Taking Interest

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Lending money on interest is one of the more severe prohibitions in the torah. [1] The lender, the borrower, the guarantor, the witnesses, and even the scribe violate when engaging in an interest-bearing loan. [2]


  1. In any case where a person owes a debt to another Jew whether it is because he borrowed money or because he hired him and owes him or because he rented something and didn’t pay yet, it is forbidden to pay more than the actual debt because of the prohibition of taking interest. [3]
  2. It is prohibited to lend with interest even if the borrower is wealthy and willingly agrees to pay the interest. [4] It is prohibited even in cases where it seems entirely fair such as reimbursing the lender for the interest he was earning while his money was in a non-Jewish bank. [5]
  3. If neighbors have a good relationship and commonly borrow without being careful to return everything they borrow, then there is no prohibition of interest as the neighbors aren’t borrowing but rather gifting one another. [6]However, if neighbors do not such a relationship then a neighbor who borrows a half a bag of sugar is borrowed only that amount may be returned unless the amount difference is insignificant (about which people don’t care) [7] or if one is unsure how much one borrowed one may return an amount to be sure the loan is repaid. [8]
  4. It is permitted for someone to borrow another Jew's credit card to pay for a purchase and repay them the amount spent. Even if the purchaser receives points from the credit card company, that isn't considered interest since it doesn't come from the borrower. Additionally, the borrower may not the purchaser for any interest fees that the purchaser may incur if he pays late.[9]
  5. Some explain that a key factor in determining if something is considered a loan is whether the item is fungible and normally traded; if it is always traded to be kept that is a sale. Another factor that is used is whether the type of item being lent is similar to the item that is being returned; if they’re dissimilar it is like a sale.[10]
  6. It is forbidden to charge interest for a rental.[11] It is forbidden to charge interest for wages of a worker.[12]
  7. There is no prohibition of ribbit upon the loveh whenever it is rabbinic ribbit.[13]

Rabbinic Prohibition of Interest

  1. There are several different forms of interest that are prohibited only rabbinically. There are several practical differences if it is only rabbinic. For example, Rabbinic interest was not extended to charities. [14] Additionally, one who receives biblical interest must return it but this does not apply to certain cases of rabbinic interest. [15]
  2. It is permitted for the yeshiva to give out student loans for tuition with interest since it is only a rabbinic form of interest in that the money was never given to the students to spend and a yeshiva is allowed to taking rabbinic forms of interest.[16]

Borrowing Items

  1. It is forbidden to lend an item to get back the same type of item. This is called Seah B'seah. For example, lending out a 5 pound bag of flour to get back another bag of flour is forbidden.[17]
  2. This type of rabbinic ribbit is permitted if the borrower has some of the same type of the item he is borrowing. For example, if someone has one egg and wants to borrow five more eggs they can do so since they already have one.[18]
  3. Some poskim hold that it is permitted to lend an item that is small or cheap and people wouldn't care about the fluctuation in the price such as lending a loaf of bread.[19]


  1. Usually it is considered a rabbinic prohibition of taking interest to have a two tiered system in which the buyer could either pay a lower price now and receive the merchandise or can get the merchandise now and only pay later but at a higher price. [20]
  2. It is common in some businesses to require a deposit when a customer places a sale to ensure that the seller follows through with the sale. It is permitted for the seller to charge a lower price to the buyer who makes a deposit since the seller’s intent in requiring a deposit isn’t to charge interest but to ensure that the sale takes place. [21]
  3. It is forbidden to pay a camp an early bird special or discounted price if you pay early.[22]
  4. It is forbidden to pay for a sefer in advance before the printer published the sefer.[23]
  5. Using advanced discounted payments for a yeshiva or non-profit tzedaka organization is permitted since this is only a rabbinic form of interest.[24]

Partnership of Jews and non-Jews

  1. It is forbidden to charge or take interest from an individual Jew or group of Jews. Some poskim allow borrowing or lending on interest to a partnership of Jews and non-Jews if the non-Jews comprise at least half of the group to which one is lending or from which one is borrowing.[25]


  1. Some poskim say that it is permitted to lend or borrow on interest from a corporation even if it is owned by Jews because halacha views the corporation as a dummy entity that isn’t Jewish. Others say that it is only permitted to lend on interest from the corporation but not borrow on interest from them, while others still forbid both borrowing and lending with interest from a Jewish corporation.[26]

Non-Financial Benefit

  1. It’s forbidden for the borrower to do a favor to the lender if he would not have done it otherwise (if not for the loan). Even if the borrower would have done a certain favor if not for the loan, the borrower may not do that favor in public unless they have a good relationship and the borrower has done public favors for the lender in the past.[27]
  2. While some poskim prohibit the borrower from thanking the lender for the loan under the prohibition of ribbit devarim [28], other poskim are lenient and allow a simple thank you. [29]
  3. There’s no prohibition to do a non-financial favor after the loan was paid up. [30]

Heter Iska

Because of the difficulty of abiding by all the details of loaning without interest, there’s an institution which is a contract set up by the Rabbis to conduct a business loan without violating the Torah prohibition of interest. This is only a general overview and not a procedure to be done without consulting an Orthodox Rabbi.

The Heter Iska splits the money in two, half (or a percentage) is a money deposit and half is a loan. The borrower may use the half which is a money deposit for business but as the deposit is considered the property of its owner wherever it may be, the profit that the borrower makes belongs to the lender. However, a loan is considered the money of the borrower and the profits belong to the borrower, who is then only obligated to return the capital without interest.

One condition of the agreement is that the borrower isn’t trusted to say that he lost money unless he proves it with acceptable witnesses and he isn’t trusted to say that he didn’t profit unless he makes a Shevuah (biblical oath) that he didn’t profit. Another condition is that if the borrower pays the agreed amount (above the original capital) he doesn’t need to prove that he didn’t make any more money. Therefore, at the end of term, the receiver returns the half which is a loan (while keeping the profit made from that half) and returns the deposit along with the profit he made from that half up to the amount agreed upon (and if he didn’t profit that amount unless he proves it he must still pay the agreed upon amount, and if he profited more, he’s exempt from paying more).

There are many other conditions and one must consult with a reliable orthodox rabbi regarding each situation and how to draw up a Heter Iska. [31]

Lending Commodities for Other Commodities

  1. It is rabbinically forbidden to lend items for the same quantity of that item.[32]
  2. It is Biblically forbidden to lend an item for a greater quantity of that item. For example, lending 100 apples for 120 apples is Biblical interest.[33]

Involvement with Interest

  1. Anyone involved in the interest transaction, such as the lender, buyer, witnesses, scribe, or another intermediary is violating the halacha of ribbit.[34]
  2. It is forbidden to give a gift when returning a loan when if one doesn’t specify that it is because of the loan.[35]

Downpayments and early bird specials

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  1. Downpayments and early bird specials. 63b rav nachman says you can’t do an early bird special unless it is yesh lo. 65a he says you can do a downpayment and get the item now and pay more later as long as you don’t specify the price and tosfot 65b and 63b adds that if its price is evident in the market it is forbidden.

