the ability of local courts to get justice and their vulnerability to bribery. Indeed- in our very case, the judges only investigate the merchants' claim because of the bribes the merchants give them.<ref>A similar sentiment is expressed by Rashi in a tshuva on the exact topic (Shut Rashi 240); "In Babylon there were formal courts who were ashamed (to act injustly), and the judges were honest, but these men are thieves and robbers and someone who protests is not answered. And all the more so when (the judge) is a nobleman, and no man rules above him." <br />
<br />
</ref><br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim<ref>Avnei Miluim Siman 28.2</ref> composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim resolution is full fleshed out in the comments of the Even Haezel.<ref>Even HaEzel Hilchot Malveh veLoveh perek 27</ref> The Ezel HaEzel begins by suggesting the source of Dina demalchuta Dina is the Noachide law requiring establishments of courts. The Noachide requirement does not only mandate the establishment of courts, but also requires that all inhabitents of a country follow the courts. However, the Noachide courts only have authority insofar as the follow their mandate of enacting just laws. The Noachide requirement of courts is not only for gentiles- but also binds Jews to the rulings of gentile courts where these rulings are just. In the case of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, the decrees of the non-Jewish courts were just- as the Avnei Miluim notes, halacha sees the return of the shipwrecked item as a mitzvah even if not mandating its return. On this basis, that Even HaEzel suggests that the court's ruling is just, since it accords with what halacha considers to be a value. Thus, to follow the ruling of the courts is thereby a fulfillment of Noachide law. <br />
<br />
To say in greater detail- the Avnei Miluim's resolution could have been read in two ways. It could have been understood to say that Dina demalchuta Dina is applicable only where the state's ruling does not violate halacha. Since there is a mitzvah to return the shipwrecked item- the state's ruling does not violate halacha. <br />
<br />
Rather than take this approach, the Even Haezel proposes that that the state's ruling not only does not contravene halacha, but is a fulfillment of the Noachide mitzvah of law and order. The ruling of the court is not only not anti-Torah, but rather a fulfillment of the highest principles.<ref>While the Even HaEzel's opinion is fantastically elegant there are more than a few issues with it. <br />
<br />
The first is his assumption that the Noachide mitzvah of appointing judges obligates Jews. Rav Asher Weiss notes (Dina Demalchuta Dina) that it could be that with the giving of the Torah, Jews were relieved of their Noachide responsibilities and placed under the jurisdiction of the Torah alone. The Even HaEzel's fundamental assumption in his piece is that Jews are still bound by the Noachide mitzvah. <br />
<br />
A second issue is over the extent of the Noachide mitzvah. The Even HaEzel seems to imply that the Noachide mitzvah requires everyone follow a court, and that the court's ruling is effective as long as it is just. There is a crucial dispute among the Rishonim that goes unmentioned. The Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 9:14) writes that Noachide law only requires the existence of courts, but proscribes no particular legal system. The Ramban (Parshat Vayishlach) in contrast, argues that the Noachide law requires non-Jews to implement all the civil law according to halacha. In other words, the Rambam views the mitzvah as granting non-Jewish courts wide authority to rule as long as they follow the structures of justice, while the Ramban views non-Jewish courts as being technically bound to follow all the structures of civil law in halacha. The Avnei Nezer (Shut Choshen Mishpat 55) points out a clear practical ramification. To the Rambam, non-Jews are obligated to follow their legal norms (nimusim). The Avnei Nezer points out that this fits with a statement of the Schach (CM 73.36), who said that where halacha and the poskim are not clear, Dina demalchuta Dina applies. This position argues that non-Jewish legal norms have inherent value and can even be a source of law for Jews. In contrast, the Avnei Nezer points out that the position of the Ramban views the halachot of Choshen Mishpat as being the epitome of justice. Any non-Jewish legal norms have no fundamental philosophic basis either among Jews nor gentiles alike. <br />
<br />
The Even HaEzel's arguement follows the Rambam. The Even HaEzel says that while we define justice according to halacha, non-Jewish courts can go beyond the limits that halacha places on enforcement. According to the Ramban, that assumption is unclear. If the Ramban is to be understood as strictly limiting civil courts to the plain reading of halacha, civil law cannot mandate where halacha would not. Hence, the Even HaEzel seems to contradict the Ramban.</ref><br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Views on Zuto shel Yam ==<br />
Typically in halacha, an item becomes ownerless after the owner despairs of ownership (Yeush). In order to have the conditions of Yeush- the owner must know about the loss of the item and express a lack of hope in the return of the item. The gemara clarifies that when an item is either washed up at sea or by a river, then the item becomes owner-less irrespective of whether the owner despairs. This is referred to as the principle of Zuto shel yam.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33723The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-20T19:37:48Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom describes how the merchants bribed local court officials to look for the items stolen from the shipwreck. In particular- Rabbeinu Gershom describes the merchants as having "paid bribes to the rulers (moshlim) and judges (shoftim), to investigate who the people suspected of having gathered there (the site of the shipwreck)." What kind of officials were these merchants dealing with?<br />
<br />
Our first source is a different tshuva of Rabbeinu Gershom, where he contrasts the courts of Talmudic Babylon to the courts of his own time. "The courts in Babylon judge righteously and take from thieves and return to the owners, but in other lands they take bribes and pervert judgement.<ref>Shut Maharam meRothenburg Prague Siman 660<br />
<br />
tshuva printed there is attributed by scholars as actually being Rabbeinu Gershom</ref>" Rabbeinu Gershom's statement from the get go implies a lack of confidence in the ability of local courts to get justice and their vulnerability to bribery. Indeed- in our very case, the judges only investigate the merchants' claim because of the bribes the merchants give them.<ref>A similar sentiment is expressed by Rashi in a tshuva on the exact topic (Shut Rashi 240); "In Babylon there were formal courts who were ashamed (to act injustly), and the judges were honest, but these men are thieves and robbers and someone who protests is not answered. And all the more so when (the judge) is a nobleman, and no man rules above him." <br />
<br />
</ref><br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim<ref>Avnei Miluim Siman 28.2</ref> composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim resolution is full fleshed out in the comments of the Even Haezel.<ref>Even HaEzel Hilchot Malveh veLoveh perek 27</ref> The Ezel HaEzel begins by suggesting the source of Dina demalchuta Dina is the Noachide law requiring establishments of courts. The Noachide requirement does not only mandate the establishment of courts, but also requires that all inhabitents of a country follow the courts. However, the Noachide courts only have authority insofar as the follow their mandate of enacting just laws. The Noachide requirement of courts is not only for gentiles- but also binds Jews to the rulings of gentile courts where these rulings are just. In the case of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, the decrees of the non-Jewish courts were just- as the Avnei Miluim notes, halacha sees the return of the shipwrecked item as a mitzvah even if not mandating its return. On this basis, that Even HaEzel suggests that the court's ruling is just, since it accords with what halacha considers to be a value. Thus, to follow the ruling of the courts is thereby a fulfillment of Noachide law. <br />
<br />
To say in greater detail- the Avnei Miluim's resolution could have been read in two ways. It could have been understood to say that Dina demalchuta Dina is appliable only where the state's ruling does not violate halacha. Since there is a mitzvah to return the shipwrecked item- the state's ruling does not violate halacha. <br />
<br />
Rather than take this approach, the Even Haezel proposes that that the state's ruling not only does not contravene halacha, but is a fulfillment of the Noachide mitzvah of law and order. The ruling of the court is not only not anti-Torah, but rather a fufillment of the highest principles.<ref>While the Even HaEzel's opinion is fantastically elegant there are more than a few issues with it. <br />
<br />
The first is his assumption that the Noachide mitzvah of appointing judges obligates Jews. Rav Asher Weiss notes (Dina Demalchuta Dina) that it could be that with the giving of the Torah, Jews were relieved of their Noachide responsibilities and placed under the jurisdiction of the Torah alone. The Even HaEzel's fundamental assumption in his piece is that Jews are still bound by the Noachide mitzvah. <br />
<br />
A second issue is over the extent of the Noachide mitzvah. The Even HaEzel seems to imply that the Noachide mitzvah requires everyone follow a court, and that the court's ruling is effective as long as it is just. There is a crucial dispute among the Rishonim that goes unmentioned. The Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 9:14) writes that Noachide law only requires the existence of courts, but proscribes no particular legal system. The Ramban (Parshat Vayishlach) in contrast, argues that the Noachide law requires non-Jews to implement all the civil law according to halacha. In other words, the Rambam views the mitzvah as granting non-Jewish courts wide authority to rule as long as they follow the structures of justice, while the Ramban views non-Jewish courts as being technically bound to follow all the structures of civil law in halacha. The Avnei Nezer (Shut Choshen Mishpat 55) points out a clear practical ramification. To the Rambam, non-Jews are obligated to follow their legal norms (nimusim). The Avnei Nezer points out that this fits with a statement of the Schach (CM 73.36), who said that where halacha and the poskim are not clear, Dina demalchuta Dina applies. This position argues that non-Jewish legal norms have inherent value and can even be a source of law for Jews. In contrast, the Avnei Nezer points out that the position of the Ramban views the halachot of Choshen Mishpat as being the epitome of justice. Any non-Jewish legal norms have no fundamental philosophic basis either among Jews nor gentiles alike. <br />
<br />
The Even HaEzel's arguement follows the Rambam. The Even HaEzel says that while we define justice according to halacha, non-Jewish courts can go beyond the limits that halacha places on enforcement. According to the Ramban, that assumption is unclear. If the Ramban is to be understood as strictly limiting civil courts to the plain reading of halacha, civil law cannot mandate where halacha would not. Hence, the Even HaEzel seems to contradict the Ramban.</ref></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33709The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-11T00:31:29Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Historical Background */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom describes how the merchants bribed local court officials to look for the items stolen from the shipwreck. In particular- Rabbeinu Gershom describes the merchants as having "paid bribes to the rulers (moshlim) and judges (shoftim), to investigate who the people suspected of having gathered there (the site of the shipwreck)." What kind of officials were these merchants dealing with?<br />
<br />
Our first source is a different tshuva of Rabbeinu Gershom, where he contrasts the courts of Talmudic Babylon to the courts of his own time. "The courts in Babylon judge righteously and take from thieves and return to the owners, but in other lands they take bribes and pervert judgement.<ref>Shut Maharam meRothenburg Prague Siman 660<br />
<br />
tshuva printed there is attributed by scholars as actually being Rabbeinu Gershom</ref>" Rabbeinu Gershom's statement from the get go implies a lack of confidence in the ability of local courts to get justice and their vulnerability to bribery. Indeed- in our very case, the judges only investigate the merchants' claim because of the bribes the merchants give them.<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim<ref>Avnei Miluim Siman 28.2</ref> composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim resolution is full fleshed out in the comments of the Even Haezel.<ref>Even HaEzel Hilchot Malveh veLoveh perek 27</ref> The Ezel HaEzel begins by suggesting the source of Dina demalchuta Dina is the Noachide law requiring establishments of courts. The Noachide requirement does not only mandate the establishment of courts, but also requires that all inhabitents of a country follow the courts. However, the Noachide courts only have authority insofar as the follow their mandate of enacting just laws. The Noachide requirement of courts is not only for gentiles- but also binds Jews to the rulings of gentile courts where these rulings are just. In the case of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, the decrees of the non-Jewish courts were just- as the Avnei Miluim notes, halacha sees the return of the shipwrecked item as a mitzvah even if not mandating its return. On this basis, that Even HaEzel suggests that the court's ruling is just, since it accords with what halacha considers to be a value. Thus, to follow the ruling of the courts is thereby a fulfillment of Noachide law. <br />
<br />
To say in greater detail- the Avnei Miluim's resolution could have been read in two ways. It could have been understood to say that Dina demalchuta Dina is appliable only where the state's ruling does not violate halacha. Since there is a mitzvah to return the shipwrecked item- the state's ruling does not violate halacha. <br />
<br />
Rather than take this approach, the Even Haezel proposes that that the state's ruling not only does not contravene halacha, but is a fulfillment of the Noachide mitzvah of law and order. The ruling of the court is not only not anti-Torah, but rather a fufillment of the highest principles.<ref>While the Even HaEzel's opinion is fantastically elegant there are more than a few issues with it. <br />
<br />
The first is his assumption that the Noachide mitzvah of appointing judges obligates Jews. Rav Asher Weiss notes (Dina Demalchuta Dina) that it could be that with the giving of the Torah, Jews were relieved of their Noachide responsibilities and placed under the jurisdiction of the Torah alone. The Even HaEzel's fundamental assumption in his piece is that Jews are still bound by the Noachide mitzvah. <br />
<br />
A second issue is over the extent of the Noachide mitzvah. The Even HaEzel seems to imply that the Noachide mitzvah requires everyone follow a court, and that the court's ruling is effective as long as it is just. There is a crucial dispute among the Rishonim that goes unmentioned. The Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 9:14) writes that Noachide law only requires the existence of courts, but proscribes no particular legal system. The Ramban (Parshat Vayishlach) in contrast, argues that the Noachide law requires non-Jews to implement all the civil law according to halacha. In other words, the Rambam views the mitzvah as granting non-Jewish courts wide authority to rule as long as they follow the structures of justice, while the Ramban views non-Jewish courts as being technically bound to follow all the structures of civil law in halacha. The Avnei Nezer (Shut Choshen Mishpat 55) points out a clear practical ramification. To the Rambam, non-Jews are obligated to follow their legal norms (nimusim). The Avnei Nezer points out that this fits with a statement of the Schach (CM 73.36), who said that where halacha and the poskim are not clear, Dina demalchuta Dina applies. This position argues that non-Jewish legal norms have inherent value and can even be a source of law for Jews. In contrast, the Avnei Nezer points out that the position of the Ramban views the halachot of Choshen Mishpat as being the epitome of justice. Any non-Jewish legal norms have no fundamental philosophic basis either among Jews nor gentiles alike. <br />
<br />
The Even HaEzel's arguement follows the Rambam. The Even HaEzel says that while we define justice according to halacha, non-Jewish courts can go beyond the limits that halacha places on enforcement. According to the Ramban, that assumption is unclear. If the Ramban is to be understood as strictly limiting civil courts to the plain reading of halacha, civil law cannot mandate where halacha would not. Hence, the Even HaEzel seems to contradict the Ramban.</ref></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33708The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-10T22:52:04Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Historical Background */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom describes how the merchants bribed local court officials to look for the items stolen from the shipwreck. In particular- Rabbeinu Gershom describes the merchants as having "paid bribes to the rulers (moshlim) and judges (shooftim), to investigate who the people suspected of having gathered there (the site of the shipwreck)." What kind of officials were these merchants dealing with? Are first source is a different tshuva of Rabbeinu Gershom, where he contrasts the courts of Talmudic Babylon to the courts of his own time. "The courts in Babylon judge rightously and take from theifs and return to the owners, but in other lands they take bribes and pervert judgement."<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim<ref>Avnei Miluim Siman 28.2</ref> composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim resolution is full fleshed out in the comments of the Even Haezel.<ref>Even HaEzel Hilchot Malveh veLoveh perek 27</ref> The Ezel HaEzel begins by suggesting the source of Dina demalchuta Dina is the Noachide law requiring establishments of courts. The Noachide requirement does not only mandate the establishment of courts, but also requires that all inhabitents of a country follow the courts. However, the Noachide courts only have authority insofar as the follow their mandate of enacting just laws. The Noachide requirement of courts is not only for gentiles- but also binds Jews to the rulings of gentile courts where these rulings are just. In the case of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, the decrees of the non-Jewish courts were just- as the Avnei Miluim notes, halacha sees the return of the shipwrecked item as a mitzvah even if not mandating its return. On this basis, that Even HaEzel suggests that the court's ruling is just, since it accords with what halacha considers to be a value. Thus, to follow the ruling of the courts is thereby a fulfillment of Noachide law. <br />
<br />
To say in greater detail- the Avnei Miluim's resolution could have been read in two ways. It could have been understood to say that Dina demalchuta Dina is appliable only where the state's ruling does not violate halacha. Since there is a mitzvah to return the shipwrecked item- the state's ruling does not violate halacha. <br />
<br />
Rather than take this approach, the Even Haezel proposes that that the state's ruling not only does not contravene halacha, but is a fulfillment of the Noachide mitzvah of law and order. The ruling of the court is not only not anti-Torah, but rather a fufillment of the highest principles.<ref>While the Even HaEzel's opinion is fantastically elegant there are more than a few issues with it. <br />
<br />
The first is his assumption that the Noachide mitzvah of appointing judges obligates Jews. Rav Asher Weiss notes (Dina Demalchuta Dina) that it could be that with the giving of the Torah, Jews were relieved of their Noachide responsibilities and placed under the jurisdiction of the Torah alone. The Even HaEzel's fundamental assumption in his piece is that Jews are still bound by the Noachide mitzvah. <br />
<br />
