Interruptions between the Bracha and Eating: Difference between revisions

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The following cases are different scenarios that occur after that sequence of events.   
The following cases are different scenarios that occur after that sequence of events.   


Case #1: Reuven begins to talk before anyone has a chance to eat.  
'''Case #1:''' Reuven begins to talk before anyone has a chance to eat.  


# S”A (O”C 167:6) rules that one who talks after the beracha before eating must make a new beracha in order to eat. This applies as well to one who hears the beracha from another in a case where no one has eaten yet (see below for cases where one eats before any talking occurs).   
# S”A (O”C 167:6) rules that one who talks after the beracha before eating must make a new beracha in order to eat. This applies as well to one who hears the beracha from another in a case where no one has eaten yet (see below for cases where one eats before any talking occurs).   


Ruling: Reuven needs to make a beracha before eating.
'''Ruling:''' Reuven needs to make a beracha before eating.


Case #2: The father eats a bite of the slice he cut for himself. Reuven and Shimon then break into conversation before eating themselves.   
'''Case #2:''' The father eats a bite of the slice he cut for himself. Reuven and Shimon then break into conversation before eating themselves.   


Ashkenazim:
'''Ashkenazim:'''
If the Mevarech or listeners talk before the tasting the bread
If the Mevarech or listeners talk before the tasting the bread
# The Rema (167:6) writes that if the mevarech (one making the beracha) eats and then the listeners speak before they get the chance to eat of the bread themselves, the listeners would still be allowed to eat the bread without a new beracha. <ref> The source for this opinion is from the Rokeach (brought down in the Beit Yosef (Tur Siman 167)). Such also seems to be the opinion of the Or Zarua from the Rema above. The logic is that once the mevarech eats of the bread, the beracha counts for all those who wish to be yotze with that beracha, whether they eat of the bread or not. The Rokeach draws the parallel to Kiddush where the rule is that only the one making Kiddush is actually required to drink for the Kiddush to count for all those present at the table. The Beit Yosef, however, responds that the beracha in our case is different. When the mevarech says the Hamotzi, it is as if everyone says Hamotzi by the law of shomea k’oneh. Each person individually must ensure to eat before talking or else they’ll require a new beracha. Kiddush, on the other hand, is considered a Birkat Hamitzva where one Jew can discharge the obligation of another Jew. In that case, the listener tags along with the one making Kiddush in terms of the entire mitzvah (i.e. the Kiddush itself and the subsequent drinking). The Aruch HaShulchan (167:6) defends the side of the Rema by saying that by Kiddush too, all are required to drink as part of fulfilling Kiddush on an individual level. Even so, the listeners are yotze with the drinking of the mekadesh. By Hamotzi, when the mevarech obligates himself to eat, the listeners are yotze with his eating alone. For more discussion, see Yalkut Yosef (167 footnote 5 in detail). </ref>  
# The Rema (167:6) writes that if the mevarech (one making the beracha) eats and then the listeners speak before they get the chance to eat of the bread themselves, the listeners would still be allowed to eat the bread without a new beracha. <ref> The source for this opinion is from the Rokeach (brought down in the Beit Yosef (Tur Siman 167)). Such also seems to be the opinion of the Or Zarua from the Rema above. The logic is that once the mevarech eats of the bread, the beracha counts for all those who wish to be yotze with that beracha, whether they eat of the bread or not. The Rokeach draws the parallel to Kiddush where the rule is that only the one making Kiddush is actually required to drink for the Kiddush to count for all those present at the table. The Beit Yosef, however, responds that the beracha in our case is different. When the mevarech says the Hamotzi, it is as if everyone says Hamotzi by the law of shomea k’oneh. Each person individually must ensure to eat before talking or else they’ll require a new beracha. Kiddush, on the other hand, is considered a Birkat Hamitzva where one Jew can discharge the obligation of another Jew. In that case, the listener tags along with the one making Kiddush in terms of the entire mitzvah (i.e. the Kiddush itself and the subsequent drinking). The Aruch HaShulchan (167:6) defends the side of the Rema by saying that by Kiddush too, all are required to drink as part of fulfilling Kiddush on an individual level. Even so, the listeners are yotze with the drinking of the mekadesh. By Hamotzi, when the mevarech obligates himself to eat, the listeners are yotze with his eating alone. For more discussion, see Yalkut Yosef (167 footnote 5 in detail). </ref>  
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# Piskei Teshuvot (167:11) explains that we don’t say Safeik Brachot L’Hakeil in this case as the Achronim conclude. Therefore, if the listeners talk before eating themselves, they will require a new beracha to eat. <ref> There is a dispute among the authorities surrounding the issue, and one would expect to encounter the rule of safeik berachot l’hakeil (by a case of doubt by a beracha, one should omit the beracha). The Kaf HaChaim (167 note 58) explains that there is no safeik beracha case here because the listeners didn’t make the beracha themselves. It is true that one who listens to a beracha with intent to be yotze may not subsequently make his own beracha. Even so, as the person in our case is just a listener, he can make the beracha again after accidentally talking without the fear of a beracha l’vatala by the second beracha as the case is slightly different than the case of one who made the beracha himself. See Yalkut Yosef (167 footnote 5) where he argues on this reasoning. </ref>  
# Piskei Teshuvot (167:11) explains that we don’t say Safeik Brachot L’Hakeil in this case as the Achronim conclude. Therefore, if the listeners talk before eating themselves, they will require a new beracha to eat. <ref> There is a dispute among the authorities surrounding the issue, and one would expect to encounter the rule of safeik berachot l’hakeil (by a case of doubt by a beracha, one should omit the beracha). The Kaf HaChaim (167 note 58) explains that there is no safeik beracha case here because the listeners didn’t make the beracha themselves. It is true that one who listens to a beracha with intent to be yotze may not subsequently make his own beracha. Even so, as the person in our case is just a listener, he can make the beracha again after accidentally talking without the fear of a beracha l’vatala by the second beracha as the case is slightly different than the case of one who made the beracha himself. See Yalkut Yosef (167 footnote 5) where he argues on this reasoning. </ref>  