Rama 173:7 says you can do poskin on parah or talit even ein lo. That’s based on tosfot 63b that says if there’s no shuma then we’re not calling it agar natar we’re calling it tarsha. But what about the fact it might go up on its own like poskin al hapeirot? Bear hagolah and tiferet lmoshe - peiro will have a shuma later but parah will never Shach - parah is yatzah shaar in that the factors necessary to determine its price like per pound is shaar kavuah Taz argues on rama and says its only if it didn’t go up Chavot daat 173:11 there’s no shiybud haguf here if you give them a specific item, but there is for the general fruit which you can give them any fruit Rav chaim in gemara and tos not rama - with ashray bmata that’s partially yesh lo

Repaying a Loan with a Future in Commodities

  1. If a lender asks to be paid the value of the loan in a commodity and the borrower wants to pay with a commodity that is acceptable.
  2. If the borrower wants to pay with a commodity at a later date and there is a concern that the commodity will change prices in between it is forbidden to do so since the transaction began as a loan and he might be repaid more than he lent. This is forbidden even if the price of the commodity is established in the marketplace.[36] It is only solved if the borrower has the amount of the commodity he planning on using to repay with[37] at the time of the deal to repay the loan with the commodity.[38]

Supplier of a Commodity at a Future Date

  1. A person pays for a future of a commodity. At the time for the supplier to deliver the commodity if they agree to exchange the commodity for another commodity it is permitted to do so as long as the supplier already owns the commodity.[39]
  2. Some explain that it is permitted even if the borrower doesn’t have any of that commodity since the deal began as a sale and not a loan.[40]

Judging by the Time of Stipulation

  1. It is considered Biblical ribbit to lend 100 items to get 120 items in return, even if at the time of the return those 120 items afterwards are the same price as the 100 items were at the time of the original loan.[41]
  2. It is considered rabbinic ribbit to lend 100 items to get 100 items in return even if at the time of the return those 100 items are worth more than the price of the 100 items were originally.[42]

Land or Documents

  1. Ribbit applies to lending land in order to receive more in return or the same land together with something else in return. This is considered Biblical ribbit.[43]
  2. Ribbit applies to money given in a document.[44]

Less than a Prutah

  1. It is forbidden to lend money in order to get less than a prutah more than he lent.[45]

Repaying Interest

  1. Biblical ribbit must be returned otherwise it is permitted to seek a bet din to collect it.[46]
  2. There is a religious obligation to pay back derabbanan ribbit.[47] Some say that this doesn’t apply to ribbit paid before and after the loan.[48]
  3. A person who took interest should return it. If he offers to return it and the other person forgives his fellow from paying him back the person who took interest can keep it.[49]

Mechila in Advance

  1. It is forbidden to take a loan in order to pay back interest as a gift even though it is a willing and intentional gift. [50]
  2. It is ineffective and forbidden to arrange in advance that someone will pay you interest and then forgive the interest so that it shouldn’t need to be returned.[51]

Mechila After the Fact

  1. If a person incorrectly took interest one should return it but if the borrower forgives the loan (mechila) the lender doesn’t need to return it.[52]
  2. If a person forced the borrower to swear that he would forgive the interest after he paid it, that is forbidden to give and take interest and the vow is in invalid.[53]
  3. The mechila has to be explicit and can’t be assumed by the lender since the borrower didn’t ask he forgave it.[54]
  4. Ideally instead of having the borrower forgive the interest the lender should really return the interest to fulfill the mitzvah of returning interest.[55]

Matana Al Menat Lehachzir

  1. If the borrower gives the lender a temporary gift that will later be returned in addition to the capital that is considered ribbit.[56]

Small Amounts

  1. It is forbidden to gift interest even in small quantities.[57]

Talmidei Chachamim

  1. A Talmid Chacham who borrowed from another Talmid Chacham food he can return him some more than he got up to a fifth since they are so careful about the halacha it is obvious that they are giving purely as a gift and not because of the loan.[58]
  2. Some say that it is permitted for a Talmid Chacham to stipulate with another Talmid Chacham to pay him a little bit of interest since it is understood to be a pure gift and because of the loan. This leniency should be relied upon sparingly so that people don’t mistakenly extrapolate.[59]
  3. Who is a Talmid Chacham? Some say that he needs to be knowledgeable in most areas of the Talmud and can answer questions properly and extrapolate halachot from one area to another and is very scrupulous of the halacha. Some say that it is referring to a student of Torah who knows the laws.[60]
  4. It is unclear if the wife of a talmid chacham is afforded the status of a talmid chacham for this halacha.[61]

Purchasing Futures of a Commodity (Poskin Al Hapeirot)

  1. You can buy gourds that are small in the field when they’ll ripen even if the price is cheaper when you pay now.[62]
  2. If you specify that if the price goes up then it is an investment and if it goes down it is a loan, that is invalid and is considered a loan with ribbit.[63]

Exchanging Favors

  1. It is forbidden to ask your friend to work for you today and you’ll work for them at a later date if the second job is harder[64] or the value of the second work is more than the first one.[65]
  2. For example, it is forbidden to ask your friend to give you a ride somewhere and next week you’ll give them a ride somewhere else that is further or would take more time.[66]
  3. It is forbidden for someone to watch someone else’s children in exchange that they will watch your children at another time if watching your children is harder or it is for a longer period of time. [67]
  4. It is permitted to exchange jobs even if the second is harder if the jobs being done are for a partnership and the people in question are partners.[68]
  5. If one person asks his friend to build his sukkah with him in exchange for him helping his friend build his sukkah if the second one is harder it is forbidden.[69]
  6. It is forbidden for a teacher to arrange for someone to substitute for him in exchange for him doing the same for that person if the second job is more difficult or is worth more.[70]
  7. It is a dispute if isn’t clear if the second job will be harder or worth more than the first job if it is permitted to initiate such a deal. One should be strict.[71]

Exchanging Loans

  1. It is forbidden to trade loans because doing so is taking and paying the value of a loan.[72]
  2. If after someone lent you money, it is permitted to lend them back.[73]


  1. If there is no reason that one job should be done before the other one it is permitted since the exchange is a simple trade of favors and there is no intention to charge for the passage of time.[74]
  2. If the people making the arrangements aren’t careful to be exacting then it is permitted since it is just one doing a chesed for the other. For example, if neighbors watch each other’s children from time to time and they don’t meticulously calculate how many times they watch each other’s children it is permitted.[75]
  3. If the two people arranged to do each other’s jobs simultaneously there is no prohibition of ribbit at all.[76]
  4. Some hold it is permitted if you don’t stipulate from the beginning that they would exchange favors as long as the difference between the difficulty or price of the favors isn't great.[77]

Who can you take interest from?


  1. It is permitted to lend to and borrow from non-Jews with interest.[78]
  2. Nowadays in Israel it is forbidden to lend non-Jews money with interest since it is possible to do business with Jews exclusively. Yet it would be permitted in order to make a livelihood but not to make oneself wealthy.[79] Some poskim are lenient even in Israel.[80]
  3. Even outside Israel one should be strict if one can.[81] Some say that for an impersonal bank it is permitted since one hardly interacts with the non-Jews.[82]
  4. It is permitted to borrow with interest from non-Jews.[83]

Non-Religious Jew

  1. It is permitted to lend to a non-religious Jew with interest if he was brought up religious and later became non-religious.[84] Initially this should be avoided.[85]
  2. One may not lend a non-religious Jew who is raised as a non-religious Jew with interest.[86] This applies to conservative and reform Jews today.[87]
  3. Some say that it is permitted to lend the Karaites with interest.[88]

Family Members

  1. It is forbidden to charge interest even between a parent and child even if they aren’t Bar/Bat mitzvah even though it is understood to be a gift.[89] This applies both to a parent borrowing from a child and a child from a parent.[90]

Gifts or Favors from the Borrower

  1. It is forbidden to give a gift or interest even before or after a loan from another Jew and certainly during the loan.[91] If someone does so they violated avak ribbit.[92]

Before or After the Loan

  1. Some say that it is permitted to give a gift before or after the loan from another Jew if you don’t specify that it is because of the loan.[93] However, others disagree.[94] Ashkenazim follow the first opinion and Sephardim the second.[95]
  2. Some say that everyone agrees if one’s intention is to give it because of the loan it is forbidden.[96] However, there is an opinion that it is permitted if one doesn’t specify that it is for the loan.[97] For example, paying to be able to buy on credit is forbidden.[98]
  3. Some say that it is permitted to give a gift before or after the loan from another Jew if you usually give the lender such gifts.[99] It is permitted for a borrower to hand a tissue to the lender since it is a common courtesy.[100]


  1. It is forbidden to teach one’s lender or his son Torah during the duration of the loan unless he did so regularly before the loan.[101]

Favors, Kind Gestures, and Saying Thank You (Ribbit Dvarim)