A second issue is over the extent of the Noachide mitzvah. The Even HaEzel seems to imply that the Noachide mitzvah requires everyone follow a court, and that the court's ruling is effective as long as it is just. There is a crucial dispute among the Rishonim that goes unmentioned. The Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 9:14) writes that Noachide law only requires the existence of courts, but proscribes no particular legal system. The Ramban (Parshat Vayishlach) in contrast, argues that the Noachide law requires non-Jews to implement all the civil law according to halacha. In other words, the Rambam views the mitzvah as granting non-Jewish courts wide authority to rule as long as they follow the structures of justice, while the Ramban views non-Jewish courts as being technically bound to follow all the structures of civil law in halacha. The Avnei Nezer (Shut Choshen Mishpat 55) points out a clear practical ramification. To the Rambam, non-Jews are obligated to follow their legal norms (nimusim). The Avnei Nezer points out that this fits with a statement of the Schach (CM 73.36), who said that where halacha and the poskim are not clear, Dina demalchuta Dina applies. This position argues that non-Jewish legal norms have inherent value and can even be a source of law for Jews. In contrast, the Avnei Nezer points out that the position of the Ramban views the halachot of Choshen Mishpat as being the epitome of justice. Any non-Jewish legal norms have no fundamental philosophic basis either among Jews nor gentiles alike. <br />
<br />
The Even HaEzel's arguement follows the Rambam. The Even HaEzel says that while we define justice according to halacha, non-Jewish courts can go beyond the limits that halacha places on enforcement. According to the Ramban, that assumption is unclear. If the Ramban is to be understood as strictly limiting civil courts to the plain reading of halacha, civil law cannot mandate where halacha would not. Hence, the Even HaEzel seems to contradict the Ramban.</ref></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33707The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-10T18:07:58Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim<ref>Avnei Miluim Siman 28.2</ref> composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim resolution is full fleshed out in the comments of the Even Haezel.<ref>Even HaEzel Hilchot Malveh veLoveh perek 27</ref> The Ezel HaEzel begins by suggesting the source of Dina demalchuta Dina is the Noachide law requiring establishments of courts. The Noachide requirement does not only mandate the establishment of courts, but also requires that all inhabitents of a country follow the courts. However, the Noachide courts only have authority insofar as the follow their mandate of enacting just laws. The Noachide requirement of courts is not only for gentiles- but also binds Jews to the rulings of gentile courts where these rulings are just. In the case of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, the decrees of the non-Jewish courts were just- as the Avnei Miluim notes, halacha sees the return of the shipwrecked item as a mitzvah even if not mandating its return. On this basis, that Even HaEzel suggests that the court's ruling is just, since it accords with what halacha considers to be a value. Thus, to follow the ruling of the courts is thereby a fulfillment of Noachide law. <br />
<br />
To say in greater detail- the Avnei Miluim's resolution could have been read in two ways. It could have been understood to say that Dina demalchuta Dina is appliable only where the state's ruling does not violate halacha. Since there is a mitzvah to return the shipwrecked item- the state's ruling does not violate halacha. <br />
<br />
Rather than take this approach, the Even Haezel proposes that that the state's ruling not only does not contravene halacha, but is a fulfillment of the Noachide mitzvah of law and order. The ruling of the court is not only not anti-Torah, but rather a fufillment of the highest principles.<ref>While the Even HaEzel's opinion is fantastically elegant there are more than a few issues with it. <br />
<br />
The first is his assumption that the Noachide mitzvah of appointing judges obligates Jews. Rav Asher Weiss notes (Dina Demalchuta Dina) that it could be that with the giving of the Torah, Jews were relieved of their Noachide responsibilities and placed under the jurisdiction of the Torah alone. The Even HaEzel's fundamental assumption in his piece is that Jews are still bound by the Noachide mitzvah. <br />
<br />
A second issue is over the extent of the Noachide mitzvah. The Even HaEzel seems to imply that the Noachide mitzvah requires everyone follow a court, and that the court's ruling is effective as long as it is just. There is a crucial dispute among the Rishonim that goes unmentioned. The Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 9:14) writes that Noachide law only requires the existence of courts, but proscribes no particular legal system. The Ramban (Parshat Vayishlach) in contrast, argues that the Noachide law requires non-Jews to implement all the civil law according to halacha. In other words, the Rambam views the mitzvah as granting non-Jewish courts wide authority to rule as long as they follow the structures of justice, while the Ramban views non-Jewish courts as being technically bound to follow all the structures of civil law in halacha. The Avnei Nezer (Shut Choshen Mishpat 55) points out a clear practical ramification. To the Rambam, non-Jews are obligated to follow their legal norms (nimusim). The Avnei Nezer points out that this fits with a statement of the Schach (CM 73.36), who said that where halacha and the poskim are not clear, Dina demalchuta Dina applies. This position argues that non-Jewish legal norms have inherent value and can even be a source of law for Jews. In contrast, the Avnei Nezer points out that the position of the Ramban views the halachot of Choshen Mishpat as being the epitome of justice. Any non-Jewish legal norms have no fundamental philosophic basis either among Jews nor gentiles alike. <br />
<br />
The Even HaEzel's arguement follows the Rambam. The Even HaEzel says that while we define justice according to halacha, non-Jewish courts can go beyond the limits that halacha places on enforcement. According to the Ramban, that assumption is unclear. If the Ramban is to be understood as strictly limiting civil courts to the plain reading of halacha, civil law cannot mandate where halacha would not. Hence, the Even HaEzel seems to contradict the Ramban.</ref></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33706The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-10T17:36:55Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim<ref>Avnei Miluim Siman 28.2</ref> composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim resolution is full fleshed out in the comments of the Even Haezel.<ref>Even HaEzel Hilchot Malveh veLoveh perek 27</ref> The Ezel HaEzel begins by suggesting the source of Dina demalchuta Dina is the Noachide law requiring establishments of courts. The Noachide requirement does not only mandate the establishment of courts, but also requires that all inhabitents of a country follow the courts. However, the Noachide courts only have authority insofar as the follow their mandate of enacting just laws. The Noachide requirement of courts is not only for gentiles- but also binds Jews to the rulings of gentile courts where these rulings are just. In the case of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, the decrees of the non-Jewish courts were just- as the Avnei Miluim notes, halacha sees the return of the shipwrecked item as a mitzvah even if not mandating its return. On this basis, that Even HaEzel suggests that the court's ruling is just, since it accords with what halacha considers to be a value. Thus, to follow the ruling of the courts is thereby a fulfillment of Noachide law. <br />
<br />
To say in greater detail- the Avnei Miluim's resolution could have been read in two ways. It could have been understood to say that Dina demalchuta Dina is appliable only where the state's ruling does not violate halacha. Since there is a mitzvah to return the shipwrecked item- the state's ruling does not violate halacha. <br />
<br />
Rather than take this approach, the Even Haezel proposes that that the state's ruling not only does not contravene halacha, but is a fulfillment of the Noachide mitzvah of law and order. The ruling of the court is not only not anti-Torah, but rather a fufillment of the highest principles.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33705The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-10T17:21:05Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.<br />
<br />
The task of resolving Rabbeinu Gershom is taken up by the Siftei Cohen (the Shach) in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama quotes the ruling of Rabbeinu Gershom, but he also quotes elsewhere the ruling of the Rashba "that the local of the state is not to be followed where it contradicts the Torah."<br />
<br />
The Shach proposes that Rabbeinu Gershom is not in fact basing his ruling on the decrees of the state courts. Rather, the Shach says that Rabbeinu Gershom believed that the buyer of the stolen gem was obligated to return it because of the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach explains that that Rabbeinu Gershom mentioned the ruling of the secular courts, because that was the basis for the ruling of the Jewish community. The Shach views the practice of mandating the return of the stolen gem as unsavory, since strict halacha would not mandate it. Yet the Shach believes that the Jewish community has the effective authority to enact such a ruling even though "it is a faulty practices." To the Shach- the civil courts are of ancilarly importations in Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling.<br />
<br />
The Avnei Miluim composed a fascinating response to the Shach. The Avnei Miluim notes that the gemara describes the concepts of "lifninim meshurat hadin (going beyond the strict halacha). According to this concept, it is a mitzvah to return a item even if technically speaking the finder has a right to keep the item. On this basis, the Avnei Miluim argues that civil courts had the authority to mandate the return of the gem since there was a halahic value behind their requirement. Even thought halacha does not mandate the return of an item lost at sea, it still seas its return as a mitzvah. Because of this, the Avnei Miluim argues that the civil courts were empowered to demand the return of the stolen gem- because the return of the stolen gem is not prohibited, but merely not mandated by straight halacha. In sum, the Avnei Miluim says that since halacha considers return a value but does not mandate it, the civil courts can demand the return. The ruling of the civil courts does not contravene halacha- it is just that halacha does not require enforcement of return in this case. <br />
<br />
thi</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33704The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-10T16:57:39Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because ''hefker beit din hefker''. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community. <br />
<br />
In order to have a clearer sense of the power Rabbeinu Gershom granted the community, let us contrast his view to that of Rabbeinu Tam. The Mordechai<ref>Mordechai Bava Batra Remez 480</ref> quotes Rabbeinu Tam saying that a community can only fine and enact legislation if the entire community had agreed to legislation. Rabbeinu Tam goes on to say "if they made no such agreement, the city has no power to force a resident to do what they what." Rabbeinu Tam then goes on to say that the rule of ''hefker beit din hefker'' is not applicable, since only courts of great rabbis have that ability. Rabbeinu Tam understands that Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation" to grant ultimate authority to the greatest rabbis of each generation. <br />
<br />
In contrast to Rabbeinu Tam, Rabbeinu Gershom understood the "Yiftach" statement to grant the same expropriation power to the leaders of every single community. We can perhaps suggest a reason for the dispute- Rabbeinu Tam sees the entire Jewish community as one, and bound to a single leader- the gadol hador (great man of the generation). In contrastion, Rabbeinu Gershom sees each community as individually requiring leadership. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government is only created by collective agreement. In contrast, to Rabbeinu Gershom, there is a preexisting institution of local government that is empowered not by consent, but has authority in itself. Rabbeinu Tam agrees that the Jewish world has a default leadership, but only on the national level- the ''gadol hador''. <br />
<br />
A further distinction worthy of note is the lay nature of leadership to Rabbeinu Gershom. Rabbeinu Gershom grants the governing board of a community the power of a court- but he does not describe particular requirement such as that expected of a judge. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam grants ultimate power to the court of the greatest scholars of the generation. Rabbeinu Tam does envision laymen having power over communal affairs, but only by the unanimous consent of the community. To Rabbeinu Tam- local government must be created ''ex nihilo'' it cannot exist on majority rule alone. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling is unique in the power it grants the state. Rabbeinu Gershom asserts that stolen gem must be returned because of the local noble court's ruling. This ruling grants exceptional power to the local secular government, and is much disputed by later commentators. <br />
<br />
To begin, we must examine the gemara's statements about the power of the state, and the understanding of subsequent commentators. The gemara quotes the principle Dina demalchuta Dina (the rule of the kingdom is the law) in four places.<br />
<br />
# To mandate paying of taxes<br />
# to permit using public works built using wood and land taken from citizens<br />
# To prohibit taking land which is not considered sold by Jewish law, but is considered sold under state law<br />
# in a dispute whether Dina demalchuta Dina would suffice to grant legal weight to contracts drawn up in a state court.<br />
<br />
This principle is interpreted in a limited way by many commentators. Some assert that the government only has authority with regulations relating to land use, because of the state's ultimate right as owner over the land. Other argue that the principle should be seen widely as giving the king power of legislation but only in specific circumstance. They argue that ruler only has power to enforce prexisting regulations which are derived from their predecessors and written in the books of law. This opinion gives no weight to enacting legislation, only enforcement of the existing rules.<br />
<br />
Others assert that the principle only grants authority to royal proclamations that relate to the welfare of the monarchy as a whole. This opinion argues that Dina demalchuta Dina is not applicable to the adjucation of courts. Instead Dina demalchuta Dina is only effective with regards to policy enactments of the monarch.<br />
<br />
Even according to the opinions which grant weight to Dina demalchut Dina in all the above mentioned cases- many commenators express the opinion that Dina demalchuta Dina does not apply in cases of civil dispute between two Jews. These commentators assert the ultimate power of the Torah as the sole code of the Jewish people and consider usage of secular law in interpersonal disputes to be a disgrace. Going further- some opinions permit Dina demalchuta Dina in cases of civil dispute, but only where the ruling does not go against the Torah.<br />
<br />
<br />
I have seen it necessary to describe the vast multitude of opinions in order that we may understand the impact of Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling. Rabbeinu Gershom mandates the return of the gem on the weight of the authority of the local courts, enforcing a particular declaration. The rulings of these local courts seems to contravene halacha. Indeed, as the claimant declares, an object lost at sea becomes owner less according to the straight letter of halacha. There is no requirement for the item to be return, and the recover of the lost item is full owner. In this case, Rabbeinu Gershom is imposing a ruling that goes against the straight letter of halacha. Some propose an answer limiting Rabbeinu Gershom's ruling, based on a different interpretation of the tshuva. However- according to the default reading, how is Rabbeinu Gershom to be understood.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33683The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-08T16:00:38Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom says that the communal decree has authority because hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom goes on to reject the assumption that the power to repossess is limited only to batei dinim of special authority. He quotes that the Talmudic statement "Yiftach in his generation, like Shmuel in his generation," which gives authority to the rulings of generational leaders, even if those leaders are lacking the intellectual prowess of their predecessors. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this statement to give full powers to every communal leader, even if they themselves are not the leaders of the generation. This point is an immense view on the power of the community.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33682The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-08T15:52:49Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Facts of the Case */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
A group of Jewish merchant were traveling down a river in Germany in a barge. The barge sank, but everyone onboard was saved. However, the barge was lost with all the precious cargo onboard. One of the Jewish merchants hires a diver to help save some of the cargo. The diver was able to pull out a chest of goods, but he has to break it because of its heavy weight. The merchant and the diver attempt to save as much of the lost cargo as possible. However, because of the low visibility and the dangers of saving, the merchant and the diver put off their search until the next day. Over the night, a group of gentiles broke into the ruin and stole a large group of cargo. In the morning, the Jewish merchants attempt to recover the lost cargo by bribing local judges and nobility to make a court order demanding the return of all stolen cargo. The Jewish merchants also succeed in convincing the nearby Jewish communities to make a decree demanding the return of the stolen items. <br />
<br />
Within a month of the sinking, a member of the Jewish community is discovered to have bought a stolen gem<ref>Different words are used for the stolen item in different kitvei yad. In the Eidelberg edition, he quotes the word יוהר. This obscure term was first used by the paytanim, and it refers to a particular gem. The history of the word and attempts to indentify it are described in the following article. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23608253.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A9c39b81466fe5cd344f200751f348776&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 Yohar: The transformations of a Middle-Persian Word in Judaeo-Arabic and in Medieval Hebrew]</ref> from one of the shipwreck thieves. The purchaser of the stolen gem refuses to return it to its owner, claiming that the gem is made owner-less by the shipwreck, and the decrees are ineffective. <br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that the buyer of the stolen gem had to return it to its owner. His argument is somewhat difficult to follow and much debated by future generations. <br />
<br />
The buyer argued that according to the straight letter of halacha the gem had become ownerless in the shipwreck. The gemara indeed says that which is lost in the river becomes permitted. Further, if the owner despaires of the loss of his item (yeush), the finder need not return the item. It is unclear how Rabbeinu Gershom responds to either of these arguments, and if decision is based on a rejection of these arguments, or rather, is based on the overriding decrees of the communities. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom ruled that both the decree of the nobility and the decree of the Jewish communities were effective. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom stated clearly that Dina demalchuta Dina was applicable to this case. <br />
