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# Some say that if everyone listening to the bracha knows how to recite the bracha themselves they shouldn't use yatzah motzei.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 273:4 writes that one should only say kiddush for others if they already fulfilled their obligation if the others don't know how to say kiddush. Pri Chadash 273:4 disagrees but adds that if those listening answer amen it works even according to Shulchan Aruch. Biur Halacha 273:4 s.v. vhu writes that it is purely a mitzvah that since the one listening knows how to say it and they are going to fulfill their obligation they should be the one to say it but certainly after the fact they fulfill their obligation.</ref> | # Some say that if everyone listening to the bracha knows how to recite the bracha themselves they shouldn't use yatzah motzei.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 273:4 writes that one should only say kiddush for others if they already fulfilled their obligation if the others don't know how to say kiddush. Pri Chadash 273:4 disagrees but adds that if those listening answer amen it works even according to Shulchan Aruch. Biur Halacha 273:4 s.v. vhu writes that it is purely a mitzvah that since the one listening knows how to say it and they are going to fulfill their obligation they should be the one to say it but certainly after the fact they fulfill their obligation.</ref> | ||
===Yatzah Motzei=== | ===Yatzah Motzei=== | ||
# If a person already fulfilled his obligation he can nonetheless fulfill the obligation of others based on the concept that all Jews are responsible for one another. That concept is called Yatzah Motzei.<ref>Rosh Hashana 29a, Shulchan Aruch 273:4</ref> This concept works for Biblical and rabbinic mitzvot.<ref>Even though the Turei Even Rosh Hashana 29b holds that it is only effective on rabbinic mitzvot, we don't accept his opinion (Minchat Shlomo 1:3). Also, even though the Tzlach Brachot 48a holds that it is only effective on Biblical mitzvot, we don't accept his opinion (Meor Yisrael Brachot 48a s.v. maan). The Rif Pesachim 27a and Rosh Pesachim 10:36 write that it is possible to have yatzah motzei for maror even though maror today is rabbinic. Shulchan Aruch 484:1 codifies the Rif and Rosh. Meor Yisrael cites the Birkei Yosef 124:3, Imrei Binah Shabbat n. 11, and Chatan Sofer 129 who assume not like the Tzlach. Ritva Hilchot Brachot 2:24 seems to be a proof for the Tzlach.</ref> | # If a person already fulfilled his obligation he can nonetheless fulfill the obligation of others based on the concept that all Jews are responsible for one another. That concept is called Yatzah Motzei.<ref>Rosh Hashana 29a, Shulchan Aruch 273:4</ref> This concept works for Biblical and rabbinic mitzvot.<ref>Even though the Turei Even Rosh Hashana 29b holds that it is only effective on rabbinic mitzvot, we don't accept his opinion (Minchat Shlomo 1:3). Also, even though the Tzlach Brachot 48a holds that it is only effective on Biblical mitzvot, we don't accept his opinion (Meor Yisrael Brachot 48a s.v. maan). The Rif Pesachim 27a and Rosh Pesachim 10:36 write that it is possible to have yatzah motzei for maror even though maror today is rabbinic. Shulchan Aruch 484:1 codifies the Rif and Rosh. Meor Yisrael cites the Birkei Yosef 124:3, Imrei Binah Shabbat n. 11, and Chatan Sofer 129 who assume not like the Tzlach. Ritva Hilchot Brachot 2:24 seems to be a proof for the Tzlach. | ||
* Zera Avraham 1:12 writes that there's no such thing as arvut on mitzvot derabbanan since we only entered the convert of responsibility for all Jews on the mitzvot we had at the time of Har Grizim and Avel and not mitzvot derabbanan. Ginat Veradim 1:13 assumed otherwise. The Birkei Yosef 124:3 proves that it applies to derabbanan's as well from Rashi Rosh Hashana 29a who says that avrut should have applied to all brachot hanehenin but it doesn't since one isn't obligated to eat. The Ran and Tashbetz 3:79 agree. Since birchat hanehenin are derabbanan, it is clear that arvut applies to derabbanan's. He repeats this in Chaim Shaal 1:75 and adds that Tosfot Brachot 48a also holds that arvut applies to derabbanan mitzvot.</ref> | |||
# Regarding [[Brachot]] HaMitzvah, even if one has already fulfilled one’s obligation one can still fulfill the obligation of others because of the principle of Aravim Zeh BaZeh, the responsibility for our fellow Jew. <Ref> Mishna Brurah 213:14 </ref> | # Regarding [[Brachot]] HaMitzvah, even if one has already fulfilled one’s obligation one can still fulfill the obligation of others because of the principle of Aravim Zeh BaZeh, the responsibility for our fellow Jew. <Ref> Mishna Brurah 213:14 </ref> | ||
# For a Bracha of Shevach such as Birchot Hashachar, Baruch She'amar, and Yishtabach there is a dispute whether one fulfill someone else's obligation even though one already fulfilled one's obligation. <ref> | # For a Bracha of Shevach such as Birchot Hashachar, Baruch She'amar, and Yishtabach there is a dispute whether one fulfill someone else's obligation even though one already fulfilled one's obligation. <ref> | ||