  1. It is forbidden to give any benefit to the lender even a nice word or greeting them with a simple word hello can be forbidden if a person didn’t usually say hello before the loan and one is doing it because of the loan.[102] This is called Ribbit Devarim and is a rabbinically forbidden form of ribbit.[103]
  2. Ribbit Devarim only applies during the duration of the loan and not before or afterwards.[104]
  3. Thanking the lender is questionable if it is permitted since it is giving something to the lender in return for the loan in addition to the original loan. Some are lenient since it is a generally accepted custom to thank people for very small favors and so it is rude to do otherwise and if the entire expression of gratitude is minimal it is like it was normal to do beforehand.[105]
  4. It is forbidden to write in a sefer thank you to someone who lent you money in order to publish a sefer.[106]
  5. it is forbidden for the lender to ask the borrower for any favor even something simple as alerting him when someone will come to a certain place.[107]
  6. It is forbidden to ask the borrower to do something for you even if he would have done so anyway.[108]
  7. The borrower can’t go to the simcha (celebration) of the lender unless he would have done so anyway.[109]

Business Obligations Upon the Borrower

  1. It is forbidden to lend money on condition that the borrower does business with him or someone else[110] specifically. There is a doubt if it is Biblical interest or only rabbinic interest.[111]
  2. If the lender has a job it is forbidden to stipulate that the borrower use the lender for his services whenever he needs that type of service.[112]
  3. If the borrower has a job it is forbidden to stipulate that the borrower do that job even for a fair price for the lender whenever the lender needs it.[113]
  4. If there is no stipulation it is nonetheless forbidden for the borrower to do business with the lender to hire him specifically.[114] If the reason one is hiring him isn't because of the loan but because he has a better deal or the like it is permitted.[115]
  5. If the lender is poor it is forbidden for the borrower to give him charity aside from repaying the loan. If he would have given him charity anyway if not for the loan it is permitted.[116]

Following Instructions of the Lender

  1. It is forbidden for the lender to tell the borrower that I will lend you on condition that you convince someone to give you a gift.[117]

Paying When Debt Is Unclear

  1. If the lender and borrower can't agree on the amount of the debt the borrower can pay the higher of the amounts. Ideally he should specify that it is a gift and not for the loan.[118]


  1. It is forbidden to give a gift to someone on condition that they give you a small gift each year (or regularly) for an extended period of time such that the accumulation of the gifts is more than the original gift. Essentially an annuity using gifts is forbidden.[119]

Payments from a Third Party to Create a Loan

  1. It is permitted to give someone money in order that they lend money to someone else.[120] That is only permitted on condition that the giver isn’t reimbursed by the borrower. Furthermore, the borrower can’t tell the lender that the giver is giving on his behalf.[121]
  2. Some poskim add that the borrower may not convince the giver to give a gift to the lender.[122] There is what to rely upon to be lenient.[123]
  3. It is certainly forbidden to hire someone to get someone to lend you money and that hired agent pays the lender some of that money.[124]

Gifts between the Borrower and a Guarantor

  1. A borrower who accepts to pay his guarantor some amount of money each month or period of time it isn’t considered interest since it isn’t a payment from the borrower to the lender. This is permitted unless the lender set up the loan in order to get the borrower to pay the guarantor.[125]

Payments from a Borrower to a Third Party

  1. It is forbidden to ask a borrower to pay back anything in excess of the capital to someone else or a tzedaka. That is considered Biblical ribbit.[126] If the third party already took the money the lender needs to return to the borrower the amount of that gift to the third party since he caused interest to be given.[127]
  2. It doesn’t matter if the lender initiated this stipulation or the borrower initiated the stipulation and the lender agreed to lend on that condition.[128]

Payments to a Third Party to Create a Loan

  1. It is permitted to pay a third party in order that he encourage someone to lend you money since the recipient of the payment isn’t the lender.[129]
  2. This third party could be anyone besides a close family member such as a financially dependant child of the lender.[130]
  3. It is forbidden for this recipient to give the money to the lender.[131]

Gifts between the Guarantor and the Lender

  1. If the guarantor or anyone else accepts to pay the lender some amount of money each month or some period of time as long as the borrower hasn’t paid that is considered interest.[132]

Paying up a Loan of the Lender

  1. It is rabbinically forbidden for the borrower to repay another loan of the lender if he does so besides returning the capital of the loan that he borrowed.[133]


  1. Money that belongs to orphans who aren’t bar or bat mitzvahed can be lent with rabbinic interest[134] but not Biblical interest.[135] This is the practice.[136]
  2. The is permitted to collect the rabbinic interest even if it is collected after he is bar or bat mitzvahed as long as it was arranged beforehand.[137]
  3. If the orphan’s money was indeed lent with Biblical interest, if the borrower invested and in fact made as much as the percent interest that was demanded he needs to pay it.[138] Some say that he only needs to pay it if he made twice as much as was demanded.[139]
  4. Money that is designated for talmud torah, poor people, or a shul can be lent with rabbinic interest.[140]
  5. Some say that it is permitted to lend money with rabbinic interest in order to have money to spend on a Shabbat meal or Suedat mitzvah.[141]
  6. This leniency does not apply to money designated for a tzedaka unless it was given to a charity and is in the domain of the charity.[142]
  7. Charity that is designated for an individual poor person can be lent with rabbinic interest.[143]
  8. Can you lend money with rabbinic interest to spend that money for a mitzvah? Some poskim hold that it is forbidden,[144] while others hold it is permitted.[145]
  9. If a power of attorney or agent lent money of orphans with interest on their behalf and they already took that money the power of attorney or agent doesn’t need to pay it back and the orphans as well can keep it.[146]

Ribbit for Pikuach Nefesh

  1. It is permitted to borrow from a Jew with interest in order to save someone’s life. That is only if borrowing from a non-Jew with interest isn’t an option that would allow saving the person’s life. [147] The lender is doing wrong by lending with interest but nonetheless one doesn’t need to worry about causing him to sin if one is trying to save someone’s life.[148]

Taking a Loan from an Israeli Bank

  1. It is permitted to take a loan from an Israeli bank account since there is a heter iska klali. It is preferable to write on the contract that it works with a heter iska.[149]

Merchant Cash Advance

  1. It is forbidden to be a broker for Merchant Cash Advance transactions since halacha deems them as a loan with interest. A heter iska can be used to solve the issue.[150]