<br />
Rabbeinu Gershom also ruled that the communal decree had power because of the principle of hefker beit din hefker. Rabbeinu Gershom understands this principle to be applicable not only to Batei Dinim, but to the Jewish communal heads.. <br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33681The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-08T15:10:04Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts of the Case ==<br />
<br />
== Historical Background ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's Decision ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of Court ==<br />
<br />
== Rabbeinu Gershom's View on Authority of the State ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=The_Shipwreck_and_Rabbeinu_Gershom&diff=33680The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom2024-10-08T15:08:10Z<p>Maharikorkus: Created page with "== The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom =="</p>
<hr />
<div>== The Shipwreck and Rabbeinu Gershom ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33667Communal Responsibility2024-09-06T15:27:55Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
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<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religious needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> The community is mandated to build these structures even if a majority does not want them- all that is necessary is for one member of the community to ask for them.<ref>Rama CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
# Chazal decreed that a community has certain security and spiritual responsibilities.<ref>Teshuva of Sma printed in Sefer Zikaron leMaran Grib Zolti p 325<br />
<br />
The Sma argues that the list given by chazal is a set one. in all cases not listed by chazal as being necessary the community can only mandate action on a majority basis. This is in contrast to the Netivot- who views the list as depending on a community changing needs</ref><br />
# If a group of people have a shared need- they are required to come together and accomplish it.<ref>Netivot Hamishpat Biurim 196:3, Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, Choshen Mishpat 3:14<br />
<br />
This answer argues that obligation does not stem from any decree of chazal. This answer also does not view a community as being different than any other group of people- this answer instead views a community as being merely a big partnership with its own set of needs.</ref><br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on the realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik.<br />
<br />
The Masah Melech (Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4) says that the city residents and downstream residents are in a state of partnership because they reside together, which is not so in the case of Regensburg, where the communities are not in partnership</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Community of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation. <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
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The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
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He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
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=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
Among the opponents of the Maharik seems to be the Maharik. In a different tshuva (124), the Maharik was asked to decide a tax case.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 124</ref> The Duke of Savoy began to expel the Jews of Savoy.The Jewish community paid off the Duke to prevent the expulsion, and the community in turn taxed its residents to collect the sum. Some property of a nonresident was in one of the houses of the Jews who would have otherwise been expelled. The Jewish community demanded that the nonresident pay the tax, since the nonresident's property would have lost had the Jews been expelled. <br />
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The Maharik said that the nonresident was exempt from paying the tax. The Maharik supported his ruling with the gemara's case of jettisoning. The Gemara says that in a case where jettisoning is required, all passengers with cargo jettison in proportion to the weight of cargo they have brought. If a passenger has cargo that weighs ten percent of the total cargo-weight, the passenger is required to throw off ten percent of the cargo which is jettisoned. After the fact, the cargo owners who didn't throw over their cargo must compensate cargo owners who threw off more of their cargo than required. Passengers who have no cargo on board do not need to compensate the cargo owners- because only people who are causes of the danger must pay. The heavy cargo is the cause of the danger which required jettisoning. <br />
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The Maharik applies the cargo principle in this case. All inhabitants of the city are "causes" of the potential expulsion. The nonresident was not a cause of the "potential expulsion," and hence is not responsible for the tax imposed to escape the expulsion. <br />
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This tshuva of the Maharik is in contradiction to the Maharik's ruling in the Regensburg case. The Maharik in the Regensburg case said that anyone at risk of danger must pay. In this case, the Maharik said that only those who caused the expulsion must pay. <br />
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Among the earliest to spot this contradiction was the Chacham Tzvi, who concluded that this Maharik should be understood as being the primary ruling, and a repudiation of his own ruling in the Regensburg case.<ref>Shut Chacham Tzvi 132</ref><br />
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The Admat Kodesh argues that the teshuvot of the Maharik must be distinguished by nature of the respective danger. In the Regesnsburg case, "the false accusation that they accused was a case of danger of death were they not to have spent money, as in the case of anti-semitism, and so is found until this very day, that they accuse them and they endanger them in them I the matter." In the case of the Maharik and the Duke (Maharik 124), the Admat Kodesh the danger was only financial. The Duke wanted money out his greed for the wealth of the Jewish communtiy. Therefore the Maharik only obligated the asset holders that the Duke knew about. The Ducal slander was with specific intent, squeezing money out of the Jews of Savoy. Hence, the Maharik limits obligation. In contrast, in the Regensburg case, the accusation was a general antisemitism- hence all Jews in the vicinity must pay to prevent the libel from spreading.<ref>Shut Admat Kodesh 1 Choshen Mishpat 72</ref> <br />
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=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
The Rashba ruled on a similar case to the Maharik. The Rashba was asked about a situation where two Jews of Marseille were accused of putting on an anti-Christian Purim Play. The nobleman of Marseille fined the collective Jewish community as punishment. The Rashba said that the two Jews who had allegedly performed the play were exempt from compensating the community for the immense sum. The Rasha premised this ruling on the idea that the two Jews were not liable for causing the community to be fined. <br />
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However, according to the ruling of the Maharik in the Reginsburg case, anyone at potential risk of danger have to compensate their saviors. The Rashba's two Jewish actors were at risk of harm were it not for the community paying the fine. <br />
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== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Expenses_for_Shared_Danger&diff=33660Expenses for Shared Danger2024-08-29T20:45:05Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
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<div><br />
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If a community faces a threat, each of the communal members is obligated to work together to save the whole.<br />
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When a ship is sinking, the passengers have to throw their luggage off to balance the boat. When a caravan is attacked by raiders, all the members of the community have to join together to pay off the raiders.<br />
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How does this obligation work- some say that the obligation to share in the danger is only at the time of the danger. People have to work together to fight off a danger, but once the danger is ended, there is no more obligation. According to this approach- people who contributed more than obligated are not compensated by the people who did not hold up to their obligation. <br />
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However, there is another opinion that the obligation to help at the time of danger is also a financial obligation. If someone doesn't hold up to their side of the bargain, they have to compensate the rest of the community.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Expenses_for_Shared_Danger&diff=33659Expenses for Shared Danger2024-08-29T19:40:06Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
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<div><br />
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If a community faces a threat, each of the communal members is obligated to work together to save the whole.<br />
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When a ship is sinking, the passengers have to throw their luggage off to balance the boat. When a caravan is attacked by raiders, all the members of the community have to join together to pay off the raiders.<br />
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How does this obligation work- some say that the obligation to share in the danger is only at the time of the danger. People have to work together to fight off a danger, but once the danger is ended, there is no more obligation. According to this approach- people who contributed more than obligated are not compensated by the people who did not hold up to their obligation. <br />
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However, there is another opinion that the obligation to help at the time of danger is also a financial obligation. If one</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Expenses_for_Shared_Danger&diff=33658Expenses for Shared Danger2024-08-29T19:35:29Z<p>Maharikorkus: Created page with " If a community faces a threat, each of the communal members is obligated to work together to save the whole. When a ship is sinking, the passengers have to throw their luggage off to balance the boat. When a caravan is attacked by raiders, all the members of the community have to join"</p>
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<div><br />
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If a community faces a threat, each of the communal members is obligated to work together to save the whole.<br />
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When a ship is sinking, the passengers have to throw their luggage off to balance the boat. When a caravan is attacked by raiders, all the members of the community have to join</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33635Self Defense2024-08-23T14:37:43Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
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<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
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== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
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# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
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== Minor Rodef ==<br />
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# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
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== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger.<ref>Vayikra 19.16</ref> The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item.<ref>Sanhedrin 53a</ref><br />
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The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<ref>Sanhedrin 53a</ref><br />
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The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<ref>Rosh Sanhedrin 8.2</ref><br />
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== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
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If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
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# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
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The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
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== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
Can you save yourself with someone else's property? The Talmud records that King David raised this exact question in his war with the Philistines. The Philistines were hiding in Jewish-owned barley fields- and King David wanted to light a fire in order to drive the Philistines out. King David asked the Sages whether he was permitted to burn the field- and they exclaimed that for a private individual it is forbidden to save himself with another person's property.<ref>Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
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# The commentators disagree over the extent of this ruling. The Talmud clearly says pekuach nefesh overrides all mitzvot in the Torah with the exception of sexual immorality, Avodah Zara, and murder. Given that, one should be able to perform theft for the purpose of saving their life. Does this ruling imply one must die rather than violate theft?<br />
# Most say that one is permitted to steal in order to save your life- but King David 's question was only about if the theft was exempt from damages.<ref>Tosafot Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
# There are some that say that the statement should be taken at face value- theft is prohibited even to save a life.<ref>Rashi Bava Kamma 60b. There are many different approaches to read Rashi's opinion- as noted by Rav Asher Weiss in his piece on this sugya- Minchat Asher Vayikra Siman 66.</ref><br />
# A person is permitted to save themselves by destroying property that is a rodef to him- or belongs to a rodef. He is exempt from paying liability for this destruction.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 380.3</ref><br />
# Some say that property is only a rodef if the owner of the property is to blame for the item being dangerous.<ref>Rama CM 380.4</ref><br />
## For example- a donkey is riding aboard a boat with its owner and other passengers. The donkey suffers a panic attack and begins jumping up and down and causes the boat to begin to sink. The passengers are permitted to throw the donkey off the ship to save their lives. The passengers are exempt for paying damages for the donkey.<ref>Bava Kama 116b</ref><br />
## Some say that this is only true if the donkey owner was negligent in bringing the donkey aboard the boat and the donkey was known to be dangerous. If the incident is a freak accident, the passengers who threw the donkey must pay damages.<ref>Tshuvot Maimoniyot Sefer Nizakin 20</ref> <br />
### Some say that this in turn is only true if there are other luggage on the boat and thus the instability is not only the donkey's fault, but partially due to the weight of other people's luggage. If the donkey is the sole cause of the danger, there is no requirement of owner negligence.<ref>Shut Gur Aryeh CM 32</ref> <br />
### Others say that this principle is always true- the donkey is not considered a Rodef unless the owner is negligent.<ref>Erech Shai CM 264.2</ref> <br />
#For more details about the practice of jettisoning on boats- see [[Maritime Law in Halacha]]<br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33625Communal Responsibility2024-08-22T22:09:28Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Dispute with the Rashba */</p>
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<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religious needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> The community is mandated to build these structures even if a majority does not want them- all that is necessary is for one member of the community to ask for them.<ref>Rama CM 163:1</ref> <br />
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== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
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# Chazal decreed that a community has certain security and spiritual responsibilities.<ref>Teshuva of Sma printed in Sefer Zikaron leMaran Grib Zolti p 325<br />
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The Sma argues that the list given by chazal is a set one. in all cases not listed by chazal as being necessary the community can only mandate action on a majority basis. This is in contrast to the Netivot- who views the list as depending on a community changing needs</ref><br />
# If a group of people have a shared need- they are required to come together and accomplish it.<ref>Netivot Hamishpat Biurim 196:3, Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, Choshen Mishpat 3:14<br />
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This answer argues that obligation does not stem from any decree of chazal. This answer also does not view a community as being different than any other group of people- this answer instead views a community as being merely a big partnership with its own set of needs.</ref><br />
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== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
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== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
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== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
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In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
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=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
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=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
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The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
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The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
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Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
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The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
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The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
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The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
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=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
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Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on the realia.<br />
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# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
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The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
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# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik.<br />
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The Masah Melech (Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4) says that the city residents and downstream residents are in a state of partnership because they reside together, which is not so in the case of Regensburg, where the communities are not in partnership</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
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Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
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This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
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The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
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The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Community of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation. <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
