Minhag: Difference between revisions

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<p class="indent">Are minhagim binding if they were instituted in error? The Gemara Chullin 6b tells of a story in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi came to Beyt Shan and permitted the people not to take Trumot and Maaserot from their crops being that it was not part of Israel. However, the gemara asks how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi abrogate their minhag? To this the gemara answers that sometimes a later rabbi is given the opportunity to say something that no one before has said. Tosfot Pesachim 51a though is bothered because this gemara seems to disregard the entire principle behind minhagim. Tosfot explains that minhagim are only binding when formulated with the correct knowledge of halacha and the minhag is just an added restriction or practice. However, if the community mistakenly thought something is forbidden when it is in reality permitted, that isn't a minhag at all. Seemingly, this idea fits nicely with the approach of communal vows because vows aren't binding when taken in error.<ref>S"A YD 232:10. See Mishna Nedarim 25b.</ref></p>
<p class="indent">Are minhagim binding if they were instituted in error? The Gemara Chullin 6b tells of a story in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi came to Beyt Shan and permitted the people not to take Trumot and Maaserot from their crops being that it was not part of Israel. However, the gemara asks how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi abrogate their minhag? To this the gemara answers that sometimes a later rabbi is given the opportunity to say something that no one before has said. Tosfot Pesachim 51a though is bothered because this gemara seems to disregard the entire principle behind minhagim. Tosfot explains that minhagim are only binding when formulated with the correct knowledge of halacha and the minhag is just an added restriction or practice. However, if the community mistakenly thought something is forbidden when it is in reality permitted, that isn't a minhag at all. Seemingly, this idea fits nicely with the approach of communal vows because vows aren't binding when taken in error.<ref>S"A YD 232:10. See Mishna Nedarim 25b.</ref></p>
<p class="indent">Lastly, is it possible to have a temporary minhag? If we assume that minhagim are based on vows, then certainly yes, because it is possible to stipulate that a certain vow should only apply for a certain amount of time. However, if we suppose that minhagim are based on not breaking from the practices of the everlasting Jewish community, then perhaps it is impossible for minhagim to be temporary just as biblical and rabbinic laws are permanent in nature. Yet, it seems that everyone can agree that minhagim could be instituted temporarily because minhagim are very much based on intent and if the community never accepted the practice with intent that it should last forever, reasonably it should be limited.<ref>The concept that minhagim can be limited is shown in S"A YD 228:27. Regarding personal minhagim, see also the Pri Chadash who proves from the Gemara Chullin.</ref></p>
<p class="indent">Lastly, is it possible to have a temporary minhag? If we assume that minhagim are based on vows, then certainly yes, because it is possible to stipulate that a certain vow should only apply for a certain amount of time. However, if we suppose that minhagim are based on not breaking from the practices of the everlasting Jewish community, then perhaps it is impossible for minhagim to be temporary just as biblical and rabbinic laws are permanent in nature. Yet, it seems that everyone can agree that minhagim could be instituted temporarily because minhagim are very much based on intent and if the community never accepted the practice with intent that it should last forever, reasonably it should be limited.<ref>The concept that minhagim can be limited is shown in S"A YD 228:27. Regarding personal minhagim, see also the Pri Chadash who proves from the Gemara Chullin.</ref></p>
# Some say that a Sephardi who learns by Rabbis who are Ashkenazic doesn’t have to follow the minhagim of his Rabbis and can continue to follow the minhag of his parents. <ref> Sh"t Or Letzion (vol 2 pg 17-18) writes that one should follow the minhag of one’s parents and not that of one’s rabbis. </ref>
==When minhagim clash with halacha==
==When minhagim clash with halacha==
# A minhag is binding if it involves a stringency above the actual strict law. However, generally speaking, a minhag to follow one opinion on a matter that is a dispute in the Rishonim isn't a binding minhag.<ref>[http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14145&st=&pgnum=78&hilite= Sdei Chemed (v. 4, Maarechet Mem, Klal 37)]</ref>
# A minhag is binding if it involves a stringency above the actual strict law. However, generally speaking, a minhag to follow one opinion on a matter that is a dispute in the Rishonim isn't a binding minhag.<ref>[http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14145&st=&pgnum=78&hilite= Sdei Chemed (v. 4, Maarechet Mem, Klal 37)]</ref>
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# If a person moved from one community to another and plans on staying there, he should follow the minhagim of the place he is planning on staying. <ref>S"A YD 214:2</ref>  
# If a person moved from one community to another and plans on staying there, he should follow the minhagim of the place he is planning on staying. <ref>S"A YD 214:2</ref>  
# If a person changes from one community to another, he should follow their minhagim but must be honest and follow all of their minhagim. Commonly when a man from one community marries a woman from another community, the woman takes upon herself the new minhagim of the community she is moving into. If the husband is a baal [[teshuva]] or a ger and doesn't have minhagim, he may accept the minhagim of his wife.<Ref>Rav Hershel Schachter in a [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/812018/Rabbi_Hershel_Schachter/Hilchos_Pesach shiur on yutorah.org (min 10-12)]</ref>
# If a person changes from one community to another, he should follow their minhagim but must be honest and follow all of their minhagim. Commonly when a man from one community marries a woman from another community, the woman takes upon herself the new minhagim of the community she is moving into. If the husband is a baal [[teshuva]] or a ger and doesn't have minhagim, he may accept the minhagim of his wife.<Ref>Rav Hershel Schachter in a [http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/812018/Rabbi_Hershel_Schachter/Hilchos_Pesach shiur on yutorah.org (min 10-12)]</ref>
# Some say that a Sephardi who learns by Rabbis who are Ashkenazic doesn’t have to follow the minhagim of his Rabbis and can continue to follow the minhag of his parents. <ref>Sh"t Or Letzion (vol 2 pg 17-18) writes that one should follow the minhag of one’s parents and not that of one’s rabbis. </ref>