  1. Ribbis by Rabbi Hershel Schachter
  2. Contemporary Issues in Hilchos Ribbis by Rabbi Yona Reiss


  1. The Gemara BM 71a says that one who lends with interest becomes poor and never recovers. The Rambam Hilchot Malveh Viloveh 4:2 delineates six biblical prohibitions which could potentially be violated in any particular loan transaction. Ramban Sefer Hamitzvot Shoresh 6 adds a 7th.
  2. Mishna Bava Metzia 75b. Shulchan Aruch YD 160:1
  3. S”A Y”D 176:6, Rama Y”D 161:1, The gemara Bava Metsia 63b explains that as long as one is paying extra to be able to hold the money for longer, it would be a violation of this prohibition.
  4. Shulchan Aruch YD 160:1,4.
  5. Iggerot Moshe YD 3:93
  6. The Weekly Halachah Discussion (vol 2, pg 348) quoting The Laws of Interest (pg 35)
  7. The Weekly Halachah Discussion (vol 2, pg 348) quoting Brit Yehuda (Siman 17 note 6)
  8. The Weekly Halachah Discussion (vol 2, pg 348) quoting Sh”t Minchat Yitzchak 9:88
  9. Rabbi Doniel Neustadt on torah.org and [dinonline.org http://www.dinonline.org/2014/01/17/receiving-points-from-credit-card-loan/]
  10. Biurim in Chelkat Binyamin 161:1 s.v. dvar wrote that there’s a machloket Chavot Daat and Mekor Mayim Chayim why a loan of slaves isn’t loan but a sale. Chavot Daat explains that since each slave is unique and needs a significant evaluation it is considered a sale when you trade one for two later. His premise is that there’s no prohibition of a loan of one item for another like apples for oranges. However, the Mekor Mayim Chaim explains that since a person doesn’t give a slave to be loaned out or traded (lhotzah) but rather to be used it isn’t considered or termed a loan but a sale.
  11. Teshuvot Maimoniyot 15 records the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer Mtuch that interest is permitted for a rental. His proof is Macot 3a. However, the Bet Yosef 160:21 disagrees with this opinion.
  12. Gemara Bava Metsia 73a clarifies that there is interest for hiring a worker. Bet Yosef 160:21 clearly states this as well.
  13. Nemukei Yosef b”m 39b s.v. garsinan, Ritva there, Darkei Moshe 160:2, Rama 160:1
  14. Shulchan Aruch and Rama YD 160:18
  15. Shulchan Aruch YD 161:2
  16. Rav Hershel Schachter (Dinei Ribbis min 35-40) explained that it is permitted for a yeshiva to lend money on interest for student tuition loans since the money isn't given to the students as a loan and then repaid, it is used to pay off the debt for classes and services provided. Postponing paying for a service isn't derech halvah, the nature of borrowing, and therefore only a rabbinic form of interest, which is permitted for a yeshiva.
  17. Bava Metsia 75a
  18. Bava Metsia 75a
  19. Yalkut Yosef CM 159:18
  20. Shulchan Aruch YD 173:7, The Laws of Ribbis p. 132, Rav Hershel Schachter (Dinei Ribbis min 40)
  21. The Laws of Ribbis p. 133
  22. Rav Hershel Schachter (Dinei Ribbis approx min 40)
  23. Rav Hershel Schachter (Dinei Ribbis approx min 40)
  24. Rav Hershel Schachter (Dinei Ribbis approx min 40)
  25. The Shoel V’Nishal (Mahudra Kama 3:31) writes to Rav Shlomo Ganzfried, author of the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, that he held that it was permitted to borrow or lend with interest from a partnership between Jews and non-Jews. He thought that since the partnership signs under the title of an entity and not individuals it is permitted according to Rashi and those who hold that lending on interest through a messenger is permitted. Further, even according to those who argue with Rashi, he thought that it was permitted if there are non-Jews in the group so that the Jews can say that they only profited from the non-Jewish borrowers and not the Jewish borrowers. Rav Yitzchak Schmelkes in Beis Yitzchak (v. 2 Kuntres Acharon no. 32) qualifies the Shoel V’nishal’s permit to cases where there are a majority or at least half non-Jews. Mishneh Halachot 6:145 and 13:130 permits borrowing or lending from banks that have a minority of Jewish shareholders because the Jewish shareholders don’t have a say in how the bank runs. The Maharam Shik YD 158 argues with the Shoel V’nishal’s logic; see there for his leniency with other conditions.
  26. Igrot Moshe YD 2:63 thought that the prohibition of borrowing with interest does not apply to a corporation. Since no one person has personal liability for the loan, the corporation may pay interest. He based this contention on the opinion of Rabbenu Tam (cited by Tosfot Ketubot 85b) who says that there are two types of indebtedness: a lien on one’s property and a personal one. Rabbenu Tam holds that if a person forgives the borrower and relinquishes the personal lien even if there still is a property lien that was sold to another person, that property lien automatically falls apart. Accordingly, one may receive interest from a bank or invest in bonds or stocks of a corporation, though one still would not be allowed to borrow from a corporation.
    Maharshag YD 3 brought a proof that there is no biblical ribbit to charge a corporation interest from the Gemara Gittin 30a that permits giving money in advance to a kohen so that the next time a person has a crop he can take off Trumah, sell it to kohanim, and then the proceeds are effectively given to the kohen and used to pay off part of the debt so that the owner can keep the proceeds of the sale. The gemara explains that even though there is a rabbinic prohibition of interest to pay in advance for food that hasn’t grown and there’s no market price, here it is permitted since the kohen borrower has no real obligation to pay out of pocket according to the original stipulations. The Chelkat Yakov YD 66 grapples with the Rogachover and Maharshag but ultimately says that it is forbidden rabbinically even though there is a good logic to permit it. Rav Zalman Nechemya Goldberg (Shiurei Ribbit p. 8) questioned the proof of the Maharshag because the risk factor that the debtors won’t pay the bank isn’t as great as the risk that a field gets ruined. Minchat Shlomo 1:28 argues with Rav Moshe and isn’t lenient in either direction. Lastly, Rav J. David Bleich in Netivot HaHalacha v. 2 p. 191-4 disagrees with Rav Moshe that it is impossible to have a shiybud nechasim without shiybud haguf. If there exists a shiybud it also applies to the guf even though there is some external conditions which make it impossible to collect from the shiybud haguf.
  27. The Weekly Halachah Discussion (vol 2, pg 346)
  28. Iggerot Moshe YD 1:80
  29. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Minchat Shlomo 1:27
  30. Birkei Yosef Y”D 160:11, The Weekly Halachah Discussion (vol 2, pg 348), Malveh Hashem (vol 1, 8:30)
  31. Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 66:1-6. See Ribit Halacha LeMaseh chapter 20. One can see this shtar isko on the website of the Beth Din of America
  32. Shulchan Aruch 160:21
  33. Shulchan Aruch YD 160:21
  34. Bava Metsia 75b, Tur and Shulchan 160:1, Shach 160:1
  35. Rashi 73b s.v. achulei implies that as long as one doesn’t specify that a gift isn’t because of the loan it is permitted even at the time of returning the loan. However, the Rosh b”m 5:67 argues that it is only permitted after payment of the loan. Bet Yosef 160:4 cites the Talmidei Harashba who says that it is only permitted to give an extra gift if it was a sale and not a loan.
  36. Rabba on 62b and Rav Oshiya on 63a explain that when a person pays the lender with a commodity at a future date there is a concern for ribbit since the price of the commodity might rise. This problem isn’t solved by the fact that there is an established market price since the borrower wouldn’t be able to buy the commodity with the pre-existing loan.
  37. Rashba 62b clarifies that although when discussing seah bseah it is sufficient to have some of the commodity and halachically we consider it as though there were multiple sales using this commodity. However, in the case of a loan that was exchanged for a commodity it remains a loan and in order to permit the potential interest it is essential that it is viewed as a real sale. It is only possible to consider the exchange a real sale if the borrower has the quantity he is offering the lender at the time of the agreement to exchange for the commodity.
  38. According to Rabba it isn't even solved if the lender has the commodity, however, according to Rav Oshiya it is solved if he has the commodity.
  39. Rav Oshiya on 63a