Among the opponents of the Maharik seems to be the Maharik. In a different tshuva (124), the Maharik was asked to decide a tax case.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 124</ref> The Duke of Savoy began to expel the Jews of Savoy.The Jewish community paid off the Duke to prevent the expulsion, and the community in turn taxed its residents to collect the sum. Some property of a nonresident was in one of the houses of the Jews who would have otherwise been expelled. The Jewish community demanded that the nonresident pay the tax, since the nonresident's property would have lost had the Jews been expelled. <br />
<br />
The Maharik said that the nonresident was exempt from paying the tax. The Maharik supported his ruling with the gemara's case of jettisoning. The Gemara says that in a case where jettisoning is required, all passengers with cargo jettison in proportion to the weight of cargo they have brought. If a passenger has cargo that weighs ten percent of the total cargo-weight, the passenger is required to throw off ten percent of the cargo which is jettisoned. After the fact, the cargo owners who didn't throw over their cargo must compensate cargo owners who threw off more of their cargo than required. Passengers who have no cargo on board do not need to compensate the cargo owners- because only people who are causes of the danger must pay. The heavy cargo is the cause of the danger which required jettisoning. <br />
<br />
The Maharik applies the cargo principle in this case. All inhabitants of the city are "causes" of the potential expulsion. The nonresident was not a cause of the "potential expulsion," and hence is not responsible for the tax imposed to escape the expulsion. <br />
<br />
This tshuva of the Maharik is in contradiction to the Maharik's ruling in the Regensburg case. The Maharik in the Regensburg case said that anyone at risk of danger must pay. In this case, the Maharik said that only those who caused the expulsion must pay. <br />
<br />
Among the earliest to spot this contradiction was the Chacham Tzvi, who concluded that this Maharik should be understood as being the primary ruling, and a repudiation of his own ruling in the Regensburg case.<ref>Shut Chacham Tzvi 132</ref> <br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
The Rashba ruled on a similar case to the Maharik. The Rashba was asked about a situation where two Jews of Marseille were accused of putting on an anti-Christian Purim Play. The nobleman of Marseille fined the collective Jewish community as punishment. The Rashba said that the two Jews who had allegedly performed the play were exempt from compensating the community for the immense sum. The Rasha premised this ruling on the idea that the two Jews were not liable for causing the community to be fined. <br />
<br />
However, according to the ruling of the Maharik in the Reginsburg case, anyone at potential risk of danger have to compensate their saviors. The Rashba's two Jewish actors were at risk of harm were it not for the community paying the fine. <br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33624Communal Responsibility2024-08-22T22:02:41Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religious needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> The community is mandated to build these structures even if a majority does not want them- all that is necessary is for one member of the community to ask for them.<ref>Rama CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
# Chazal decreed that a community has certain security and spiritual responsibilities.<ref>Teshuva of Sma printed in Sefer Zikaron leMaran Grib Zolti p 325<br />
<br />
The Sma argues that the list given by chazal is a set one. in all cases not listed by chazal as being necessary the community can only mandate action on a majority basis. This is in contrast to the Netivot- who views the list as depending on a community changing needs</ref><br />
# If a group of people have a shared need- they are required to come together and accomplish it.<ref>Netivot Hamishpat Biurim 196:3, Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, Choshen Mishpat 3:14<br />
<br />
This answer argues that obligation does not stem from any decree of chazal. This answer also does not view a community as being different than any other group of people- this answer instead views a community as being merely a big partnership with its own set of needs.</ref><br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on the realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik.<br />
<br />
The Masah Melech (Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4) says that the city residents and downstream residents are in a state of partnership because they reside together, which is not so in the case of Regensburg, where the communities are not in partnership</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Community of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation. <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
Among the opponents of the Maharik seems to be the Maharik. In a different tshuva (124), the Maharik was asked to decide a tax case.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 124</ref> The Duke of Savoy began to expel the Jews of Savoy.The Jewish community paid off the Duke to prevent the expulsion, and the community in turn taxed its residents to collect the sum. Some property of a nonresident was in one of the houses of the Jews who would have otherwise been expelled. The Jewish community demanded that the nonresident pay the tax, since the nonresident's property would have lost had the Jews been expelled. <br />
<br />
The Maharik said that the nonresident was exempt from paying the tax. The Maharik supported his ruling with the gemara's case of jettisoning. The Gemara says that in a case where jettisoning is required, all passengers with cargo jettison in proportion to the weight of cargo they have brought. If a passenger has cargo that weighs ten percent of the total cargo-weight, the passenger is required to throw off ten percent of the cargo which is jettisoned. After the fact, the cargo owners who didn't throw over their cargo must compensate cargo owners who threw off more of their cargo than required. Passengers who have no cargo on board do not need to compensate the cargo owners- because only people who are causes of the danger must pay. The heavy cargo is the cause of the danger which required jettisoning. <br />
<br />
The Maharik applies the cargo principle in this case. All inhabitants of the city are "causes" of the potential expulsion. The nonresident was not a cause of the "potential expulsion," and hence is not responsible for the tax imposed to escape the expulsion. <br />
<br />
This tshuva of the Maharik is in contradiction to the Maharik's ruling in the Regensburg case. The Maharik in the Regensburg case said that anyone at risk of danger must pay. In this case, the Maharik said that only those who caused the expulsion must pay. <br />
<br />
Among the earliest to spot this contradiction was the Chacham Tzvi, who concluded that this Maharik should be understood as being the primary ruling, and a repudiation of his own ruling in the Regensburg case.<ref>Shut Chacham Tzvi 132</ref> <br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33623Communal Responsibility2024-08-22T21:54:27Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* The Maharik Himself- Contradiction */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religious needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> The community is mandated to build these structures even if a majority does not want them- all that is necessary is for one member of the community to ask for them.<ref>Rama CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
# Chazal decreed that a community has certain security and spiritual responsibilities.<ref>Teshuva of Sma printed in Sefer Zikaron leMaran Grib Zolti p 325<br />
<br />
The Sma argues that the list given by chazal is a set one. in all cases not listed by chazal as being necessary the community can only mandate action on a majority basis. This is in contrast to the Netivot- who views the list as depending on a community changing needs</ref><br />
# If a group of people have a shared need- they are required to come together and accomplish it.<ref>Netivot Hamishpat Biurim 196:3, Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, Choshen Mishpat 3:14<br />
<br />
This answer argues that obligation does not stem from any decree of chazal. This answer also does not view a community as being different than any other group of people- this answer instead views a community as being merely a big partnership with its own set of needs.</ref><br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Community of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
Among the opponents of the Maharik seems to be the Maharik. In a different tshuva (124), the Maharik was asked to decide a tax case.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 124</ref> The Duke of Savoy began to expel the Jews of Savoy.The Jewish community paid off the Duke to prevent the expulsion, and the community in turn taxed its residents to collect the sum. Some property of a nonresident was in one of the houses of the Jews who would have otherwise been expelled. The Jewish community demanded that the nonresident pay the tax, since the nonresident's property would have lost had the Jews been expelled. <br />
<br />
The Maharik said that the nonresident was exempt from paying the tax. The Maharik supported his ruling with the gemara's case of jettisoning. The Gemara says that in a case where jettisoning is required, all passengers with cargo jettison in proportion to the weight of cargo they have brought. If a passenger has cargo that weighs ten percent of the total cargo-weight, the passenger is required to throw off ten percent of the cargo which is jettisoned. After the fact, the cargo owners who didn't throw over their cargo must compensate cargo owners who threw off more of their cargo than required. Passengers who have no cargo on board do not need to compensate the cargo owners- because only people who are causes of the danger must pay. The heavy cargo is the cause of the danger which required jettisoning. <br />
<br />
The Maharik applies the cargo principle in this case. All inhabitants of the city are "causes" of the potential expulsion. The nonresident was not a cause of the "potential expulsion," and hence is not responsible for the tax imposed to escape the expulsion. <br />
<br />
This tshuva of the Maharik is in contradiction to the Maharik's ruling in the Regensburg case. The Maharik in the Regensburg case said that anyone at risk of danger must pay. In this case, the Maharik said that only those who caused the expulsion must pay. <br />
<br />
Among the earliest to spot this contradiction was the Chacham Tzvi, who concluded that this Maharik should be understood as being the primary ruling, and a repudiation of his own ruling in the Regensburg case.<ref>Shut Chacham Tzvi 132</ref> <br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33622Communal Responsibility2024-08-22T21:42:46Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* The Maharik Himself- Contradiction */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religious needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> The community is mandated to build these structures even if a majority does not want them- all that is necessary is for one member of the community to ask for them.<ref>Rama CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
# Chazal decreed that a community has certain security and spiritual responsibilities.<ref>Teshuva of Sma printed in Sefer Zikaron leMaran Grib Zolti p 325<br />
<br />
The Sma argues that the list given by chazal is a set one. in all cases not listed by chazal as being necessary the community can only mandate action on a majority basis. This is in contrast to the Netivot- who views the list as depending on a community changing needs</ref><br />
# If a group of people have a shared need- they are required to come together and accomplish it.<ref>Netivot Hamishpat Biurim 196:3, Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, Choshen Mishpat 3:14<br />
<br />
This answer argues that obligation does not stem from any decree of chazal. This answer also does not view a community as being different than any other group of people- this answer instead views a community as being merely a big partnership with its own set of needs.</ref><br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Community of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
Among the opponents of the Maharik seems to be the Maharik. In a different tshuva (124), the Maharik was asked to decide a tax case. The Duke of Savoy began to expel the Jews of Savoy.The Jewish community paid off the Duke to prevent the expulsion, and the community in turn taxed its residents to collect the sum. Some property of a nonresident was in one of the houses of the Jews who would have otherwise been expelled. The Jewish community demanded that the nonresident pay the tax, since the nonresident's property would have lost had the Jews been expelled. <br />
<br />
The Maharik said that the nonresident was exempt from paying the tax. The Maharik supported his ruling with the gemara's case of jettisoning. The Gemara says that in a case where jettisoning is required, all passengers with cargo jettison in proportion to the weight of cargo they have brought. If a passenger has cargo that weighs ten percent of the total cargo-weight, the passenger is required to throw off ten percent of the cargo which is jettisoned. After the fact, the cargo owners who didn't throw over their cargo must compensate cargo owners who threw off more of their cargo than required. Passengers who have no cargo on board do not need to compensate the cargo owners- because only people who are causes of the danger must pay. The heavy cargo is the cause of the danger which required jettisoning. <br />
<br />
The Maharik says that <br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
=== Challenge of the Masah Melech ===<br />
<br />
=== Shagat Aryeh's Attack ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33621Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-22T21:23:30Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div><br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat. It is permitted to throw luggage to save the ship and its passengers.<ref>Shuchan Aruch CM 380.4</ref><br />
# In such a case- each passenger throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off. <br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should have had to throw.<br />
### Some say that the passengers only compensate for the thrown off luggage in certain cases.<ref>Magid Mishnah Hilchot Chovel veMazik 8.15</ref><br />
#### They say that if the boat is overweight- any cargo on the boat has the status of rodef. They say that any owners of cargo thrown overboard are not compensated. <br />
##### Others say that is only true if the cargo thrown off the ship was distinct from the cargo left aboard the ship.<ref>Nimukei Yosef Bava Kamma 44a</ref><br />
###### Some say that the cargo which was placed last on the boat last.<ref>Sma Shulchan Aruch CM 380. 9</ref><br />
###### Some say the cargo which was registered last.<ref>Shach Choshen Mishpat 380.4</ref><br />
<br />
== Maritime Law ==<br />
<br />
== Shipwreck ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33620Self Defense2024-08-22T21:10:15Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Self Defense with Someone Else's Property */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
<br />
== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
<br />
# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
<br />
== Minor Rodef ==<br />
<br />
# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
<br />
== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger.<ref>Vayikra 19.16</ref> The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item.<ref>Sanhedrin 53a</ref><br />
<br />
The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<ref>Sanhedrin 53a</ref><br />
<br />
The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<ref>Rosh Sanhedrin 8.2</ref><br />
<br />
== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
<br />
If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
<br />
# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
<br />
The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
<br />
== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
Can you save yourself with someone else's property? The Talmud records that King David raised this exact question in his war with the Philistines. The Philistines were hiding in Jewish-owned barley fields- and King David wanted to light a fire in order to drive the Philistines out. King David asked the Sages whether he was permitted to burn the field- and they exclaimed that for a private individual it is forbidden to save himself with another person's property.<ref>Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
<br />
# The commentators disagree over the extent of this ruling. The Talmud clearly says pekuach nefesh overrides all mitzvot in the Torah with the exception of sexual immorality, Avodah Zara, and murder. Given that, one should be able to perform theft for the purpose of saving their life. Does this ruling imply one must die rather than violate theft?<br />
# Most say that one is permitted to steal in order to save your life- but King David 's question was only about if the theft was exempt from damages.<ref>Tosafot Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
# There are some that say that the statement should be taken at face value- theft is prohibited even to save a life.<ref>Rashi Bava Kamma 60b. There are many different approaches to read Rashi's opinion- as noted by Rav Asher Weiss in his piece on this sugya- Minchat Asher Vayikra Siman 66.</ref><br />
# A person is permitted to save themselves by destroying property that is a rodef to him- or belongs to a rodef. He is exempt from paying liability for this destruction.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 380.3</ref><br />
# Some say that property is only a rodef if the owner of the property is to blame for the item being dangerous.<ref>Rama CM 380.4</ref><br />
## For example- a donkey is riding aboard a boat with its owner and other passengers. The donkey suffers a panic attack and begins jumping up and down and causes the boat to begin to sink. The passengers are permitted to throw the donkey off the ship to save their lives. The passengers are exempt for paying damages for the donkey.<ref>Bava Kama 116b</ref><br />
## Some say that this is only true if the donkey owner was negligent in bringing the donkey aboard the boat and the donkey was known to be dangerous. If the incident is a freak accident, the passengers who threw the donkey must pay damages.<ref>Tshuvot Maimoniyot Sefer Nizakin 20</ref> <br />
#For more details about the practice of jettisoning on boats- see [[Maritime Law in Halacha]]<br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33619Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-22T21:03:33Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Rambam vs. Raavad */</p>
<hr />
<div><br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat. It is permitted to throw luggage to save the ship and its passengers.<ref>Shuchan Aruch CM 380.4</ref><br />
# In such a case- each passenger throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off. <br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should have had to throw.<br />
### Some say that the passengers only compensate for the thrown off luggage in certain cases.<ref>Magid Mishnah Hilchot Chovel veMazik 8.15</ref><br />
#### They say that if the boat is overweight- any cargo on the boat has the status of rodef. They say that any owners of cargo thrown overboard are not compensated. <br />
##### Others say that is only true if the cargo thrown off the ship was distinct from the cargo left aboard the ship.<ref>Nimukei Yosef Bava Kamma 44a</ref><br />
###### Some say that the cargo which was placed last on the boat last.<ref>Sma Shulchan Aruch CM 380. 9</ref><br />
###### Some say the cargo which was registered last.<ref>Shach Choshen Mishpat 380.4</ref></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33618Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-22T21:00:08Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div><br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat. It is permitted to throw luggage to save the ship and its passengers. <br />
# In such a case- each passenger throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off. <br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should have had to throw.<br />
### Some say that the passengers only compensate for the thrown off luggage in certain cases.<ref>Magid Mishnah Hilchot Chovel veMazik 8.15</ref><br />
#### They say that if the boat is overweight- any cargo on the boat has the status of rodef. They say that any owners of cargo thrown overboard are not compensated. <br />
##### Others say that is only true if the cargo thrown off the ship was distinct from the cargo left aboard the ship.<ref>Nimukei Yosef Bava Kamma 44a</ref><br />
###### Some say that the cargo which was placed last on the boat last.<ref>Sma Shulchan Aruch CM 380. 9</ref><br />
###### Some say the cargo which was registered last.<ref>Shach Choshen Mishpat 380.4</ref><br />
<br />