Sephardim:  
'''Sephardim:'''
# Ben Ish Chai (Emor 16) rules in accordance with the Rema above based on the concept of Safeik Berachot L’Hakeil. Thus, as long as the mevarech ate before any talking took place, the listeners may and should eat without a new beracha.  
# Ben Ish Chai (Emor 16) rules in accordance with the Rema above based on the concept of Safeik Berachot L’Hakeil. Thus, as long as the mevarech ate before any talking took place, the listeners may and should eat without a new beracha.  
# This is also the opinion of the Yalkut Yosef (167:11 in Kitzur S”A) Additionally, he rules that even if another listener ate before the talking, then all may eat the bread without any issue of a hefsek. One who talked in such a case can also think the beracha in his head before eating as this counts as a beracha for the Rambam and Smag yet wouldn’t be a beracha l’vatala. <ref> For a lengthy discussion of these rulings in light of the complexity of the issues, see Halichot Olam (vol. 1 pgs. 346-350). </ref>  
# This is also the opinion of the Yalkut Yosef (167:11 in Kitzur S”A) Additionally, he rules that even if another listener ate before the talking, then all may eat the bread without any issue of a hefsek. One who talked in such a case can also think the beracha in his head before eating as this counts as a beracha for the Rambam and Smag yet wouldn’t be a beracha l’vatala. <ref> For a lengthy discussion of these rulings in light of the complexity of the issues, see Halichot Olam (vol. 1 pgs. 346-350). </ref>  


Ruling: The consensus for Ashkenazim is that Reuven and Shimon must make a beracha before they eat of the bread. The consensus for Sephardim is that Reuven and Shimon may eat the bread without a new beracha. (Preferably, they should think the beracha before tasting.) Obviously, any at the table who don’t talk are fine according to all opinions.  
'''Ruling:''' The consensus for Ashkenazim is that Reuven and Shimon must make a beracha before they eat of the bread. The consensus for Sephardim is that Reuven and Shimon may eat the bread without a new beracha. (Preferably, they should think the beracha before tasting.) Obviously, any at the table who don’t talk are fine according to all opinions.  


Case #3: Shimon goes ahead and eats a bite of his slice. The father hasn’t had a chance to eat yet. (Ideally, Shimon should’ve waited for his father, (S”A O”C 167) but such isn’t relevant to our case.) Reuven then begins to talk.  
'''Case #3:''' Shimon goes ahead and eats a bite of his slice. The father hasn’t had a chance to eat yet. (Ideally, Shimon should’ve waited for his father, (S”A O”C 167) but such isn’t relevant to our case.) Reuven then begins to talk.  