  40. Rif bava metsia 34b, Nemukei Yosef 34b quoting Rabbenu Chananel and Rav Hai Goan, Rashba 62b s.v. vki, Gra Y.D. 175:10. The Rif explains that as long as the initial transaction was a sale in the future of a commodity and not a loan it is permitted to switch over the first commodity to the second even if the borrower doesn’t have the commodity.
  41. Gemara Bava Metsia 60b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 160:21
  42. The reason that this is only rabbinic ribbit and not Biblical ribbit is because we judge the situation whether something is ribbit or not based on the stipulation at the time of the loan. That is the ruling of the Shach YD 160:35 and Gra 160:53. This is also the opinion of the Ritva 61b s.v. vtisbara, Ran, and Talmid Harashba cited by Bet Yosef 160:21. However, the Hagahot Ashri 6:1 writes that this was the doubt of the gemara whether we judge the deal from the stipulation or the time of the return and if we judge it by the time of the return it is considered ribbit. This case might therefore be ribbit Biblically. The Granat explains that even the Hagahot Ashri only considers it Biblical ribbit if it is an exchange of currency which is uncommon but not with actual commodities which is certainly rabbinic.
  43. Tosfot Bava Metsia 61a s.v. im holds that based on a klal uprat uklal land is excluded from the laws of ribbit. Rosh b”m 5:1 and Ran b”m 61a s.v. karkaot agrees. Tur 161:1 cites Ri who agrees. Bet Yosef cites the Rabbenu Yerucham who is strict. The Rabbenu Yerucham 1:8 is citing the Rashba b”m 61a minayin, however, in our versions of the Rashba it seems in conclusion he is lenient. The Bet Yosef isn’t certain if there’s a rabbinic prohibition even according to Tosfot. Taz 161:1 says obviously there is a rabbinic prohibition. Certainly Tosfot adds that money to receive some land or benefit from land is forbidden. The Shach 161:1 and Taz 161:1 who point out that Shulchan Aruch 161:1 seems to be strict. See Gra 161:1 who might be lenient to consider it only a rabbinic prohibition.
  44. Rosh Bava Metsia 5:1 writes that theoretically documents should be excluded from ribbit because of a klal uprat. However, he notes that there’s no case of a loan with a document, giving a loan to receive it return with an interest on the side is a rental. Bet Yosef 161:1 asks why it isn’t considered a loan to give a document of debt that is worth 100 to receive in return a document of debt of 200. Bach 161:1 and Taz 161:1 both argue that such a deal would certainly be ribbit since the document merely represents money.
  45. Tosfot Bava Metsia 61a s.v. im writes that based on a klal uprat it is possible to deduce that less than a prutah is excluded from ribbit. Rosh agrees. However, The Tur 161:1 cites the Ramah who disagrees. See Ritva 61a fnt. 35 who points out that the Ramah cited by Shitah Mikubeset 61a seems not be discussing this idea. Shulchan Aruch 161:1 follows the Ramah. See fnt. to Ritva who cites the Gedulei Trumah 46:1:1 who explained that the only dispute is whether a person can lend less than a prutah to receive interest but the Mishneh Lmelech Hilchot Malveh Vloveh 6:1 disagrees and says that it is a dispute where the loan is greater than a prutah to gain interest that is less than a prutah. Rav Elyashiv on Bava Metsia 61a s.v. sham btosfot comments that the Gra explains the Ramah who says that it is forbidden to take less than a prutah because a half shiur of something prohibited is also prohibited. Rav Elyashiv questions this because perhaps taking less than a prutah in one loan can’t possibly combine with another less than a prutah unless it would be another loan.
  46. Rabbi Elazar 61b, Shulchan Aruch 161:2
  47. The rishonim debate whether there’s a religious obligation to pay for deoritta ribbit according to Rabbi Yochanan who says that there isn’t a monetary claim upon the lender. Tosfot 62a s.v. tenay holds that there’s no obligation but Rivan holds that there is. Rashba 62b cites the discussion and Ritva sides with Tosfot. Nemukei Yosef 34a sides with the Rivan. The Rashba concludes that there’s no practical application to this dispute because we hold that there is a monetary obligation to return ribbit. The Ran and Ritva argue that from this discussion you can learn how to treat rabbinic ribbit whether this is a religious obligation to return ribbit derabbanan. Ritva holds that there’s no obligation to return rabbinic ribbit, however, the Ran and Nemukei Yosef holds that there is. Rashba holds that there’s no obligation. Riaz Bava Metsia 62a s.v. elah accepts the Rashba that there’s no comparison between what Rabbi Yochanan held to what we should hold for rabbinic ribbit since Rabbi Yochanan held that someone who collected ribbit owns the money he collected but Rabbi Elazar argues that it isn’t his at all. He concludes that for rabbinic ribbit it doesn’t need to be returned if a person is doing it as part of teshuva. Shulchan Aruch 161:2 holds like the Nemukei Yosef.
  48. Rashba 5:187 writes that if a person gave ribbit after the loan the receiver doesn’t have to return it even as a religious obligation and he adds that ribbit after the loan is less serious than other forms of rabbinic ribbit. Rashba 1:938 writes that the prohibition of giving ribbit after the loan only applies to the receiver and not the borrower. Bet Yosef 161:2 cites the Rashba as a proof that there’s no religious obligation to return ribbit paid after the loan. Rama 161:2 codifies this opinion.
  49. Rambam Malveh Vloveh 4:13 and Rosh b”m 5:2
    • The Raavad 4:13 agrees with the Geonim that forgiving the loan is ineffective. Their reason is that it seems that the torah invalidated forgiving the interest as is always the case of interest, even though a person willing lends money with interest it is still forbidden. Similarly, the Geonim say that interest that was taken illegitimately can’t be forgiven and needs to be returned. The Maggid Mishna clearly states that the Rambam agrees that forgiving interest in advance doesn’t permit the loan. Otherwise that would undo the prohibition of interest.
  50. The Geonim cited by Rambam Malveh Vloveh 4:13 argue that obviously it is forbidden to give interest as even though one forgives it knowingly because that is every case of interest and yet it is forbidden. The Maggid Mishna points out that the Rambam agrees with the Geonim on this contention. Rosh b”m 5:2 agrees as well. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 161:6 codifies this opinion.
    • Yet, the Mishna Lemelech 4:13 writes that it is permitted to forgive paying the interest in advance for rabbinic loans and that is permitted. His proof is that the Gemara Bava Metsia 75a and Rambam 4:9 permit rabbis to lend with interest since it is understood to be a complete gift and the Maggid Mishna says that it isn’t stipulated interest but interest after the fact. However, Shach 160:6 rules based on the Tur that it is forbidden to give interest even as a gift even if it isn’t stipulated in advance.
  51. Bedek Habayit 160:5 cites that Ritva 61 a.s. Ma who writes that if a person forces his borrower to swear that after the loan he will forgive the interest because a forced mechila isn’t valid.
  52. Shulchan Aruch YD 160:5, Rambam 4:13 argues with the Geonim who held that mechila enver worked for ribbit and the Rambam holds that it is worked after the fact.
  53. Ritva Bava Metsia 61a s.v. ma, Bedek Habayit 160:5
  54. Pitchei Teshuva 160:1 citing Yavetz 1:147
  55. Chelkat Binyamin 130:35 writes that if the borrower forgives the interest the lender didn’t fulfill the mitzvah, though he is exempt. Rather the lender should pay the borrower.
  56. Rama 160:5
  57. Rama 160:17 only permits giving interest in small amounts for Talmidei Chachamim on occasion but not everyone.
  58. Gemara Bava Metsia 75a, Shulchan Aruch 160:17
  59. Rama 161:17
  60. Biurim of Chelkat Binyamin
  61. Biurim of Chelkat Binyamin
  62. Tosfot 64a s.v. ma says that you could buy wine from the vineyard even though it isn’t produced yet as long as you don’t specify how much and just buy everything. Also once the grapes are small it is permitted to buy the wine that will be produced later. That’s similar to buying gourds when they ripen if they’re now small (64a). However, the Nemukei Yosef 43b disagrees on both points. It is forbidden to buy the wine from the vineyard even if you don’t specify an amount since it isn’t produced yet. Also, since no one buys unripe grapes even when they’re unripe it isn’t like they’re relevant to allow buying wine that is produced from them. However, gourds are sometimes sold unripe. Rama 173:10 accepts Nemukei Yosef.
  63. Tosfot b"m 54a s.v iy explains that since a person accepted the achrayut of the money it is certainly a loan.