=== Rambam vs. Raavad ===<br />
The Rambam says that if a ship is about to break and one passenger throws cargo overboard to save the ship, the passenger who throws the cargo is not liable. The Rambam says that the passenger is permitted to throw the cargo overboard since "the weight in it is like a pursuer (rodef) going after them to kill them." <br />
<br />
The Ravaad argues the baggage is not considered a rodef. The Talmud only considered a donkey a rodef, and the case of luggage is not comprable to a rodef.<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah, a commentator on the Rambam, explains that the Rambam is referring to a specific luggage case. There are two situations when luggage needs to be thrown overboard<br />
<br />
# the ship is in a storm and needs to be lightened<br />
# the ship is overweight<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah explain that the Rambam refers to the luggage as a rodef where the ship is overweight. If the ship is overweight, then the luggage is the key reason for the boat being in danger, and therefore the luggage is a rodef. If the luggage is thrown overboard while the ship is in a storm- the Rambam would agree that the costs of the thrown over luggage has to be distributed equally.<br />
<br />
The Nimukei Yosef argues that the Maggid Mishnah's answer simply doesn't cut it. Even if we were to say that the Rambam is referring to a case where the ship is overweighed with luggage, it does not give carte blanche to throw pieces of cargo overboard. No cargo is no more of a rodef than any other piece of cargo- we are not sure which piece of cargo was the one that made the ship overweight. In the donkey case, we consider the donkey a rodef since the wild donkey was clearly the chief cause of the danger onboard the ship. In short- the Nimukei Yosef and the Ravad argue that in order for something to be considered a rodef it must be clearly distinguishable in it danger.<br />
<br />
=== Donkey Responsibility ===<br />
We pointed out that there is a dispute whether cargo is considered rodef. The opinion that considers cargo to be a rodef compares the cargo case to the donkey case, where the donkey is permitted to be killed because it is a rodef.<br />
<br />
Why is the donkey a rodef? The Tshuvot Maimoniot says that the donkey is a rodef only if it was dangerous for a donkey to have been been brought aboard a ferry. If the normal socially practice is for a donkey to be brought aboard a ferry- the donkey cannot be later considered a rodef. <br />
<br />
The Beit Yosef questions this ruling. In halacha a person is permitted to kill a dangerous animal even if the animal has not yet attacked people. The Beit Yosef questions how the Tshuvot Maimoniot can say that the donkey is not a rodef based on the context, even thought practically speaking, the donkey poses a real life danger. <br />
<br />
The Darchei Moshe explains that the donkey is different because the donkey is not a dangerous animal. The Darchei Moshe says that the Tshuvot Maimoniot allowed the passenger on the ship to throw the donkey overboard. However, the Tshuvot Maimoniot required that the passengers split the cost of the donkey unless the donkey was formally a rodef.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33617Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-22T20:47:30Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div><br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat. It is permitted to throw luggage to save the ship and its passengers. <br />
# In such a case- each passenger throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off. <br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should have had to throw.<br />
### Some say that the passengers only compensate for the thrown off luggage in certain cases.<br />
#### They say that if the boat is overweight- any cargo on the boat has the status of rodef. They say that any owners of cargo thrown overboard are not compensated. <br />
##### Others say that is only true if the cargo thrown off the ship was distinct from the cargo left aboard the ship.<br />
###### Some say that the cargo which was placed last on the boat last<br />
###### Some say the cargo which was registered last<br />
<br />
=== Rambam vs. Raavad ===<br />
The Rambam says that if a ship is about to break and one passenger throws cargo overboard to save the ship, the passenger who throws the cargo is not liable. The Rambam says that the passenger is permitted to throw the cargo overboard since "the weight in it is like a pursuer (rodef) going after them to kill them." <br />
<br />
The Ravaad argues the baggage is not considered a rodef. The Talmud only considered a donkey a rodef, and the case of luggage is not comprable to a rodef.<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah, a commentator on the Rambam, explains that the Rambam is referring to a specific luggage case. There are two situations when luggage needs to be thrown overboard<br />
<br />
# the ship is in a storm and needs to be lightened<br />
# the ship is overweight<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah explain that the Rambam refers to the luggage as a rodef where the ship is overweight. If the ship is overweight, then the luggage is the key reason for the boat being in danger, and therefore the luggage is a rodef. If the luggage is thrown overboard while the ship is in a storm- the Rambam would agree that the costs of the thrown over luggage has to be distributed equally.<br />
<br />
The Nimukei Yosef argues that the Maggid Mishnah's answer simply doesn't cut it. Even if we were to say that the Rambam is referring to a case where the ship is overweighed with luggage, it does not give carte blanche to throw pieces of cargo overboard. No cargo is no more of a rodef than any other piece of cargo- we are not sure which piece of cargo was the one that made the ship overweight. In the donkey case, we consider the donkey a rodef since the wild donkey was clearly the chief cause of the danger onboard the ship. In short- the Nimukei Yosef and the Ravad argue that in order for something to be considered a rodef it must be clearly distinguishable in it danger.<br />
<br />
=== Donkey Responsibility ===<br />
We pointed out that there is a dispute whether cargo is considered rodef. The opinion that considers cargo to be a rodef compares the cargo case to the donkey case, where the donkey is permitted to be killed because it is a rodef.<br />
<br />
Why is the donkey a rodef? The Tshuvot Maimoniot says that the donkey is a rodef only if it was dangerous for a donkey to have been been brought aboard a ferry. If the normal socially practice is for a donkey to be brought aboard a ferry- the donkey cannot be later considered a rodef. <br />
<br />
The Beit Yosef questions this ruling. In halacha a person is permitted to kill a dangerous animal even if the animal has not yet attacked people. The Beit Yosef questions how the Tshuvot Maimoniot can say that the donkey is not a rodef based on the context, even thought practically speaking, the donkey poses a real life danger. <br />
<br />
The Darchei Moshe explains that the donkey is different because the donkey is not a dangerous animal. The Darchei Moshe says that the Tshuvot Maimoniot allowed the passenger on the ship to throw the donkey overboard. However, the Tshuvot Maimoniot required that the passengers split the cost of the donkey unless the donkey was formally a rodef.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33616Self Defense2024-08-22T20:32:33Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Self Defense with Someone Else's Property */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
<br />
== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
<br />
# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
<br />
== Minor Rodef ==<br />
<br />
# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
<br />
== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger. The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item<br />
<br />
The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<br />
<br />
The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<br />
<br />
== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
<br />
If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
<br />
# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
<br />
The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
<br />
== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
Can you save yourself with someone else's property? The Talmud records that King David raised this exact question in his war with the Philistines. The Philistines were hiding in Jewish-owned barley fields- and King David wanted to light a fire in order to drive the Philistines out. King David asked the Sages whether he was permitted to burn the field- and they exclaimed that for a private individual it is forbidden to save himself with another person's property.<ref>Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
<br />
# The commentators disagree over the extent of this ruling. The Talmud clearly says pekuach nefesh overrides all mitzvot in the Torah with the exception of sexual immorality, Avodah Zara, and murder. Given that, one should be able to perform theft for the purpose of saving their life. Does this ruling imply one must die rather than violate theft?<br />
# Most say that one is permitted to steal in order to save your life- but King David 's question was only about if the theft was exempt from damages.<ref>Tosafot Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
# There are some that say that the statement should be taken at face value- theft is prohibited even to save a life.<ref>Rashi Bava Kamma 60b. There are many different approaches to read Rashi's opinion- as noted by Rav Asher Weiss in his piece on this sugya- Minchat Asher Vayikra Siman 66.</ref><br />
# A person is permitted to save themselves by destroying property that is a rodef to him- or belongs to a rodef. He is exempt from paying liability for this destruction.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 380.3</ref><br />
# Some say that property is only a rodef if the owner of the property is to blame for the item being dangerous.<ref>Rama CM 380.4</ref><br />
## For example- a donkey is riding aboard a boat with its owner and other passengers. The donkey suffers a panic attack and begins jumping up and down and causes the boat to begin to sink. The passengers are permitted to throw the donkey off the ship to save their lives. The passengers are exempt for paying damages for the donkey.<ref>Bava Kama 116b</ref><br />
## Some say that this is only true if the donkey owner was negligent in bringing the donkey aboard the boat and the donkey was known to be dangerous. If the incident is a freak accident, the passengers who threw the donkey must pay damages.<ref>Tshuvot Maimoniyot Sefer Nizakin 20</ref> <br />
#For more details about the practice of jettisoning on boats- see [[Maritime Law in Halacha]]<br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33615Self Defense2024-08-22T20:24:12Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Self Defense with Someone Else's Property */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
<br />
== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
<br />
# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
<br />
== Minor Rodef ==<br />
<br />
# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
<br />
== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger. The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item<br />
<br />
The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<br />
<br />
The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<br />
<br />
== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
<br />
If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
<br />
# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
<br />
The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
<br />
== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
Can you save yourself with someone else's property? The Talmud records that King David raised this exact question in his war with the Philistines. The Philistines were hiding in Jewish-owned barley fields- and King David wanted to light a fire in order to drive the Philistines out. King David asked the Sages whether he was permitted to burn the field- and they exclaimed that for a private individual it is forbidden to save himself with another person's property. <br />
<br />
# The commentators disagree over the extent of this ruling. The Talmud clearly says pekuach nefesh overrides all mitzvot in the Torah with the exception of sexual immorality, Avodah Zara, and murder. Given that, one should be able to perform theft for the purpose of saving their life. Does this ruling imply one must die rather than violate theft?<br />
# Most say that one is permitted to steal in order to save your life- but King David 's question was only about if the theft was exempt from damages.<ref>Tosafot Bava Kamma 60b</ref> <br />
# There are some that say that the statement should be taken at face value- theft is prohibited even to save a life.<ref>Rashi Bava Kamma 60b. There are many different approaches to read Rashi's opinion- as noted by Rav Asher Weiss in his piece on this sugya- Minchat Asher Vayikra Siman 66.</ref><br />
# A person is permitted to save themselves by destroying property that is a rodef to him- or belongs to a rodef. He is exempt from paying liability for this destruction.<br />
# Some say that property is only a rodef if the owner of the property is to blame for the item being dangerous<br />
## For example- a donkey is riding aboard a boat with its owner and other passengers. The donkey suffers a panic attack and begins jumping up and down and causes the boat to begin to sink. The passengers are permitted to throw the donkey off the ship to save their lives. The passengers are exempt for paying damages for the donkey.<br />
## Some say that this is only true if the donkey owner was negligent in bringing the donkey aboard the boat and the donkey was known to be dangerous. If the incident is a freak accident, the passengers who threw the donkey must pay damages. <br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33580Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-20T21:30:52Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Donkey Responsibility */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah contains many laws about ships<br />
<br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat.<br />
# The Gemara says that in such a case- everyone throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off<br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should not have had to throw<br />
# The Gemara also says that if someone brings a donkey aboard a small ferry boat and the donkey goes crazy, all the passengers are permitted to throw the donkey in the river to save the other passengers<br />
## The Gemara says that it is permitted to throw the donkey in the river since the donkey is a rodef to the passengers<br />
# These halachot present a seeming contradiction<br />
# One Halacha says that everyone has to throw luggage, the other halacha says only the most dangerous cargo has to be thrown off.<br />
This contradiction is fleshed out in a halachic dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad<br />
<br />
=== Rambam vs. Raavad ===<br />
The Rambam says that if a ship is about to break and one passenger throws cargo overboard to save the ship, the passenger who throws the cargo is not liable. The Rambam says that the passenger is permitted to throw the cargo overboard since "the weight in it is like a pursuer (rodef) going after them to kill them." <br />
<br />
The Ravaad argues the baggage is not considered a rodef. The Talmud only considered a donkey a rodef, and the case of luggage is not comprable to a rodef.<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah, a commentator on the Rambam, explains that the Rambam is referring to a specific luggage case. There are two situations when luggage needs to be thrown overboard<br />
<br />
# the ship is in a storm and needs to be lightened<br />
# the ship is overweight<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah explain that the Rambam refers to the luggage as a rodef where the ship is overweight. If the ship is overweight, then the luggage is the key reason for the boat being in danger, and therefore the luggage is a rodef. If the luggage is thrown overboard while the ship is in a storm- the Rambam would agree that the costs of the thrown over luggage has to be distributed equally.<br />
<br />
The Nimukei Yosef argues that the Maggid Mishnah's answer simply doesn't cut it. Even if we were to say that the Rambam is referring to a case where the ship is overweighed with luggage, it does not give carte blanche to throw pieces of cargo overboard. No cargo is no more of a rodef than any other piece of cargo- we are not sure which piece of cargo was the one that made the ship overweight. In the donkey case, we consider the donkey a rodef since the wild donkey was clearly the chief cause of the danger onboard the ship. In short- the Nimukei Yosef and the Ravad argue that in order for something to be considered a rodef it must be clearly distinguishable in it danger.<br />
<br />
=== Donkey Responsibility ===<br />
We pointed out that there is a dispute whether cargo is considered rodef. The opinion that considers cargo to be a rodef compares the cargo case to the donkey case, where the donkey is permitted to be killed because it is a rodef.<br />
<br />
Why is the donkey a rodef? The Tshuvot Maimoniot says that the donkey is a rodef only if it was dangerous for a donkey to have been been brought aboard a ferry. If the normal socially practice is for a donkey to be brought aboard a ferry- the donkey cannot be later considered a rodef. <br />
<br />
The Beit Yosef questions this ruling. In halacha a person is permitted to kill a dangerous animal even if the animal has not yet attacked people. The Beit Yosef questions how the Tshuvot Maimoniot can say that the donkey is not a rodef based on the context, even thought practically speaking, the donkey poses a real life danger. <br />
<br />
The Darchei Moshe explains that the donkey is different because the donkey is not a dangerous animal. The Darchei Moshe says that the Tshuvot Maimoniot allowed the passenger on the ship to throw the donkey overboard. However, the Tshuvot Maimoniot required that the passengers split the cost of the donkey unless the donkey was formally a rodef.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33579Self Defense2024-08-20T21:22:04Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Self Defense with Someone Else's Property */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
<br />
== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
<br />
# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
<br />
== Minor Rodef ==<br />
<br />
# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
<br />
== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger. The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item<br />
<br />
The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<br />
<br />
The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<br />
<br />
== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
<br />
If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
<br />
# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
<br />
The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
<br />
== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
Can you save yourself with someone else's property? The Talmud records that King David raised this exact question in his war with the Philistines. The Philistines were hiding in Jewish-owned barley fields- and King David wanted to light a fire in order to drive the Philistines out. King David asked the Sages whether he was permitted to burn the field- and they exclaimed that for a private individual it is forbidden to save himself with another person's property. <br />