Ruling: Halachically, the case has the same result as in case #2. (see above discussion) For Ashkenazim, Reuven needs a new beracha, whereas for Sephardim, he doesn’t.  
'''Ruling:''' Halachically, the case has the same result as in case #2. (see above discussion) For Ashkenazim, Reuven needs a new beracha, whereas for Sephardim, he doesn’t.  


Case #4: As the father is cutting a slice for himself, he begins to talk. No one has had a chance to eat yet.
'''Case #4:''' As the father is cutting a slice for himself, he begins to talk. No one has had a chance to eat yet.


Ashkenazim:
'''Ashkenazim:'''
# Pri Megadim (M.Z. 167:8) rules that where the mevarech talks, the beracha still counts for the others at the table. Therefore, the listeners may go on to eat the bread without any beracha as they didn’t talk.  
# Pri Megadim (M.Z. 167:8) rules that where the mevarech talks, the beracha still counts for the others at the table. Therefore, the listeners may go on to eat the bread without any beracha as they didn’t talk.  
# Mishna Berura (213:15) also agrees with this ruling despite some earlier reservations (see Mishna Berura (167:43) and Be’ur Halacha there).
# Mishna Berura (213:15) also agrees with this ruling despite some earlier reservations (see Mishna Berura (167:43) and Be’ur Halacha there).
# This is also the consensus in Piskei Teshuvot (167:12). He adds that this is only true when the beracha was a good beracha and the talking that followed was accidental. <ref> He also adds that according to the Be’ur Halacha mentioned above, if a listener had eaten before the father had talked, then the other listeners would certainly be fine to eat now. The reasoning is that the beracha is then Chal already by the eating and counts as a legitimate beracha before the hefsek occurs. As noted above, the father would need a new beracha, even in such a case. </ref>
# This is also the consensus in Piskei Teshuvot (167:12). He adds that this is only true when the beracha was a good beracha and the talking that followed was accidental. <ref> He also adds that according to the Be’ur Halacha mentioned above, if a listener had eaten before the father had talked, then the other listeners would certainly be fine to eat now. The reasoning is that the beracha is then Chal already by the eating and counts as a legitimate beracha before the hefsek occurs. As noted above, the father would need a new beracha, even in such a case. </ref>


Sephardim:  
'''Sephardim:'''
# Ben Ish Chai (Emor 16) also brings down that the listeners would be fine to eat the bread now, even though the father had talked.  
# Ben Ish Chai (Emor 16) also brings down that the listeners would be fine to eat the bread now, even though the father had talked.  
# This is also the ruling of Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 167:11)  
# This is also the ruling of Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 167:11)  


Ruling: The father needs a new beracha, but Reuven and Shimon are fine to eat of the bread without any further beracha.  
'''Ruling:''' The father needs a new beracha, but Reuven and Shimon are fine to eat of the bread without any further beracha.  


Case #5: Reuven quickly takes a bite of his slice before his father has a chance to eat. The father then begins to talk. Shimon hasn’t yet eaten.
'''Case #5:''' Reuven quickly takes a bite of his slice before his father has a chance to eat. The father then begins to talk. Shimon hasn’t yet eaten.


Ashkenazim:
'''Ashkenazim:'''
# As noted above, whenever one talks before eating, he is obligated to make a new beracha. However, the beracha does count for the listeners who haven’t spoken (see case #4).
# As noted above, whenever one talks before eating, he is obligated to make a new beracha. However, the beracha does count for the listeners who haven’t spoken (see case #4).


Sephardim:
'''Sephardim:'''
# Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 167:11) rules that once anyone eats of the bread, the beracha takes effect, even for those who subsequently talk. Therefore, even the father can now eat the bread without another beracha.  
# Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 167:11) rules that once anyone eats of the bread, the beracha takes effect, even for those who subsequently talk. Therefore, even the father can now eat the bread without another beracha.  


Ruling: Shimon can eat of the bread without any issue. The father would require another beracha, only according to Ashkenazim.  
'''Ruling:''' Shimon can eat of the bread without any issue. The father would require another beracha, only according to Ashkenazim.  