  64. Shulchan Aruch 160:9, Chelkat Binyamin 160:80, Mishnat Ribbit 19:2, Brit Yehuda 11:1
  65. Chelkat Binyamin 19:80, Brit Yehuda 11:1
  66. Mishnat Ribbit 19:3
  67. Mishnat Ribbit 19:3
  68. Chatom Sofer YD 135, Brit Yehuda ch. 11 fnt. 1, Chelkat Binyamin 160:79, Mishnat Ribbit 19:6. The Chelkat Binyamin explains that the reason is that the first person isn’t working for the second person but rather they are working for the collective business.
  69. Mishnat Ribbit Biurim 19 fnt. 1
  70. Mishna Ribbit 19:3
  71. Rashi 75a and Tur 160:9 imply that even if it isn’t clear that the second job is harder it is still forbidden the transaction. Prisha 160:15 states this explicitly. However, Shulchan Aruch 160:9 implies it is permitted. Chelkat Binyamin 160:82 is strict.
  72. Rama 160:9 quotes the dispute of the rishonim if it is permitted to lend someone on condition that they lend you back afterwards. The Gra holds it is forbidden.
  73. The Chelkat Binyamin 160:90 cites the Graz who says that for rabbinic ribbit cases we can follow the rishonim who permitted trading one loan for another loan. Therefore, if after the setup of the loan it is permitted to lend them in return since that would only be rabbinic ribbit even if one gave cash in return after the setup of the loan.
  74. Mishnat Ribbit 19 fnt. 1 s.v. umstimat writes that if the people arranging the agreement don’t care which job is first then it is clear that they aren’t charging one another interest for the passage of time for the vale of the first job. He cites this from the Kuntres Acharon Lkitzur Piskei Dinei Ribbit 8:4. He ends that Rav Shternbuch advised avoiding this by stating that one shouldn’t arrange it as an obligation.
  75. Chelkat Binyamin 160:79, Mishnat Ribbit 19:3
  76. Chelkat Binyamin 160:81. This is also clearly implied by Rashi 75a s.v. aval, Tur and Shulchan Aruch 160:9.
  77. Brit Yehuda 11:2 citing Gedulei Truma 3:24, Mishnat Ribbit 19:5
  78. The Gemara Bava Metsia 70b states that it is permitted to charge non-Jews ribbit and there is only a rabbinic prohibition to do so. The reason the rabbis forbade it is that they didn’t want people to learn from the non-Jews by interacting with them too much. They only permitted it for a talmid chacham or someone who needs to make money to survive. This is codified by the Rambam and Rif. However, Tosfot 70b s.v. tashich writes that today we lend with interest to non-Jews for three reasons: 1) we follow the opinion that there’s no rabbinic prohibition to lend to non-Jews at all. 2) Due to the high taxes we have to charge non-Jews interest otherwise financially wouldn’t survive and it is considered necessary for our livelihood. 3) Really based on the reason of the prohibition it is prohibited to do any business with non-Jews and if we didn’t do that we wouldn’t survive. Meiri b”m 70b agrees with reason two. Tur YD 159:1 cites the last reason of Tosfot. Shulchan Aruch and Rama Y.D. 159:1 simply writes that nowadays it is permitted to lend non-Jews with interest.
  79. Netivot Shalom YD 159:1:16 writes that today in Israel since it is possible to do without lending non-Jews with interest it is unclear if it is permitted to do so nowadays. Additionally, Rav Moshe Halevi in Malveh Hashem 5:3 writes that Jews who live in Israel should be strict not to lend non-Jews with interest since it is possible to transact with Jews and be financially stable. He explains that none of the reasons of Tosfot apply today except that perhaps we don't hold that there's any prohibition which is rejected. Similarly, Rav Shlomo Mazuz in Kerem Shlomo 159:8 is strict.
  80. Chut Shani 2:1 p. 39 writes that even nowadays it is permitted to lend a non-Jew with interest even though in Israel we can support ourselves without business to non-Jews. Since there is some business with non-Jews and non-religious Jews the leniencies are still relevant. Chelkat Binyamin 159:10 (written in America) is lenient in all cases.
  81. Chachmat Adam 130:6 writes that any honest man who could avoid taking interest from non-Jews should do so.
  82. Chelkat Binyamin 159:1 s.v. vhaidna writes that one doesn’t have to be strict for the Chachmat Adam if one is lending to a bank and one only has to interact with them minimally.
  83. Rambam Malveh Vloveh 5:2 explains that they never prohibited it lest one come to learn from their ways since it is normal for a borrower to avoid the lender and not learn from him. Meiri b”m 70b agrees. Chazon Ovadia Shabbat v. 1 p. 7 and Malveh Hashem 5:5 codify this as the halacha.
  84. Shulchan Aruch 159:2
  85. Rama 159:2
  86. Shulchan Aruch and Rama 159:3 forbid lending with ribbit to someone who is a tinok shenishba. Gemara Shabbat 68b clarifies that a child who was captive among non-Jews (tinok shenishba) and didn't know about Shabbat is considered as though he sinned unintentionally. Brit Yehuda 30:12 agree. Rambam Mamrim 3:3 writes that the sons of the karaites who were brought up with the mistakes of their parents aren't considered minim but should be returned in teshuva. (Yet, see the manuscript editions which include another few words that alter the meaning of the Rambam.) Pirush Mishnayot Chullin 1:2 writes that someone who reject tenants of our faith are considered minim. However, someone who was born into a family and background with such thoughts aren't culpable and are similar to a tinok shenishba. Binyan Tzion Chadashot 23 posits that many of the non-religious Jews today are considered tinok shenishba since they're following the ways of their fathers.
    • Chazon Ish YD 1:6 writes that once we try to teach him about the Orthodox ways and he turns it down he is considered to be a mumar. The amount of effort necessary to spend in trying to teach him is subjective and is left up to the judgement of the rabbis of each generation. Additionally, once he is aware of the Orthodox Jews and practices even without trying to teach him he can be considered a mumar. However, that too depends on how aware he was of the Orthodox Jews and to what degree and with what intensity his parents taught his otherwise. This is the basis for the dispute whether Karaites are mumarim.
  87. Igrot Moshe 4:91:6, Chelkat Binyamin 159:22
  88. Shulchan Aruch 159:3. Bet Yosef 159:3 cites the Pirush Mishnayot Chullin 1:2 where the Rambam says that karaites are like tinok shenishba and it is forbidden to lend them with interest. Bet Yosef points out that the Nemukei Yosef 42b quotes the Ri who says that anyone who once recognized Orthodox Jews isn’t a tinok shenishba disagrees with this Rambam. Shulchan Aruch follows the Rambam. However, the Shach 159:6 cites the Maharshal, Maharnach 113, Rash quoted by Mabit 1:38, Rav Betzalel 3 who are strict. Nekudat Hakesef he writes that the halacha on this matter is unresolved. Chelkat Binyamin 159:21 concludes with the Graz who is strict.
  89. The Gemara Bava Metsia 75a concludes that it is forbidden to charge your children interest because it is teaching them a bad lesson. That is also the opinion of Rambam Malveh Vloveh 4:8 and Shulchan Aruch 160:8. Why in fact isn’t it Biblically forbidden to charge your children interest irrelevant of the fact that it is teaching a bad lesson? Chelkat Binyamin cites three approaches as to why it is technically permitted. 1) It is certain that in the end you don’t collect it (Prisha 160:13). 2) We’re only about money that the father gave the child and is now taking it back as interest (Ritva 75a, Knesset Hagedola, Lechem Mishna 4:8). 3) It is understood that the person means to give a gift to his children as a pure gift that he would have done so even if they didn’t lend money (Taz 160:4).
  90. Taz 160:4 based on Rambam
  91. Mishna Bava Metsia 75b, Shulchan Aruch YD 160:6
  92. Shulchan Aruch YD 160:6, Shach 160:8. Bet Yosef 160:5 inquires whether giving a gift after the loan that was specified for the loan is considered a Biblical violation of ribbit or only rabbinic. He notes that the Rambam Malveh Vloveh 6:3 who writes that one only violates ribbit Biblically if it was specified at the time of the initial loan would think this is only rabbinic ribbit. See Bet Yosef 166:3 that perhaps Rashi holds it is Biblical.
  93. Tur 160:6, Bet Yosef citing Rosh, Hagot Mordechai 433, Smak 260, and Rashi 73b s.v. achulei, Rama 160:6. Smag cited by Tur 160:6 makes a compromise to allow it if it is a small gift.
  94. Rambam Malveh Uloveh 5:11, Shulchan Aruch 160:6
  95. Laws of Ribbis p. 87 is lenient.
  96. Shach 160:10, Taz 160:3, Chelkat Binyamin 160:45