<br />
# The commentators disagree over the extent of this ruling. The Talmud clearly says pekuach nefesh overrides all mitzvot in the Torah with the exception of sexual immorality, Avodah Zara, and murder. Given that, one should be able to perform theft for the purpose of saving their life. Does this ruling imply one cannot save oneself, or that<br />
There is an exception to the prohibition of saving oneself with the property of another person. A person is permitted to self themself by destroying property that is a rodef to him- or belongs to a rodef.<br />
<br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33578Self Defense2024-08-20T21:17:44Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Self Defense with Someone Else's Property */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
<br />
== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
<br />
# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
<br />
== Minor Rodef ==<br />
<br />
# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
<br />
== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger. The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item<br />
<br />
The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<br />
<br />
The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<br />
<br />
== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
<br />
If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
<br />
# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
<br />
The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
<br />
== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
Can you save yourself with someone else's property? The Talmud records that King David raised this exact question in his war with the Philistines. The Philistines were hiding in Jewish-owned barley fields- and King David wanted to light a fire in order to drive the Philistines out. King David asked the Sages whether he was permitted to burn the field- and they exclaimed that for a private individual it is forbidden to save himself with another person's property. <br />
<br />
# The commentators disagree over the extent of this ruling. The Talmud clearly says pekuach nefesh overrides all mitzvot in the Torah with the exception of sexual immorality, Avodah Zara, and murder. Given that, one should be able to perform theft for the purpose of saving their life. Does this ruling imply one cannot save oneself, or that<br />
<br />
Elsewhere in the Talmud<br />
<br />
A later dispute emerged in the commentators about someone offered the choice of death or handing over the property of a friend. Which choice should someone pick, and are they liable to compensate their friend if they end up picking the option of handing over property?<br />
<br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Self_Defense&diff=33577Self Defense2024-08-20T21:09:15Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah permits a person to neutralize an attacker if his life is threatened. This concept is known in halacha as Rodef (heb. רודף; lit. a chaser). When necessary it is even permissible to kill a rodef in order to save the intended victim. <br />
<br />
== Saving the life of a victim ==<br />
<br />
# When an attacker is chasing his victim in order to kill him, it is permissible and a mitzvah to save the victim from death, even if that necessitates killing the attacker.<ref>Sanhedrin 73a, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
# However, two criteria that need to be met in order to kill a rodef are: <br />
## The rodef is warned that the victim he is chasing is Jewish and if he tries to kill him, he is culpable of death.<ref>Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:7), Tur and Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref> Some poskim hold that this warning is only necessary when there is time and it is possible, but when impossible it isn't necessary.<ref>Sma 425:3 writes that the entire warning is only necessary initially, but after the fact it isn't necessary. Bach 425:4 s.v. ma shkatuv keysad implies that the formal hatrah warning necessary for bet din punishments isn't necessary except initially for Rambam. However, informing the rodef that the victim is Jewish and he will be culpable for killing him is necessary, seemingly even after the fact. See [https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif RJJ article by Rabbi Bechofer (p. 11 fnt. 38)] where he quotes R' Ari Federgrun, who questioned Sma's proof.</ref><br />
## If it is at all possible the savior should try to neutralize the rodef without killing the rodef. If incapacitating him by injuring one of his limbs or in another manner is possible those means must be resorted to before killing the rodef. If the savior kills the rodef without trying to neutralize the rodef without killing him, he is culpable for his murder.<ref>Sanhedrin 57a-b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:13), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1, Aruch Hashulchan 425:6</ref><br />
### Some poskim make a distinction between the intended victim and someone else coming to save the intended victim. The intended victim may kill the rodef without first trying to neutralize the rodef by incapacitating him in another fashion. However, someone else coming to save the intended victim must first try to neutralize the rodef before resorting to kill him.<ref>Hagahot Mishna Lmelech (Chovel Umazik 8:10) quoting one answer in Rivash 238</ref> However, most poskim reject this distinction and require even the intended victim to try to neutralize the rodef without killing him if at all possible.<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/67649220/Split_Second_Decisions_Policing_and_the_Halachos_of_Rodeif Rabbi Bechhofer in RJJ article (p. 4 fnt. 18)] presents that Brisker Rav (Griz on Rambam Chovel 8:10), Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 139), Rashi (Sanhedrin 57a s.v. vyachol), Yad Ramah (Sanhedrin 57a), and Rosh (Bava Kama 3:13) do not hold of any distinction between the nitzal and matzil. Rabbi Bechhofer presents an argument that Rambam does hold like this distinction. </ref><br />
<br />
== Minor Rodef ==<br />
<br />
# It is possible to kill a rodef even if he's a minor.<ref>Sanhedrin 72b, Rambam (Rotze'ach 1:6), Shulchan Aruch C.M. 425:1</ref><br />
<br />
== Lo Tamod- You Shall Not Stand on Blood ==<br />
The Torah prohibits a person from not assisting someone in mortal danger. The Talmud also explains that there exists a mitzvah to save someone from death as a fulfillment of returning a lost item<br />
<br />
The Talmud says that in a case where someone sees another person in need- you must try all you can to save the person, including the rescuer spending his own money.<br />
<br />
The commentators explain that while the rescuer is liable to spend his own money in the moment, but that the rescued must later compensate the rescuer for expenses.<br />
<br />
== Property in a Rodef Case ==<br />
The Talmud says that if someone is being chased by a rodef and in order to escape, the victim damages property of a third party- the victim must later compensate the owners of the broken property for damages. If the victim damages the rodef's property, the victim is exempt. <br />
<br />
If a rescuer chases after the rodef in order to save the victim and damages property over the course of the chase- the rescuer is exempt from the cost of damages even if the rescuer damaged property of a third party<br />
<br />
# The Talmud explains that the rescuer is exempt from damages out a concern lest people refrain from saving out of a liability concern<br />
## In contrast, no such concern exists if the victim damages property in his flight, since he has the natural incentive of self preservation<br />
# There is a dispute about when this exemption applies. The case in controversy is where the rescuer is also a potential victim, and by defeating the rodef, the rescuer also saves the victim.<br />
## Some say that the exemption does not apply- in this case we are not concerned that the rescuer would not rescue- since his life was at risk.<ref>Pnei Yehoshua Bava Kama 60b</ref><br />
## Others say that the exemption from liability applies anytime you save other people.<ref>Netivot Hamispat Biurim 340.6<br />
<br />
The Netivot is commenting on the Terumat Hadeshen's case of someone who borrows weapons before fighting in a battle to save the town. The Terumat Hadeshen exempts the borrower for loss of property is the battle is lost and the weapons stolen because of meta Machmat melacha. The Netivot argues that the Terumat Hadeshen must be describing a case where the battle was not life or death, because if it were, there would be no doubt about exempting the borrower from liability.</ref><br />
<br />
== Self Defense with Someone Else's Property ==<br />
The Talmud explains that King David was the first to ask whether you could do self defense with someone else's property<br />
<br />
King David was attacking the Philistines, and the Philistines hid from King David in Jewish fields. King David wondered whether he could destroy the fields to get to the Philistines.<br />
<br />
== Sources ==<br />
<references/></div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33576Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-20T20:47:07Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Jettisoning */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah contains many laws about ships<br />
<br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat.<br />
# The Gemara says that in such a case- everyone throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off<br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should not have had to throw<br />
# The Gemara also says that if someone brings a donkey aboard a small ferry boat and the donkey goes crazy, all the passengers are permitted to throw the donkey in the river to save the other passengers<br />
## The Gemara says that it is permitted to throw the donkey in the river since the donkey is a rodef to the passengers<br />
# These halachot present a seeming contradiction<br />
# One Halacha says that everyone has to throw luggage, the other halacha says only the most dangerous cargo has to be thrown off.<br />
This contradiction is fleshed out in a halachic dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad<br />
<br />
=== Rambam vs. Raavad ===<br />
The Rambam says that if a ship is about to break and one passenger throws cargo overboard to save the ship, the passenger who throws the cargo is not liable. The Rambam says that the passenger is permitted to throw the cargo overboard since "the weight in it is like a pursuer (rodef) going after them to kill them." <br />
<br />
The Ravaad argues the baggage is not considered a rodef. The Talmud only considered a donkey a rodef, and the case of luggage is not comprable to a rodef.<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah, a commentator on the Rambam, explains that the Rambam is referring to a specific luggage case. There are two situations when luggage needs to be thrown overboard<br />
<br />
# the ship is in a storm and needs to be lightened<br />
# the ship is overweight<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah explain that the Rambam refers to the luggage as a rodef where the ship is overweight. If the ship is overweight, then the luggage is the key reason for the boat being in danger, and therefore the luggage is a rodef. If the luggage is thrown overboard while the ship is in a storm- the Rambam would agree that the costs of the thrown over luggage has to be distributed equally.<br />
<br />
The Nimukei Yosef argues that the Maggid Mishnah's answer simply doesn't cut it. Even if we were to say that the Rambam is referring to a case where the ship is overweighed with luggage, it does not give carte blanche to throw pieces of cargo overboard. No cargo is no more of a rodef than any other piece of cargo- we are not sure which piece of cargo was the one that made the ship overweight. In the donkey case, we consider the donkey a rodef since the wild donkey was clearly the chief cause of the danger onboard the ship. In short- the Nimukei Yosef and the Ravad argue that in order for something to be considered a rodef it must be clearly distinguishable in it danger.<br />
<br />
=== Donkey Responsibility ===<br />
We pointed out that there is a dispute whether cargo is considered rodef. The opinion that considers cargo to be a rodef compares the cargo case to the donkey case, where the donkey is permitted to be killed because it is a rodef.<br />
<br />
Why is the donkey a rodef? The Tshuvot Maimoniot</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33575Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-20T20:43:55Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Jettisoning */</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah contains many laws about ships<br />
<br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat.<br />
# The Gemara says that in such a case- everyone throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off<br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should not have had to throw<br />
# The Gemara also says that if someone brings a donkey aboard a small ferry boat and the donkey goes crazy, all the passengers are permitted to throw the donkey in the river to save the other passengers<br />
## The Gemara says that it is permitted to throw the donkey in the river since the donkey is a rodef to the passengers<br />
# These halachot present a seeming contradiction<br />
# One Halacha says that everyone has to throw luggage, the other halacha says only the most dangerous cargo has to be thrown off.<br />
This contradiction is fleshed out in a halachic dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad<br />
<br />
=== Rambam vs. Raavad ===<br />
The Rambam says that if a ship is about to break and one passenger throws cargo overboard to save the ship, the passenger who throws the cargo is not liable. The Rambam says that the passenger is permitted to throw the cargo overboard since "the weight in it is like a pursuer (rodef) going after them to kill them." <br />
<br />
The Ravaad argues the baggage is not considered a rodef. The Talmud only considered a donkey a rodef, and the case of luggage is not comprable to a rodef.<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah, a commentator on the Rambam, explains that the Rambam is referring to a specific luggage case. There are two situations when luggage needs to be thrown overboard<br />
<br />
# the ship is in a storm and needs to be lightened<br />
# the ship is overweight<br />
<br />
The Magid Mishnah explain that the Rambam refers to the luggage as a rodef where the ship is overweight. If the ship is overweight, then the luggage is the key reason for the boat being in danger, and therefore the luggage is a rodef. If the luggage is thrown overboard while the ship is in a storm- the Rambam would agree that the costs of the thrown over luggage has to be distributed equally.<br />
<br />
The Nimukei Yosef argues that the Maggid Mishnah's answer simply doesn't cut it. Even if we were to say that the Rambam is referring to a case where the ship is overweighed with luggage, it does not give carte blanche to throw pieces of cargo overboard. No cargo is no more of a rodef than any other piece of cargo- we are not sure which piece of cargo was the one that made the ship overweight. In the donkey case, we consider the donkey a rodef since the wild donkey was clearly the chief cause of the danger onboard the ship. In short- the Nimukei Yosef and the Ravad argue that in order for something to be considered a rodef it must be clearly distinguishable in it danger.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33574Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-20T20:26:48Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah contains many laws about ships<br />
<br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
<br />
# If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat.<br />
# The Gemara says that in such a case- everyone throws off a percentage of cargo equaling their percentage of weight<br />
## for example- if one person's luggage is ten percent of the total cargo by weight aboard the ship, this person must throw off ten percent of the luggage thrown off<br />
## After the fact, even if the luggage was not thrown off according to this method, the passengers compensate one another for luggage they should not have had to throw<br />
# The Gemara also says that if someone brings a donkey aboard a small ferry boat and the donkey goes crazy, all the passengers are permitted to throw the donkey in the river to save the other passengers<br />
## The Gemara says that it is permitted to throw the donkey in the river since the donkey is a rodef to the passengers<br />
# These halachot present a seeming contradiction<br />
# One Halacha says that everyone has to throw luggage, the other halacha says only the most dangerous cargo has to be thrown off.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Maritime_Law_in_Halacha&diff=33573Maritime Law in Halacha2024-08-20T20:15:51Z<p>Maharikorkus: Created page with "The Torah contains many laws about ships == Jettisoning == If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat."</p>
<hr />
<div>The Torah contains many laws about ships<br />
<br />
== Jettisoning ==<br />
If a ship is caught in a storm- it may be necessary to throw cargo into the water to stabilize the boat.</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Shomrim&diff=33567Shomrim2024-08-20T15:57:56Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
<hr />
<div>When someone temporarily has someone else's property, they become a shomer- or bailee in contemporary English. As shomer, they have a responsibility towards the item, and a corresponding liability if something goes wrong. <br />
<br />
The Torah (Shemot 22:6-14) distinguishes between four categories of shomrim who each have a different level of liability and responsibility <br />
<br />
'''Shomer Chinam'''- Someone who watches someone else's item for no salary <br />
<br />
'''Shomer Sachar'''- Someone who is paid to watch something<br />
<br />
'''Socher'''- Some who rents something<br />
<br />
'''Shoel'''- Someone who borrows something.<br />
<br />
== How do you become a shomer? ==<br />
<br />
# Someone does not become a shomer until the owner of the item asks them to watch the item, and the other party verbally accepts to watch the item.<br />
# Some say that even if the person has agreed to be a shomer, his responsibilities as shomer don't begin until he makes a formal act of acquisition on the item.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 291:4</ref> Because there is a dispute over whether an act of acquisition is actually require, in situations where someone accepted to be a Shomer but did not do a kinyan, we don't treat the person as a shomer.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/does-a-shomer-need-to-make-a-kinyan/</ref><br />
## however- if a Shomer is paid, receiving the payment is a form of acquisition.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/does-a-shomer-need-to-make-a-kinyan/</ref> <br />
# If the owner asks someone to watch something, and the other person responds "leave it," the person's response is not considered to be acceptance of the role of shomer.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 291:2</ref><br />
## if someone at an airport asks to leave something with someone else, the person with the item does not become a shomer.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/how-does-one-accept-the-responsibility-to-be-a-shomer/</ref><br />
# If someone gives something to carry somewhere- it is assumed that by taking the item someone has become a shomer Chinam.<ref>Shut Rosh 94:2. The Rosh was asked about a case where Reuben (pseudonym) heard that Shimon (pseudonym) would be traveling to a nearby city. Reuben asked Shimon to carry a pair of shoes for him. Shimon agreed. Shimon put the shoes on his donkey without tying them down. When Shimon got off his donkey to use the bathroom, the shoes fell off and were lost. Reuben demanded that Shimon pay for his negligence because Shimon was a Shomer Chinam.<br />
<br />
The Rosh ruled that even though Shimon did not accept upon himself to be shomer, nevertheless since he nevertheless became shomer because were "he not to guard them in the road, certainly they would be lost in the road." <br />
<br />
This teshuva of the Rosh is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch CM 291:2.</ref> <br />