==References==
==References==
<references/>
<references/>

Revision as of 16:46, 23 May 2011

Speaking as an interruption

  1. The Gemara Brachot (40a) mentions the opinion of Rav that one who says to another to take of the bread before he has a chance to eat himself may still eat without having to make a new beracha. The same is true for one who tells another to get the salt or dip.
  2. Tosfot (there) comment that nowadays people eat their bread without salt. The implication is that asking someone to bring salt after making the beracha would then constitute an interruption, or hefsek, and one may then need a new beracha to eat. Only speech that relates to the piece of bread itself would not be a hefsek. [1]
  3. Rambam (Hilchot Berachot Perek Alef) writes that anything that relates to the general meal isn't considered a hefsek. Asking for salt is then not a hefsek, even where one is fine eating the bread without it.
  4. The Rama (O"C 167:6) and the Beit Yosef (Tur O"C 167) bring from the Kol Bo that ideally one should avoid even such speech. If one did say any of those things, however, he may eat without a new beracha.
  5. The Sefer HaZikaron L'Gri Weinberg quotes the opinion of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach that one who took a vow to never eat before reciting a pasuk may say the pasuk after the beracha, if he forgot to do so beforehand and only remembered then. It would therefore not be a hefsek.

If the one making the beracha or the listeners talk

General rule: Talking about matters unrelated to the meal constitutes a Hefsek, according to all authorities. One who talks between a beracha and the eating has to recite a new beracha (see case #1 below). The following cases were constructed to demonstrate this rule as it applies by a communal meal. While the discussion is about bread, the same rules apply for all situations of eating. These laws are only by talking that is unrelated to the meal. Situation: There is a family sitting down to a bread meal after washing. The father (or mevarech) makes the beracha on the bread with intent that the beracha should count for the others present, and all present listen to the beracha with kavana to be yotze with the father’s beracha. The listeners are Reuven and Shimon. They answer Amen. The following cases are different scenarios that occur after that sequence of events.

Case #1: Reuven begins to talk before anyone has a chance to eat.

  1. S”A (O”C 167:6) rules that one who talks after the beracha before eating must make a new beracha in order to eat. This applies as well to one who hears the beracha from another in a case where no one has eaten yet (see below for cases where one eats before any talking occurs).

Ruling: Reuven needs to make a beracha before eating.

Case #2: The father eats a bite of the slice he cut for himself. Reuven and Shimon then break into conversation before eating themselves.

Ashkenazim: If the Mevarech or listeners talk before the tasting the bread

  1. The Rema (167:6) writes that if the mevarech (one making the beracha) eats and then the listeners speak before they get the chance to eat of the bread themselves, the listeners would still be allowed to eat the bread without a new beracha. [2]
  2. Mishna Berura (167:43) writes that nearly all the Achronim argue on the Rema (see Be’ur Halacha there and previous reference for the outline of the discussion).
  3. The Sha’ar Hatzion (there) lists the Achronim who disagree with the Rema and they include: Taz, Magen Avraham, Eliyah Rabbah, Likutei HaPri Chadash, S”A Harav, Chayei Adam, Shiurei Bracha, Halacha Berura, and possibly the Gra.
  4. Piskei Teshuvot (167:11) explains that we don’t say Safeik Brachot L’Hakeil in this case as the Achronim conclude. Therefore, if the listeners talk before eating themselves, they will require a new beracha to eat. [3]

Sephardim:

  1. Ben Ish Chai (Emor 16) rules in accordance with the Rema above based on the concept of Safeik Berachot L’Hakeil. Thus, as long as the mevarech ate before any talking took place, the listeners may and should eat without a new beracha.
  2. This is also the opinion of the Yalkut Yosef (167:11 in Kitzur S”A) Additionally, he rules that even if another listener ate before the talking, then all may eat the bread without any issue of a hefsek. One who talked in such a case can also think the beracha in his head before eating as this counts as a beracha for the Rambam and Smag yet wouldn’t be a beracha l’vatala. [4]

Ruling: The consensus for Ashkenazim is that Reuven and Shimon must make a beracha before they eat of the bread. The consensus for Sephardim is that Reuven and Shimon may eat the bread without a new beracha. (Preferably, they should think the beracha before tasting.) Obviously, any at the table who don’t talk are fine according to all opinions.

Case #3: Shimon goes ahead and eats a bite of his slice. The father hasn’t had a chance to eat yet. (Ideally, Shimon should’ve waited for his father, (S”A O”C 167) but such isn’t relevant to our case.) Reuven then begins to talk.