  97. Chavot Daat 160:3 writes that even if one intends to give a gift in order to get a loan it is permitted as long as one doesn’t specify that it is for the loan. Pitchei Teshuva 160:7 cites this.
  98. The Laws of Ribbis p. 87
  99. Tosfot 64b s.v. achal, Sefer Hatrumot 2:46:3:11, Rambam Malveh Uloveh 5:12, Bet Yosef 161:4
  100. Laws of Ribbis p. 90
  101. Rambam Malveh Vloveh 5:12, Shulchan Aruch 160:10. See Chavot Daat 160 who writes that according to the Rashba responsa 799 it should be permitted to teach him Torah since the lender didn't gain any financial gain. Nonetheless, Chavot Daat explains that we follow the Rambam who holds that any expenditure of money or time of the borrower for the sake of the lender is forbidden.
  102. Gemara Bava Metsia 75b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 160:11
  103. Chelkat Binyamin 160:95
  104. Rabbenu Yerucham Meisharim 8:1, Meyuchas LRitva Bava Metsia 68b s.v. visura, Radvaz 3:1060, Chelket Binyamin 160:95 citing Ran Ketubot 46a, Sefer Hatrumot 3:13
  105. Chelkat Binyamin 160:108 presents reasons to be lenient since thanking someone for a loan is merely a sign of derech eretz and not in exchange for the loan. See there at length. Additionally, he cites Minchat Shlomo 1:27:1 and 2:68 based on Graz is strict.
  106. Igrot Moshe YD 1:80. There he permits writing that Hashem should bless the person since that is a mitzvah to publicize someone who does a mitzvah.
  107. Mishna Bava Metsia 75b, Shulchan Aruch 160:12
  108. Taz 160:5 in explaining the Rambam, Chelkat Binyamin 160:111. Rav Meir Akoka in Bnetivot Hahorah 10:24 p. 150 proves from the S"A 172:4, S"A 160:23, and Mabit 1:6 unlike the Taz. He applies the Taz to many examples including: lending money on condition that he stops smoking, he puts conditions on how he can spend the money properly, for a certain apartment, how the loan is repaid with check or cash.
  109. Chelkat Binyamin 160:112
  110. Chelkat Binyamin 160::249
  111. Shulchan Aruch YD 160:23. Taz 160:22 disagrees that it is certainly forbidden for a borrower to give trumah to a kohen lender since the lender is gaining but doing business with someone isn’t considered a gain since he is paying for a service. Nekudat Hakesef 160:23 writes that if the lender didn’t have a lot of business and this agreement gets him more business it is forbidden. Chelkat Binyamin 160:248 is strict for Shulchan Aruch certainly in a case of hiring a worker.
  112. Shulchan Aruch 160:23
  113. Chelkat Binyamin 246 writes that the Gra 167:1 compares it to S"A YD 160:23. Chelkat Binyamin writes that according to the second answer of the Shach it is permitted but we shouldn't follow that answer alone.
  114. Rama 160:23
  115. Chelkat Binyamin 160:253
  116. Chelkat Binyamin 160:254
  117. Rabbenu Yerucham 1:8 cited by Bet Yosef 160:15 and codified by Shulchan Aruch 160:15.
    • The Gra 160:31 explains that based on the principle of arev and eved kenani it is considered as though the money was given from that third party to the lender since it was given on his say so. Furthermore, since that gift was given by the agency of the borrower it is like he gave the gift to the lender.
    • Taz 160:20 explains that it is forbidden since the lender has pleasure over the fact that people follow his instructions. Shach 160:8 seems to agree.
  118. Laws of Ribbis p. 88 citing Avnei Nezer CM 26, Brit Yehuda 5:35, Minchat Yitzchak 6:161, 9:88
  119. Pitchei Teshuva 160:5 writes that the Teshuva Mahava 1:54-58 has a series of teshuvot about whether it is forbidden to give a gift in order to get back a greater gift broken up over time. Originally he held it was only rabbinic ribbit but finally concluded it was ribbit. Sheilat Yavetz also writes that such a setup is ribbit. However, the Knesset Hagedola holds that it is permitted.
  120. Gemara Bava Metsia 69b
  121. Rosh b”m 5:47 holds that it is necessary to have 3 conditions in order for someone to give a gift to a lender. 1) the giver isn’t reimbursed by the borrower, 2) the borrower can’t tell the lender that he should lend him because of that gift, and 3) the borrower can’t initiate to have someone give a gift to the lender. The Ramban b”m 69b s.v. shari disagrees with condition 3 since ultimately the money isn’t given from the borrower it is permitted. Additionally, it is clear that the Ramban forbade asking an agent to give a gift for him. Ritva 69b s.v. amar accepts the Ramban that it is permitted to convince the giver to give the gift and he even allows the borrower to reimburse the giver since the giver gave it on his own. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 160:13 accepts the Ramban but still insists that the first two conditions are necessary. Pitchei Teshuva 160:9 quotes the Mishna Lmelech Malveh 5:14 and Shaar Hamelech who think that according to the Ramban the second condition isn’t necessary. Chelkat Binyamin 160:128 quotes a dispute about this point and is lenient only in an extenuating circumstance as Shulchan Aruch implies that this second condition is absolutely necessary.
  122. The Rosh Bava Metsia 5:47 held it is forbidden for someone to ask someone to give a gift to someone in order that they lend for them since doing so makes the giver into an agent of the borrower. However, the Ramban 69b s.v. shari disagrees. Since the borrower isn’t paying for this gift and the money is coming from a third party it is considered as though the money wasn’t given from the borrower to the lender and is permitted. Rashba 69b s.v. ha writes that the Raavad held like the Rosh and the Ramban argued. Shulchan Aruch 160:13 follows the Ramban but cites the Rosh as an individual opinion.
  123. Shulchan Aruch 160:13 follows the Ramban as he does he writes in the Bet Yosef that since it is only rabbinic one can be lenient. Shach 160:18 cites this. Chelkat Binyamin 160:126 agrees. See however Pitchei Teshuva 160:9 who cites the Gedulei Trumah that this dispute is about a Biblical question.
  124. Taz 160:7
  125. Pitchei Teshuva 160:10 citing the Chavot Yair 190
  126. Tosfot Bava Metsia 71b s.v. maso writes that it is obviously forbidden to have the borrower pay someone else for the loan since that is like he paid the original lender based on the principle of arev. An arev is a guarantor who is indebted because money was paid to someone else based on his word, similarly, the interest is being paid to the third party based on the agreement of the lender. This is true even if the third party isn’t Jewish. Bet Yosef 160:14 cites the Haghot Ashri 5:47, Rabbenu Yerucham 1:8 27b, Mordechai b”m 327-328, Ran responsa 29:7 who agree.
  127. Mordechai b”m 327-328 clarifies that since giving the interest to a third party is Biblical interest it must be returned by the lender. This is cited by the Shach 160:19. Even though the Pitchei Teshuva 160:11 quotes that Rabbi Akiva Eiger wasn’t sure about this, Chelkat Binyamin p. 78 clarifies that it was only the questioner to Rabbi Eiger who wasn’t sure but Rabbi Eiger certainly would accept the Shach.
  128. Rama 160:14
  129. Gemara Bava Metsia 69b, Shulchan Aruch 308:16
  130. Shulchan Aruch 308:16. Taz 160:10 adds that a child even if they’re not financially dependant on the father it is forbidden to pay them since it is like paying the lender themselves. Shach 160:21 agrees. Pitchei Teshuva 160:12 cites the Lechem Rav who says that paying a husband to encourage his wife to lend him is forbidden since they are financially connected.
  131. Rama 160:16 writes that it is forbidden for the recipient of the money to give it to the lender since it is like a scheme of how to pay interest.
  132. Taz 160:6
  133. Radvaz 3:1060, Chavot Daat 160:5. Radvaz points out that this is different that the laws of someone who one took a neder not to benefit since paying their loans isn't a benefit.
  134. Gemara Bava Metsia 70a concludes that it is only permitted to lend money of orphans as interest if the interest is only rabbinic but not if it is Biblical. This is accepted by the poskim and Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 160:18.
  135. Although it was clear from the Bavli Bava Metsia 70a it is forbidden to lend money of orphans with Biblical interest, the Maharil responsa 73 cites a practice to do so and justifies it based on the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 7. However, the Maharil concludes that the practice is completely invalid and should not be followed. The Rama 160:18 cites the maharil that this practice was completely rejected. Shach 160:27 adds that there’s no such practice any more as it was wrong. See Yabia Omer YD 5:13 who cites many rishonim who did explain that the yerushalmi held it was permitted.