# If someone were to to ask someone else to use the other person's safe, the safe owner asked not accepted to be a Shomer for the item placed in the safe.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/if-i-let-someone-put-something-in-my-safe-for-safekeeping-do-i-become-a-shomer/</ref> <br />
# One is only a shomer for that which the shomer is aware of. Some say if you accepted the role of Shomer mistakenly, you are not a shomer.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 291:4. <br />
<br />
In Bava Kama 62a, Rava is quoted as having said that if someone give a shomer a coin to guard and tells him that it is silver but it is really gold. If the coin is later damaged by virtue of the shomer's negligence, the shomer only has to pay the value of a silver coin, since he thought he was accepting to be shomer of a silver coin. <br />
<br />
In Mordechai Bava Kama (Remez 207), a story is quoted of a person who borrowed a sword which he later lost. It turned out that the sword really had been used as collateral for a loan by the lender. Therefore when the borrower lost the sword, he had not only caused a loss of the sword itself, but rather the loss of the entire loan. The Mordechai writes that the borrower is only liable to pay the value of the sword proper, since the borrower was not aware of the sword's collateral value when he borrowed the sword.</ref><br />
# If someone gives an item to a child to watch the child does not become a shomer.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.15</ref><br />
# If a child gives something to watch to an adult, it is disputable whether the adult becomes a shomer.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.18</ref><br />
# The rules of shomer do not apply to the following types of assets. It is disputed whether someone who watches the following items is liable if he is negligent. <br />
## land<br />
## servants<br />
## debt documents<br />
#The rules of shomer do not apply to assets received from non-Jews<br />
#For cases where the rules of shomer don't apply- the person receiving the item to watch can still become liable if he does a formal act of kinyan. <br />
<br />
== Shomer Shmasar Lshomer ==<br />
# One guard should not give the item to another guard to watch. However, he could give it to his wife or children to watch.<reF>Bava Metsia 36b, Shulchan Aruch C.M. 291:21</ref><br />
==Shomer Chinam==<br />
# A shomer chinam, someone watching someone's property for free, is only obligated in a case of negligance.<ref>Bava Metsia 94b, Shulchan Aruch C.M. 291:1</ref><br />
# When a shomer chinam loses something he's exempt. Some say that he is exempt once he put in a safe place and doesn't remember where he left it. Others argue that he is obligated in such a case because of negligence. Rather he is only exempt if he left it in a safe place and now he looks in that place and doesn't see it. He is exempt even though there's no suspicion of a robbery but nonetheless if it was moved by someone else or the like it is called losing an object and is exempt.<ref> Gemara Bava Metsia 35a explains that if a person lost an object because he doesn't know that is negligence and not exempt. Meiri b"m 35a quotes two opinions about the definition of losing an object that is exempt. Some say that one is exempt anytime one put it in a safe place but if one doesn't remember where he left it that is negligence since he didn't put it in a safe place. However, others say that it is negligence if one doesn't remember where one left it even if one certainly put it in a safe place. Shomrim Hafked p. 138 explains that according to the second opinion the only time one is exempt for losing an object is if one looks in the place where one left it and it isn't there but there was no evidence of thievery. This is implied by Igrot Moshe CM 1:32. Ritva b"m 35a follows the first opinion of the Meiri, but the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch CM 291:7 follow the second opinion. Shomrim Hafked does as well.</ref><br />
# A shomer chinam needs only to do the minimum necessary to guard again everyday dangers<br />
# There is no one fast rule on how much a Shomer chinam is recquired to watch an item. The level of shmira depends on the nature of the watched item and its vulnerabilities. A shomer chinam must follow this standard of care, even if he is not so careful with his own possessions. <ref>SA CM 291:13-18</ref><br />
## If the Shomer explicitly asks the owner of the item permission, he can agree to a different standard of shmira<br />
<br />
== Shomer Sachar ==<br />
<br />
# A shomer sachar is liable for all situations that the item is lost, except when the loss happened outside of his control.<br />
# A shomer sacher must watch the item with a higher level of care than a shomer chinam. A shomer sacher must protect the item even against dangers that are unlikely.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:2.2</ref><br />
# In order to be considered a shomer sacher, he must be paid a salary (minimum 1 prutah) to watch the item.<ref>Pitchei Chosen 3:1.2</ref><br />
# A craftsman is a shomer sacher for the things which he repairs.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.3</ref><br />
# A broker is a shomer Sachar for the items he stores on behalf of a seller.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.5</ref><br />
# Someone who is paid to deliver something is a Shomer sacher for the item.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.4</ref><br />
# Anyone who profits because of an item which they are watching becomes a shomer sacher for it.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.4</ref><br />
# A housekeeper is a shomer sacher if he is given something to watch. Some say that a housekeeper is a shomer sacher on everything in the house.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.7</ref><br />
# If someone receives a non-financial benefit because they watched an item (like a favor), they are a shomer sacher. <ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.9</ref><br />
# A paid babysitter who takes a kid to the park is a shomer sachaer on the stroller and toys brought along.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.7 footnote 17</ref><br />
== Socher ==<br />
A socher is someone who pays money in order to rent an item. A socher has the same liabilities as shomer sacher. <br />
<br />
== Shoel ==<br />
A shoel or borrower is someone who is given an item to use temporarily for free. The shoel is liable if anything happens to the item, even if it is not a fault of his own. A shoel is only exempt is damage happened to the item from the task for which it was lent.<br />
<br />
There is a dispute over what kinds of damage are exempted. Some say that that the borrower is only exempt if the item is harmed from the task for which the item was lent; for example if someone borrows an animal and the animal is harmed from the strain of work. If someone borrowed an animal for a journey and rob<br />
<br />
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A town is attacked by raiders and one of the townspeople borrows weapons from another- and the townspeople lose the battle and the weapons are captured. Some say that the borrower is exempt from liability for the weapons, since the loss of weapons in battle is a risk of weapons borrowing. Others say that the borrower is obligated, because there is nothing wrong with the weapons.<ref>Shach CM 340.6</ref><br />
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== ''Balav imo'' ==<br />
A shoel and socher are exempt from liability if they began work accompanied by the owner.<br />
<br />
==Sources==<br />
<references/><br />
[[Category: Choshen Mishpat]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Shomrim&diff=33566Shomrim2024-08-20T15:37:10Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* How do you become a shomer? */</p>
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<div>When someone temporarily has someone else's property, they become a shomer- or bailee in contemporary English. As shomer, they have a responsibility towards the item, and a corresponding liability if something goes wrong. <br />
<br />
The Torah (Shemot 22:6-14) distinguishes between four categories of shomrim who each have a different level of liability and responsibility <br />
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'''Shomer Chinam'''- Someone who watches someone else's item for no salary <br />
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'''Shomer Sachar'''- Someone who is paid to watch something<br />
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'''Socher'''- Some who rents something<br />
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'''Shoel'''- Someone who borrows something.<br />
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== How do you become a shomer? ==<br />
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# Someone does not become a shomer until the owner of the item asks them to watch the item, and the other party verbally accepts to watch the item.<br />
# Some say that even if the person has agreed to be a shomer, his responsibilities as shomer don't begin until he makes a formal act of acquisition on the item.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 291:4</ref> Because there is a dispute over whether an act of acquisition is actually require, in situations where someone accepted to be a Shomer but did not do a kinyan, we don't treat the person as a shomer.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/does-a-shomer-need-to-make-a-kinyan/</ref><br />
## however- if a Shomer is paid, receiving the payment is a form of acquisition.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/does-a-shomer-need-to-make-a-kinyan/</ref> <br />
# If the owner asks someone to watch something, and the other person responds "leave it," the person's response is not considered to be acceptance of the role of shomer.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 291:2</ref><br />
## if someone at an airport asks to leave something with someone else, the person with the item does not become a shomer.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/how-does-one-accept-the-responsibility-to-be-a-shomer/</ref><br />
# If someone gives something to carry somewhere- it is assumed that by taking the item someone has become a shomer Chinam.<ref>Shut Rosh 94:2. The Rosh was asked about a case where Reuben (pseudonym) heard that Shimon (pseudonym) would be traveling to a nearby city. Reuben asked Shimon to carry a pair of shoes for him. Shimon agreed. Shimon put the shoes on his donkey without tying them down. When Shimon got off his donkey to use the bathroom, the shoes fell off and were lost. Reuben demanded that Shimon pay for his negligence because Shimon was a Shomer Chinam.<br />
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The Rosh ruled that even though Shimon did not accept upon himself to be shomer, nevertheless since he nevertheless became shomer because were "he not to guard them in the road, certainly they would be lost in the road." <br />
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This teshuva of the Rosh is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch CM 291:2.</ref> <br />
# If someone were to to ask someone else to use the other person's safe, the safe owner asked not accepted to be a Shomer for the item placed in the safe.<ref>https://baishavaad.org/if-i-let-someone-put-something-in-my-safe-for-safekeeping-do-i-become-a-shomer/</ref> <br />
# One is only a shomer for that which the shomer is aware of. Some say if you accepted the role of Shomer mistakenly, you are not a shomer.<ref>Shulchan Aruch CM 291:4. <br />
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In Bava Kama 62a, Rava is quoted as having said that if someone give a shomer a coin to guard and tells him that it is silver but it is really gold. If the coin is later damaged by virtue of the shomer's negligence, the shomer only has to pay the value of a silver coin, since he thought he was accepting to be shomer of a silver coin. <br />
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In Mordechai Bava Kama (Remez 207), a story is quoted of a person who borrowed a sword which he later lost. It turned out that the sword really had been used as collateral for a loan by the lender. Therefore when the borrower lost the sword, he had not only caused a loss of the sword itself, but rather the loss of the entire loan. The Mordechai writes that the borrower is only liable to pay the value of the sword proper, since the borrower was not aware of the sword's collateral value when he borrowed the sword.</ref><br />
# If someone gives an item to a child to watch the child does not become a shomer.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.15</ref><br />
# If a child gives something to watch to an adult, it is disputable whether the adult becomes a shomer.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.18</ref><br />
# The rules of shomer do not apply to the following types of assets. It is disputed whether someone who watches the following items is liable if he is negligent. <br />
## land<br />
## servants<br />
## debt documents<br />
#The rules of shomer do not apply to assets received from non-Jews<br />
#For cases where the rules of shomer don't apply- the person receiving the item to watch can still become liable if he does a formal act of kinyan. <br />
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== Shomer Shmasar Lshomer ==<br />
# One guard should not give the item to another guard to watch. However, he could give it to his wife or children to watch.<reF>Bava Metsia 36b, Shulchan Aruch C.M. 291:21</ref><br />
==Shomer Chinam==<br />
# A shomer chinam, someone watching someone's property for free, is only obligated in a case of negligance.<ref>Bava Metsia 94b, Shulchan Aruch C.M. 291:1</ref><br />
# When a shomer chinam loses something he's exempt. Some say that he is exempt once he put in a safe place and doesn't remember where he left it. Others argue that he is obligated in such a case because of negligence. Rather he is only exempt if he left it in a safe place and now he looks in that place and doesn't see it. He is exempt even though there's no suspicion of a robbery but nonetheless if it was moved by someone else or the like it is called losing an object and is exempt.<ref> Gemara Bava Metsia 35a explains that if a person lost an object because he doesn't know that is negligence and not exempt. Meiri b"m 35a quotes two opinions about the definition of losing an object that is exempt. Some say that one is exempt anytime one put it in a safe place but if one doesn't remember where he left it that is negligence since he didn't put it in a safe place. However, others say that it is negligence if one doesn't remember where one left it even if one certainly put it in a safe place. Shomrim Hafked p. 138 explains that according to the second opinion the only time one is exempt for losing an object is if one looks in the place where one left it and it isn't there but there was no evidence of thievery. This is implied by Igrot Moshe CM 1:32. Ritva b"m 35a follows the first opinion of the Meiri, but the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch CM 291:7 follow the second opinion. Shomrim Hafked does as well.</ref><br />
# A shomer chinam needs only to do the minimum necessary to guard again everyday dangers<br />
# There is no one fast rule on how much a Shomer chinam is recquired to watch an item. The level of shmira depends on the nature of the watched item and its vulnerabilities. A shomer chinam must follow this standard of care, even if he is not so careful with his own possessions. <ref>SA CM 291:13-18</ref><br />
## If the Shomer explicitly asks the owner of the item permission, he can agree to a different standard of shmira<br />
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== Shomer Sachar ==<br />
<br />
# A shomer sachar is liable for all situations that the item is lost, except when the loss happened outside of his control.<br />
# A shomer sacher must watch the item with a higher level of care than a shomer chinam. A shomer sacher must protect the item even against dangers that are unlikely.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:2.2</ref><br />
# In order to be considered a shomer sacher, he must be paid a salary (minimum 1 prutah) to watch the item.<ref>Pitchei Chosen 3:1.2</ref><br />
# A craftsman is a shomer sacher for the things which he repairs.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.3</ref><br />
# A broker is a shomer Sachar for the items he stores on behalf of a seller.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.5</ref><br />
# Someone who is paid to deliver something is a Shomer sacher for the item.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.4</ref><br />
# Anyone who profits because of an item which they are watching becomes a shomer sacher for it.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.4</ref><br />
# A housekeeper is a shomer sacher if he is given something to watch. Some say that a housekeeper is a shomer sacher on everything in the house.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.7</ref><br />
# If someone receives a non-financial benefit because they watched an item (like a favor), they are a shomer sacher. <ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.9</ref><br />
# A paid babysitter who takes a kid to the park is a shomer sachaer on the stroller and toys brought along.<ref>Pitchei Choshen 3:1.7 footnote 17</ref><br />
== Socher ==<br />
A socher is someone who pays money in order to rent an item. A socher has the same liabilities as shomer sacher. <br />
<br />
== Shoel ==<br />
A shoel or borrower is someone who is given an item to use temporarily for free. The shoel is liable if anything happens to the item, even if it is not a fault of his own. A shoel is only exempt is damage happened to the item from the task for which it was lent.<br />
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''Meta Machmat Melacha''- Death from work<br />
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== ''Balav imo'' ==<br />
A shoel and socher are exempt from liability if they began work accompanied by the owner.<br />
<br />
==Sources==<br />
<references/><br />
[[Category: Choshen Mishpat]]</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33551Communal Responsibility2024-08-18T15:46:26Z<p>Maharikorkus: </p>
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<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religious needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> The community is mandated to build these structures even if a majority does not want them- all that is necessary is for one member of the community to ask for them.<ref>Rama CM 163:1</ref> <br />
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== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
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# Chazal decreed that a community has certain security and spiritual responsibilities.<ref>Teshuva of Sma printed in Sefer Zikaron leMaran Grib Zolti p 325<br />
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The Sma argues that the list given by chazal is a set one. in all cases not listed by chazal as being necessary the community can only mandate action on a majority basis. This is in contrast to the Netivot- who views the list as depending on a community changing needs</ref><br />
# If a group of people have a shared need- they are required to come together and accomplish it.<ref>Netivot Hamishpat Biurim 196:3, Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, Choshen Mishpat 3:14<br />
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This answer argues that obligation does not stem from any decree of chazal. This answer also does not view a community as being different than any other group of people- this answer instead views a community as being merely a big partnership with its own set of needs.</ref><br />
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== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
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== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
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== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
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In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
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=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
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=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
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The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