Ruling: Halachically, the case has the same result as in case #2. (see above discussion) For Ashkenazim, Reuven needs a new beracha, whereas for Sephardim, he doesn’t.

Case #4: As the father is cutting a slice for himself, he begins to talk. No one has had a chance to eat yet.

Ashkenazim:

  1. Pri Megadim (M.Z. 167:8) rules that where the mevarech talks, the beracha still counts for the others at the table. Therefore, the listeners may go on to eat the bread without any beracha as they didn’t talk.
  2. Mishna Berura (213:15) also agrees with this ruling despite some earlier reservations (see Mishna Berura (167:43) and Be’ur Halacha there).
  3. This is also the consensus in Piskei Teshuvot (167:12). He adds that this is only true when the beracha was a good beracha and the talking that followed was accidental. [5]

Sephardim:

  1. Ben Ish Chai (Emor 16) also brings down that the listeners would be fine to eat the bread now, even though the father had talked.
  2. This is also the ruling of Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 167:11)

Ruling: The father needs a new beracha, but Reuven and Shimon are fine to eat of the bread without any further beracha.

Case #5: Reuven quickly takes a bite of his slice before his father has a chance to eat. The father then begins to talk. Shimon hasn’t yet eaten.

Ashkenazim:

  1. As noted above, whenever one talks before eating, he is obligated to make a new beracha. However, the beracha does count for the listeners who haven’t spoken (see case #4).

Sephardim:

  1. Yalkut Yosef (Kitzur S”A 167:11) rules that once anyone eats of the bread, the beracha takes effect, even for those who subsequently talk. Therefore, even the father can now eat the bread without another beracha.

Ruling: Shimon can eat of the bread without any issue. The father would require another beracha, only according to Ashkenazim.

References

  1. By that logic, the salt isn't required for the bread itself. Such appears to be the opinion of the Rashba (Shut HaRashba 1:208) where one was fine having the bread plain. In that way, asking for salt is like ordinary speech, which constitutes a hefsek.
  2. The source for this opinion is from the Rokeach (brought down in the Beit Yosef (Tur Siman 167)). Such also seems to be the opinion of the Or Zarua from the Rema above. The logic is that once the mevarech eats of the bread, the beracha counts for all those who wish to be yotze with that beracha, whether they eat of the bread or not. The Rokeach draws the parallel to Kiddush where the rule is that only the one making Kiddush is actually required to drink for the Kiddush to count for all those present at the table. The Beit Yosef, however, responds that the beracha in our case is different. When the mevarech says the Hamotzi, it is as if everyone says Hamotzi by the law of shomea k’oneh. Each person individually must ensure to eat before talking or else they’ll require a new beracha. Kiddush, on the other hand, is considered a Birkat Hamitzva where one Jew can discharge the obligation of another Jew. In that case, the listener tags along with the one making Kiddush in terms of the entire mitzvah (i.e. the Kiddush itself and the subsequent drinking). The Aruch HaShulchan (167:6) defends the side of the Rema by saying that by Kiddush too, all are required to drink as part of fulfilling Kiddush on an individual level. Even so, the listeners are yotze with the drinking of the mekadesh. By Hamotzi, when the mevarech obligates himself to eat, the listeners are yotze with his eating alone. For more discussion, see Yalkut Yosef (167 footnote 5 in detail).
  3. There is a dispute among the authorities surrounding the issue, and one would expect to encounter the rule of safeik berachot l’hakeil (by a case of doubt by a beracha, one should omit the beracha). The Kaf HaChaim (167 note 58) explains that there is no safeik beracha case here because the listeners didn’t make the beracha themselves. It is true that one who listens to a beracha with intent to be yotze may not subsequently make his own beracha. Even so, as the person in our case is just a listener, he can make the beracha again after accidentally talking without the fear of a beracha l’vatala by the second beracha as the case is slightly different than the case of one who made the beracha himself. See Yalkut Yosef (167 footnote 5) where he argues on this reasoning.
  4. For a lengthy discussion of these rulings in light of the complexity of the issues, see Halichot Olam (vol. 1 pgs. 346-350).
  5. He also adds that according to the Be’ur Halacha mentioned above, if a listener had eaten before the father had talked, then the other listeners would certainly be fine to eat now. The reasoning is that the beracha is then Chal already by the eating and counts as a legitimate beracha before the hefsek occurs. As noted above, the father would need a new beracha, even in such a case.