  136. Even though the Shach 160:19 writes that the practice was not to lend orphan’s money with any interest even rabbinic interest, the Nodeh Byehuda YD 40 writes that the practice is completely justified based on the majority of rishonim and Shulchan Aruch. He testified that he did so personally. Pitchei Teshuva 160:20 cites the Nodeh Beyehuda. Chelkat Binyamin 160:200 agreed.
  137. Pitchei Teshuva 160:23 citign Mishna Lemelech
  138. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 160:19. The Rashba responsa 2:174 writes that if the orphan’s money was lent with Biblical interest it must be returned like any case of interest. However, the Maharil responsa 37 tries very hard to allow the orphans to keep it. The Maharam prague edition 969 has another justification.
  139. The Bet Yosef 160:19 writes that even according to the Mordechai 332 and Maharam’s leniency that we view the loan with interest as though it was an investment (iska) that is permitted it is at most viewed as an iska transaction. Therefore, since in an iska half of the profits go to the investor the orphans only deserve have of the profits made up to the amount of the percent that they demanded. However, the Mahara Sason 162 argues that the lender has to pay all of his profits to the orphans and not just half. The Shach 160:32, Chachmat Adam 130:10, and Chelkat Binyamin 160:215 cite this dispute and do not offer any resolution.
  140. Shulchan Aruch 160:18. The Rosh, Tur, Rabbenu Yerucham, and Rashba apply the leniency of lending orphan’s money with rabbinic interest to other cases of mitzvah such as talmud torah. The Shulchan Aruch codifies this opinion.
  141. Pitchei Teshuva 160:22 citing the Bear Yakov, Yalkut Yosef 253:4
  142. Chelkat Binyamin 160:195 based on Mishna Lmelech
  143. Chelkat Binyamin 160:196 quotes the Bet Yosef within the Rashba says that lending charity with rabbinic interest is only permitted if the money isn’t yet designated for one poor person. However, the achronim hold that it is permitted as long is it is designated for the poor and even an individual.
  144. Mishna Brurah (Shaar Hatziyun 242:15)
  145. Chazon Ovadia Shabbat v. 1 p. 9 writes that it is permitted to lend money with rabbinic interest in order to spend it for a Shabbat meal or seudat mitzvah. This is based on the Magen Avraham 242:2 who says that it is permitted to lend with interest in order to spend for a Shabbat meal.
    • Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 8;2 establishes that it is permitted to lend with interest in order to have money for a meal of a mitzvah such to establish the kiddush hachodesh. Shibolei Haleket 55 applies this also to Shabbat meals. What type of interest is permitted for a mitzvah? Or Zaruah Tzedaka 30 explains that even Biblical interest is permitted to further a mitzvah. Mordechai b”m 287 cites Rabbenu Shmuel who agrees. This opinion is cited in the Aguda b”m 4:73, Maharil 37, and Hagahot Maimoniyot (kushta edition, malveh 4). Mahara Ben Tauba cited in Tashbetz 34 agreed. However, this opinion is rejected by the overwhelming majority of poskim as is evidenced by Bet Yosef 160:18.
    • Maharam (krimnoa edition 109) holds that it is forbidden to lend money for charity with Biblical interest but it is permitted to lend them with rabbinic interest. This is also the opinion of the Rosh responsa 18:8, Rashba responsa 4:232, Shulchan Aruch 160:18, and Gra 160:43. Radvaz 6:2306 writes that everyone holds that rabbinic interest is permitted for charity.
    • Magen Avraham 242:2 cites the Shibolei Haleket that it is permitted to lend with interest for a Shabbat meal. The Netiv Chaim explains that this means borrowing with interest from a non-Jew. However, Rav Ovadia (Chazon Ovadia Shabbat v. 1 p. 7) argues that there is no prohibition to borrow from a non-Jews with interest (Rambam Malveh 5:2). Shulchan Aruch Harav 242:9, Rav Shlomo Kluger in Chachmat Shlomo 242, Kinyan Torah 7:20, Bear Yakov 242 cited by Pitchei Teshuva 160:22, and Chazon Ovadia all hold that it is permitted to lend with rabbinic interest in order to get money for the meals of Shabbat. Shevet Halevi 2:64:1, 8:189 seems also to support this opinion.
  146. Shulchan Aruch 160:20
    • Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 160:22 writes that it is permitted to borrow with interest in order to save someone’s life. Taz 160:21 is bothered what is the point since it is obvious that it is permitted to violate any sin (besides idolatry, illicit relations, and murder). Bet Lechem Yehuda writes that it is permitted to borrow with interest from a Jew even if a non-Jew is available but it’ll take longer and in order to save time one can borrow from the Jew if it is quicker and could impact saving the person.
    • Why does pikuach nefesh allow violating lifnei iver? Shulchan Aruch O.C. 306:14 rules that in order to protect someone from getting involved with a great sin it is permitted to sin a small sin, even if that involves violating Shabbat. If so we see that it is like pikuach nefesh to save someone from spiritual destruction. Why then is it permitted to cause someone sin in order to save someone else?
    • Tosfot Shabbat 4a s.v. vchi writes that the principle that one could save someone else from sinning by sinning oneself doesn’t apply if they entered the situation by negligence. This is codified by the poskim such as Magen Avraham 306:28 and Mishna Brurah 306:56. Rabbi Baruch Pesach Mendelson (Bet Yitzchak v. 39 p. 730 explained that there is no mitzvah of arvut when the person got into the situation of sin by his own negligence. Therefore, it is forbidden to save him from sin by sinning yourself.
    • Eretz Tzvi 2:20 writes that violating Shabbat to save someone from a violation of Shabbat isn't pikuach nefesh. Otherwise the gemara Shabbat 4a wouldn't have had a safek about this. Also, Tosfot 4a says that we wouldn't violate Shabbat if he was negligent but if it really was pikuach nefesh we would violate Shabbat even if he was negligent to become sick.
  147. Taz 160:21 writes that it is obvious that the lender with interest is doing wrong and really he has an obligation to spend in order to save the person.
  148. Yalkut Yosef Sova Semachot v. 1 p. 517 writes that it is permitted to take an interest loan from the Israeli banks. Here are his reasons:
    • The Israeli banks were set up with a heter iska klali. Even so it is preferable to say that it is done according to the heter iska. Tzemech Tzedek YD 88 writes that you should write the contract uses a heter iska and not just say it otherwise it is a haarama. Simchat Cohen 7:96 and Yalkut Yosef describe how Rav Shmuel Salant set up the Israeli banks with a heter iska. To rely on the heter iska the person taking the loan should have to use it for business and not for debt or needs. Graz Ribbit n. 42 writes that a loan with a heter iska that is spent for something other than a business is prohibited. Har Hakarmel 25 agrees. Shoel Umeishiv 3:160 allows using the loan for something else since as a result of the loan one is able to make money with another business. Maharsham 2:216 agreed. Imrei Yosher 1:108 argued with the Shoel Umeishiv based on Teshuvot Maimon in Bet Yosef 177. Teshurat Shay 88 agrees. Maharshag YD 1:5 argued that a heter iska klali is ineffective unless you state it specifically.
    • the corporation of the bank has a limited liability for individual owners and as such there's no loan between two people but between a corporation and an individual. Rashba responsa 1:669 entertained the idea that there's no ribbit with money designated for charity that doesn't belong to any individual. Maharit 45, Har Tzvi YD 126, Tzafnat Pane'ach 184, Bet Avi 3:129:6, Maharia Halevi 2:54, and Cheshev Haefod 53 are lenient. are also lenient. See Minchat Shlomo 1:28, Minchat Yitzchak 3:1:2-3, Chelkat Yakov 3:160, and Chayei Halevi 2:54. Igrot Moshe 2:62 writes that there's no ribbit for a corporation to pay interest like in a savings bank but there is when discussing an individual paying a corporation.
    • According to Rashi (cited by Rama 160:16) that there’s no prohibition of ribbit when done through a shaliach perhaps that can permit using a bank loan since the teller is merely an agent of the bank.
  149. dinonline.org points out that even Rav Moshe’s leniency of corporations wouldn’t apply since there is usually a personal guarantee or COJ attached to the contract. Therefore without a heter iska it is forbidden to be a broker for these transactions.