==Related Pages==
==Related Pages==

Revision as of 03:45, 18 April 2014

What are minhagim based on?

Why are minhagim binding? In what capacity do we have to observe them? To answer these questions we are going to explore the halachic foundations upon which minhagim are based. There are two primary approaches to explain the obligation for minhagim. The first is based on a Gemara Nedarim 81b which states that one who violates a minhag is in a violation of a neder. The Ran (ibid.) explains that if a person practices a good practice with intention of continuing to keep that practice, rabbinically it is considered as though he took a vow and he is forbidden from breaking that vow. In order for the vow to be effective biblically he would have to enunciate it, however, rabbinically it is sufficient to have acted upon the intent to keep the practice.

Taking this further, Rav Hershel Schachter in an article on yutorah.org explains that there is the concept of a communal vow and applies to everyone in the community. Furthermore the communal vow is binding not only to the original community who accepted the practice but also to future generations. A proof for this concept is the Gemara Ketubot 111a, which states that the Jews took upon themselves three vows and theoretically they are binding upon Jews to this day.[1] The concept could be explained by a similar concept we find regarding Korbanot. The Jewish community is considered a single unit that doesn't die because each successive generation fills the shoes of the previous one. Therefore, the Gemara Temurah 15b establishes that even though usually a person can not have a korban chatat brought on his behalf after he passes away, a congregation can do so because in reality the congregation lives on through their descendants.

The second approach to explain minhagim is based on a Gemara Pesachim 50b. The gemara relates a story in which the people of Bayshan took upon themselves a practice to refrain from traveling on Friday so as not to come to desecrate Shabbat. The next generation, however, found this practice too cumbersome and inhibited their ability to make a livelihood. Yet, when they asked Rabbi Yochanan if they could abolish this practice they were told that they should not disregard the practices of their parents citing a pasuk from Mishlei 1:8. The gemara implies that there is an inherent issue with breaking from communal practices and particularly apply to later generations. From the fact that the Gemara doesn't cite the violation of breaking a vow as the Gemara Nedarim does it seems that the Gemara Pesachim believes that there is another binding force of minhagim.[2] Rav Hershel Schachter[3] cites Rav Moshe Soloveitchik as having explained that the Rambam's opinion was that minhagim are binding because the act of breaking the minhag is an issue of separating from the community, which in it of itself is a problem.[4]

Now that we have examined two approaches to minhagim, let us explore a few potential applications and see how each approach relates to that case. First, do minhagim apply to halachic scenarios? That is, what happens when minhag and halacha clashes? For example, there is a major discussion in the rishonim and achronim whether there is an obligation to wear Tefillin on Chol HaMoed. Let's suppose that I usually follow a certain Rabbi or sefer for my halachic questions and he says that I should wear Tefillin on Chol HaMoed, but my father's minhag is not to wear Tefillin, what should I do? According to the first approach, it is reasonable to assume that a community can only take upon themselves vows in gray areas of halacha. For example, the Gemara points out that a person may not vow to abrogate a mitzvah because that simply isn't up to his discretion. Similarly, the halachic question of wearing Tefillin on Chol HaMoed shouldn't be one decided upon by a community and its vow shouldn't be binding.[5]However, according to the second approach it is possible that a community's practice is binding even in areas of halacha because however the practice was established, the individual should be restricted from breaking from the communal practices.[6]

Does a person who moves communities need to continue his old practices or should he follow the customs of the place he entered? If one were to suppose that minhagim are like vows, it is logical that the vows should follow a person wherever he may be. However, if minhagim are a way of observing local customs, then upon moving one should adopt the local practices. In reality, everyone agrees that upon moving one should change his customs to follow the place where he plans on staying.[7] It could be explained by supposing that the way communal vows work is that they only apply to a person while he is still part of that community.