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The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Community of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
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=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
=== Challenge of the Masah Melech ===<br />
<br />
=== Shagat Aryeh's Attack ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33549Communal Responsibility2024-08-18T14:04:01Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Similar Opinions to the Maharik */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religous needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case of Bava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
The Mishpatei Shmuel also brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Communinity of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
=== Challenge of the Masah Melech ===<br />
<br />
=== Shagat Aryeh's Attack ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33548Communal Responsibility2024-08-18T13:52:08Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religous needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case ofBava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger.<ref>This argument of the Maharik is bolstered by the context of the Gemara. The Mishna and Gemara in Bava Batra 7b quote a tannaic dispute about the obligation to build a wall. The Tanna Kamma of the Mishna explains that all cities are required to build a wall, whereas Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel insists that only cities on the border have to build a wall since they are at certain risk of raid. The Gemara explains the opinion of the Tanna kama that "sometimes raiders come." This formulation of the Tanna Kamma implies that we are concerned about danger no matter the uncertain nature</ref> We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna (268), a contemporary of the Maharik, records a neat formulation that resolves the Masah Melech's rejection.<br />
<br />
The Mahari Bruna says that "in slanders not relating to money, even in one city, all the countries are in dangers, as was proved, as a result of our sinfulness in the country of Silesia. We see that all of the country is like one city." The Mahari Bruna asserts that the reason that a city builds a wall is because of shared danger, and that in cases of libel, "the country is like one city"<br />
<br />
In contrast the Maseh Melech views the obligation to build a wall as an inherently city obligation. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other Jewish communities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Communinity of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
=== Challenge of the Masah Melech ===<br />
<br />
=== Shagat Aryeh's Attack ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33547Communal Responsibility2024-08-16T19:14:26Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Premises of the Maharik's Argument */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religous needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from the gutter case ofBava Metzia 108a.<ref>The Shagat Aryeh (his comments on the Maharik are printed in the back of the Machon Oraita 1988 edition of Shut Maharik) says that the reason for the obligation of the city residents to assist the downstream inhabitants in gutter repair is for a different reason. The city residents harm the resident downstream if the gutter is not repaired, since all the waste will gather on the downstream. Therefore, the city participates in gutter repair not because the city is at risk- but rather because the city is the malefactor. This reading of the Shagat Aryeh removes this Gemara in Bava Metzia as being a proof for the Maharik</ref><br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger. We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other cities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Communinity of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
<br />
== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
<br />
The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
<br />
He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
<br />
=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
<br />
=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
<br />
=== Challenge of the Masah Melech ===<br />
<br />
=== Shagat Aryeh's Attack ===<br />
<br />
== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkushttps://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Communal_Responsibility&diff=33546Communal Responsibility2024-08-16T19:04:39Z<p>Maharikorkus: /* Premises of the Maharik's Argument */</p>
<hr />
<div>Halacha places high importance on a community's responsibility to one another. A community is halachically obligated to fund communal needs. These needs include security needs; a community is required to build a wall and gates. These needs also include religous needs; a community is required to build a synagogue and ensure that is well stocked with a sefer Torah and seforim.<ref>All of this from Shulchan Aruch CM 163:1</ref> <br />
<br />
== Rationales behind Communal Responsibility ==<br />
<br />
== Extent of Communal Responsibility ==<br />
A big component of the halachic discussion around how far communal responsibility extends comes from a crucial Tshuva of the Maharik. This Tshuva of the Maharik is quoted by the Rama<ref>Rama CM 163:6</ref> and by many generations of Achronim, thereby making it a really focal point for the discussion of communal responsibility.The Maharik argued that in a case where there is a risk to the Jewish people of a region, all Jewish communities are required to pitch in. We will structure the article around the Tshuva and the response of other poskim in order to examine how poskim viewed the question.<br />
<br />
== Background of Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
[[File:Shul of regensburg.jpg|thumb|Sketch of Synagogue of Regensburg in 1519]]<br />
In the late 1470s- a major blood libel broke out in Regensburg. The city of Regensburg imprisoned seventeen leading members of the Jewish community. After repeated negotiations the city of Regensburg agreed to release the imprisoned Jews in exchange for the payment of an immense sum; 23,000 florins. The Jewish community of Regensburg asked all the other communities of Germany to assist in paying the expense. The Rabbonim of Germany in turn asked the Maharik, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Colon_Trabotto Rav Yosef Colon] (1420-1480), over whether they were obligated to pay. It is to these rabbonim that the Maharik directed his ruling. <br />
<br />
== Ruling of the Maharik ==<br />
The Maharik noted that were the blood libel not to be stopped, it would lead to the persecution of other Jewish communities in Germany. The Maharik said that any community that would potentially be a target of the blood libel was obligated to contribute to stop the libel from spreading in Regensburg. <br />
<br />
In the Maharik's exact worlds <blockquote>It is according to my humble opinion that all those communities (the Jewish communities of Germany) which are fit to be considered and almost certainly, that God forbidden, also upon them should pass the poisoned chalice, if this matter is not repaired as much as possible. The law is that they (the other Jewish communities at risk of blood libel) too should bear the burden, for because the safety of the holy community of Regensburg is their safety, and the opposite, the opposite, God forbid.<ref>Shut Maharik Shoresh 4</ref> </blockquote><br />
<br />
=== Proof of Maharik ===<br />
The Maharik brought proof from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 108a- the gemara there how to assess the expenses for an urban gutter. A gutter must be regularly cleaned in order to allow outflow. The Gemara says that if the downriver community cleans the gutter- the city's residents must contribute to the downriver community's expenses. If the gutter is clogged, the downriver community is first at risk of potential flooding. If the gutter is overfilled, next at risk are the residents of the city. Rashi explains that since the city is saved from potential danger of flooding by the gutter cleaning, it is liable to contribute to the expenses of gutter cleaning.<br />
<br />
=== Maharik's Response to Potential challenges ===<br />
The Maharik extends this analogy to his case. If the dangerous situation in Regensburg is not resolved, the catastrophic wave of anti-Semitism will engulf all of Germany. <br />
<br />
The Maharik notes a potential challenge to his comparison- he is comparing the physical phenomenon of flooding with the social phenomenon of anti-antisemitism. It is among the laws of physics that if too much rain occurs the gutter will flood. There is a certain and predictable danger of flooding. In contrast, the wave of persecution is not inanimate- but the product of human decisions and thereby more uncertain.<blockquote>But here the danger is not so certain, that one can doubt and say maybe this false libel and slander won't spread in other places.<ref>Continued quotation of the Maharik quoted prior</ref></blockquote>In response, the Maharik responds with two arguments. The first is a chillingly prophetic analysis on the spread of antisemitism.<blockquote>We see that, because of our many sins, all of their plots on us are to overpower and ambush us, and Hashem in his great mercy will save us from their hands- every situation like this (of antisemitism) is a certain danger.<ref>continued quotation from Maharik</ref></blockquote>The Maharik argues that the current expression of antisemitism in Regensburg is not merely a one-of, but rather an expression of deeper antisemitism that lurks behind the seemingly calm exterior of German society.<br />
<br />
The Maharik goes on to say, that even were antisemitism to be a rare threat- Chazal viewed any threat as deserving attention. As chief example, the Maharik notes that communities can nonetheless obligate all of their citizens to pay tax against any threat no matter its likelihood. <br />
<br />
Orphans are exempt from paying all Jewish communal taxes, except for urban expenses which benefit the orphans, including the the security expenses of the city. The Gemara lists among the security expenses an enigmatic ''Turzina.'' The Aruch explains that Turizna means that the community "purchases horses for the knights so that they can ride outside of the city to see if invaders are coming." <br />
<br />
The Maharik argues that if even orphans are required to contribute to a warning system for a potential threat, then that means that even avoiding a potential threat counts as a security expense. <br />
<br />
The Maharik brings further proof from the obligation of a city's residents to build a wall. The wall is only built to defend against a potential danger- yet we force all the residents of the community to pay because of the possibility of a threat to the community. On these grounds, ultimately, the Maharik rests his case with the insistence that all of the potential communities in Germany at risk because of the Regensburg Blood Libel must contribute. <br />
<br />
The Maharik concludes by placing a decree of cherem and a curse on anyone from the vulnerable communities of Germany who does not contribute to the Jews of Regensburg. <br />
<br />
=== Premises of the Maharik's Argument ===<br />
Given the wide scope of the Maharik's arguments- I have restated a bullet point order of his assumptions so as to provide an easy summary.<br />
<br />
Here is a summary of the Maharik's assumption on Realia.<br />
<br />
# The Blood libel in the community of Regensberg can be resolved by the Jews of Regensburg arranging a payout with the local government there<br />
# Were the Jewish community of Regensburg not to arrange a financial settlement, Jewish communities all over Germany would be at risk<br />
<br />
The Maharik's argument is as follows<br />
<br />
# If there is a danger that presently is harming A, and if not resolved will harm A, and from there harm B<br />
# Both A and B must jointly pay to prevent the danger- since both are at risk<br />
## The Maharik proves this from Bava Metzia 108a and the gutter case<br />
# This is so even if the risk is not certain because all risks of danger are considered certain risks<br />
## The Maharik proves this argument Bava Batra 8b- since orphans are given a wide series of tax exemptions, but are nevertheless required to pay for scouts lest an invader, come- that indicates potential danger is a source of obligation.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) is not impressed by the Maharik's proof. Orphans are obligated in taxes that relate to protection. Even if that protection is for an unlikely scenario, this does not mean that orphans only pay taxes for certain dangers. The Maharik spins this assumption out of nowhere<br />
<br />
Shut Mishpatei Shmuel (96) brings a similar objection to the Maseh Melech. Why are we assuming that we can comparing an orphan who is a citizen to someone who is not at all a citizen. An orphan is obligated to pay taxes- someone who does not live in said city has no such obligations. The Maharik seems to view an orphan's obligation to pay for defense not as stemming from a formal tax, but rather compensation to the city for benefit<br />
<br />
This in turn turns on how to understand the way the Gemara exempts orphans from some taxation. The Gemara says that orphans only pay taxes on what gives them benefit; since, lacking a parent, they lack the legal ability to forgive their money. The Gemara assumes that a resident of a city who pays taxes for what they don't need, thereby forgives the city for taking the money. <br />
<br />
The Maharik is assuming that the Gemara formally exempts orphans from taxation and only makes them liable for benefit they receive. Hence, the Maharik sees orphan's need to pay for scouts, as proof that protection against an uncertain menace is a benefit.<br />
<br />
brings a different line of attack- the fact that a city has scouts watching for raiders does not prove that we are extra strict in being safe against minor threats. You only have scout watching if there is in fact a risk. Further, a big city is at a high risk of being attacked by invaders, so having scouts isn't exactly a crazy thing</ref><br />
## The Maharik also proves this from Bava Batra 7b- we force all inhabitants of a city to contribute to build a wall out of concern for potential danger. We force even those who are not inhabitants of the city but own property in the city, because their property is subject to danger. This implies that merely being subject to shared danger is the source of the obligation to pay, not a preexisting relationship.<ref>The Masah Melech (2:4.4) rejects this argument. He argues that inhabitants in a city are obligated in the expenses for a wall out of their joint state partnership. This state of partnership does not exist in the Maharik's case, where the case, where the communities are not joined into a wider community. The Masah Melech rejects the attempt of the Maharik to pass off the property owner point as a proof that anyone affected by a danger must contribute- the property owner is himself a resident in some respects. Even though the property owner does not live in the city, his property gains value as the city prospers, and hence he is a partner in the city. </ref><br />
### This fact is crucial, since the other cities of Germany do not have a formal relationship besides their shared country<br />
<br />
== Explanations of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
After the Rama included the opinion of the Maharik in the Shulchan Aruch- many commentators discovered a seemingly contradiction within the Rama. The Rama describes a case of person who, while trying to save his himself or his property, also ends up saving other people. Do the other people owe the rescuer anything? The rescuer was saving his own items, not solely doing a magnanimous deed. The Rema writes that in such a case, the rescued person pays the rescuer if one of the following two conditions are fulfilled<br />
<br />
# The rescuer had to spend additional money to save the other person, more than he would have spent had he saved only himself<br />
# The rescuer performed the rescue with intent to save the other people<br />
<br />
This ruling of the Rama flatly contradicts the Rama's citation of the Maharik. In the Maharik case neither condition was applicable<br />
<br />
# The Communinity of Regignsburg spent no more on behalf of the other communities<br />
# The Community of Reginsburg paid with intent to save itself<br />
<br />
=== Explanation of the Shvut Yaakov ===<br />
The Shvut Yaakov answer the question by challenging its premises.<ref>Shut Shvut Yaakov 1:158</ref> The Maharik case is dealing with a community, while the rescuer case is dealing with private individuals. The Shvut Yaakov says that community have far wider powers to demand compensation than individuals. <br />
<br />
The Shvut Yaakov premises this distinction on the principle of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''. The Gemara explains that in a certain case, a community can cut down a privately owned tree and pay the tree owner later. How can the community appropriate the tree without even paying for it. The Gemara cites the rationale of ''Kdeira Debei Shutfei''- a phrase that literally means a dish owned by many partners. The Rashbam explains that in a case where a dish has multiple cooks, each cook assumes that the other cook will take responsibility for the dish. Ultimately the dish will not be cooked, because each person will pass off responsibility. In order that community's behave proactively, the community is permitted to chop down and raise the money later. The Shvuut Yaakov states that in a case of communal danger- halacha incentives a speedy response lest no community take action. Therefore- the first community to respond is awarded compensation <br />
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=== Explanation of the Netivot Hamishpat ===<br />
The Netivot Hamishpat links the ruling of the Maharik to a wider rule about partners.<ref>Netivot Hamisphat Biurim 196:3</ref> The Netivot explains that anytime two people need the same thing; each party can force the other to contribute. If one party does the essential task- then the other person must compensate the doer. If the task is not essential, then the conditions of the Rama apply. The Netivot says the Rama's case is one where the rescued could have been saved without the rescuer. The Netivot explains that the Maharik's case is where the other communities could not be saved without the intervention of Regensburg. It is interest <br />
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== Opponents of the Maharik's Ruling ==<br />
The Maharik's wide conceptual leap was deeply controversial in the generations to come. Most of the attackers viewed the Maharik as not having strongly grounded his ruling in the Talmudic text. They attributed this perceived carelessness of the Maharik to the exigencies of the crisis in Regensburg. The Masah Melech wrote "love causes the straight line to be crooked, that is the order of the law."<ref>Masah Melech Chelek 2, Shaar 4<br />
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The Maseh Melech is making a play on words in his attack<br />
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He uses the expression "ואהבה קלקלה את שורה" an expression which originates in Bereishit Medrish Rabbah Vayira Parsha 55:8, which Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai uses to explain why Avraham saddled the donkey himself during the akeida and why Yosef rode the chariot himself to greet his father. In both cases, great men performed things ordinarily done by servants out of a sense of love. The Maaseh Melech makes a pun on the word "shura" which means order, and follows it with "shuras hadin," which means the strict letter of the law.</ref> The Masah Melech viewed the Maharik's ruling as resulting from the Maharik's empathy with the brutal suffering of the Jews of Rothenburg, at the expense of a proper reading of the law.<br />
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=== The Maharik Himself- Contradiction ===<br />
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=== Dispute with the Rashba ===<br />
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=== Challenge of the Masah Melech ===<br />
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=== Shagat Aryeh's Attack ===<br />
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== Similar Opinions to the Maharik ==</div>Maharikorkus