Are minhagim binding if they were instituted in error? The Gemara Chullin 6b tells of a story in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi came to Beyt Shan and permitted the people not to take Trumot and Maaserot from their crops being that it was not part of Israel. However, the gemara asks how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi abrogate their minhag? To this the gemara answers that sometimes a later rabbi is given the opportunity to say something that no one before has said. Tosfot Pesachim 51a though is bothered because this gemara seems to disregard the entire principle behind minhagim. Tosfot explains that minhagim are only binding when formulated with the correct knowledge of halacha and the minhag is just an added restriction or practice. However, if the community mistakenly thought something is forbidden when it is in reality permitted, that isn't a minhag at all. Seemingly, this idea fits nicely with the approach of communal vows because vows aren't binding when taken in error.[8]

Lastly, is it possible to have a temporary minhag? If we assume that minhagim are based on vows, then certainly yes, because it is possible to stipulate that a certain vow should only apply for a certain amount of time. However, if we suppose that minhagim are based on not breaking from the practices of the everlasting Jewish community, then perhaps it is impossible for minhagim to be temporary just as biblical and rabbinic laws are permanent in nature. Yet, it seems that everyone can agree that minhagim could be instituted temporarily because minhagim are very much based on intent and if the community never accepted the practice with intent that it should last forever, reasonably it should be limited.[9]

When minhagim clash with halacha

  1. A minhag is binding if it involves a stringency above the actual strict law. However, generally speaking, a minhag to follow one opinion on a matter that is a dispute in the Rishonim isn't a binding minhag.[10]

Changing Minhagim

  1. If a person moved from one community to another and plans on staying there, he should follow the minhagim of the place he is planning on staying. [11]
  2. If a person changes from one community to another, he should follow their minhagim but must be honest and follow all of their minhagim. Commonly when a man from one community marries a woman from another community, the woman takes upon herself the new minhagim of the community she is moving into. If the husband is a baal teshuva or a ger and doesn't have minhagim, he may accept the minhagim of his wife.[12]
  3. Some say that a Sephardi who learns by Rabbis who are Ashkenazic doesn’t have to follow the minhagim of his Rabbis and can continue to follow the minhag of his parents. [13]

Related Pages

  1. Minhagim of Chanuka

Sources

  1. For further discussion of this topic, see a letter of the Rogachover (Safnat Paneach 143:2) regarding the vow that Yosef made his brothers take.
  2. Additionally, in discussing communal minhagim the Bet Yosef YD 214:2 only references the Gemara Pesachim and describes minhagim as communal acceptances and doesn't use the language of vows.
  3. Nefesh HaRav (p. 235)
  4. Pirkei Avot 2:4. See there where he explains that separating from the community is a way of breaking from the tradition in which the Torah was meant to be kept. The Torah was given to Bnei Yisrael as a unit (see Rashi Shemot 19:2) and should be kept that way. A person who deviates from communal practices is in essence causing the Torah to be perverted.
  5. This position is endorsed by the Sdei Chemed (v. 4, n. 38) and Yabia Omer O.C. 2:23. Both express the idea that the institutors of the minhag may not have the ability to be a decider of halacha to arbitrate between the rishonim. In such a case, the minhag is not binding.
  6. In fact, the Ohr Letzion (v. 2, p. 17-8 and v. 1, 5:7) advocates this approach with reservation. He explains that the community of Rabbi Yose HaGlali ate cheese and chicken together because the opinion of Rabbi Yose was that it was permitted even though the other Rabbis forbad it. Even after Rabbi Yose died, they followed his opinion, says the Or Letzion, because once they practice in accordance with his opinion before it was known to be a dispute, for that community it remains a permitted activity and do not need to consider the other opinion. One of his proofs is the Rambam (Shmitta VeYovel 10:6) who writes although he believes that the halacha does not follow the geonim in their count of the Shmitta cycle, because the practice is like the geonim, the practice should continue.
  7. S"A YD 214:2
  8. S"A YD 232:10. See Mishna Nedarim 25b.
  9. The concept that minhagim can be limited is shown in S"A YD 228:27. Regarding personal minhagim, see also the Pri Chadash who proves from the Gemara Chullin.
  10. Sdei Chemed (v. 4, Maarechet Mem, Klal 37)
  11. S"A YD 214:2
  12. Rav Hershel Schachter in a shiur on yutorah.org (min 10-12)
  13. Sh"t Or Letzion (vol 2 pg 17-18) writes that one should follow the minhag of one’s parents and not that of one’s rabbis.